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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

BRENDA F. ELLINGSWORTH,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 970456-CA

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction of workers' compensation
insurance fraud, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-109 (1994).1
This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal per Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion to suppress defendant's
medical records and all evidence derived from those records on the basis that the
Workers' Compensation Fund is not a state agency for Fourth Amendment purposes?

*A11 of former Title 35 has been renumbered or repealed, and its provisions are
now found in Titles 34 and 35A. See Title 35 (1997), compiler's notes. A copy of
former Title 35 and is attached in Add. A. All citations in this brief to the Utah Code,
unless otherwise noted, will be to the law in effect at the time of trial in 1995.

Standard of Review: When reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress
evidence, the appellate court reviews the lower court's findings of fact for clear error and
its legal conclusions for correction of error. State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah App.
1993); State v. Higgins. 837 P.2d 9, 11 (Utah App. 1992).
2. Did the trial court commit reversible error in permitting the prosecutor to ask
defendant about the veracity of two State's witnesses where defendant's responses
explained the discrepancies between her own testimony and that of both witnesses
without labeling anyone a liar, and the remaining evidence of guilt was strong?
Standard of Review: Defendant failed to object to some of the challenged questioning.
Therefore, she must establish plain error as to the unpreserved claim, requiring that any
error be both obvious and harmful. State v. Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 634 (Utah App.
1997). Reversal is warranted on the preserved claim involving Dr. Seeman "'only if the
likelihood of a different outcome is sufficiently high that it undermines our confidence in
the verdict.'" State v. Piansiaksone 954 P.2d 861, 871 (Utah 1998) (quoting State v.
Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1227 (Utah 1997)).
Reversal is not warranted as to the remaining questions unless "'the likelihood of a
different outcome is sufficiently high that it undermines our confidence in the verdict.'"
Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d at 871 (quoting Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1227).
3. Did the trial court commit plain error in failing to recognize and act on three
instances in which the prosecutor allegedly misstated the evidence where, in any event,
2

the remaining evidence of guilt minimized any possible prejudice arising from the
statements? Standard of Review: Because defendant failed to object below to any of
the challenged instances, he must establish plain error to prevail on his claim. That
standard is set forth at point 2, supra.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
The text of constitutional, statutory, or rule provisions pertinent to resolution of the
issues involved herein is attached in addendum A, including Utah Code Ann. sections:
31A-1-105 (1994)
31A-22-1001 (1994)

31A-31-105 (1994)
34A-2-101 to -112 (1997)

31A-28-201 to-221 (1994)

35-1-1 to-109 (1994)

35-3-3 (1988)
35-3-1 to -18 (1994)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one count of workers' compensation insurance fraud,
a third degree felony (R.89-92).2 Following resolution of several pre-trial evidentiary
motions (R.109-16, 121-2), a jury convicted defendant as charged (R.123-9, 193). The
court sentenced her to serve zero-to-five years in the Utah State Prison, stayed imposition
of the sentence, and placed her on thirty-six months' probation (R. 196-7).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Events of October 12, 1994: Around September 29, 1994, defendant Brenda
Eliingsworth began work at Blynco Manufacturing Company, whose business involved
2

This charge is in the second amended information, replacing two earlier
informations charging various degrees of insurance fraud (R.3-10, 75-79).
3

making window coverings (R.213/139-42). Defendant was responsible for putting the
slats in a pre-made cord form hanging from a rack in front of her and for ensuring that
each blind worked properly (R.213/139-41; 215/536). Two weeks later, on October 12,
defendant allegedly injured her upper back and right shoulder when a pulley jammed as
she pulled a cord to adjust the height of a blind she was finishing (R. 213/152, 157, 166,
146, 171-2; 214/ 447; 215/536-7). She reported to her supervisor, Debbie Cleverly, who
had her rest, then sent her to St. Mark's Hospital when defendant complained of "really
bad" pain (R.213/146; 215/537-9). She never returned to work (R.213/146, 153).
Cleverly found that no one had seen the alleged incident happen (R.213/150, 1601). She reported the claim to Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah (WCF), Blynco's
insurance company, then wrote a letter to submit with the claim, explaining why she had
doubts about the claim's validity (R.213/146-52). Her letter explained that no one
working near defendant saw or heard anything when the alleged accident occurred, and
that defendant's attendance and attitude in her short time with the company strongly
suggested that she "didn't want the position" and she was "looking for a way out" (R.
213/150-1). Neither Cleverly—with ten years of experience at Blynco-nor Sharon
Rowley—a 4.5 year veteran with the company and the worker directly behind defendant
when the injury occurred (R.213/171-2, 176)-could understand how the injury could
have happened (R.213/139, 170-2,176, 181). Rowley could not remember hearing of any
similar injury ever occurring at Blynco (R.213/175-6).
4

Rebecca Dickinson treated defendant at St. Mark's on October 12 (R.215/467-8,
484). For the shoulder and upper back pain defendant complained of, Dickinson
suggested Tylenol, rest, and returning to work on light duty the next day (R.215/469-70).
Dickinson gave defendant four narcotics pills at defendant's request (R.215/485).3 Before
she left, defendant was given Dr. Michael Borne's name and address in case she needed
follow-up care, and the hospital set up an appointment (R.214/246; 215/476, 566-7).
Events of October 14. 1994: On October 14, 1994, defendant was physically
assaulted by her ex-husband (R.213/190-2). She told the responding officer and the
ambulance crew that he struck her several times in the face and head (R.213/192-3, 1967, 213-14). To the ambulance crew, she complained of "pain in [her] upper [&] lower
back, neck, shoulder" and face (R.213/213-4). When asked about her medical history, she
mentioned only ulcers and the Blynco injury (R.213/216).
Dr. Steven Minnaugh treated defendant at St. Mark's Hospital after the assault (R.
214/248-9). Defendant told him that she had been punched "several times," had been
thrown against a wall and was suffering, among other things, neck and upper back pain
(R.214/254-5). She did not mention the Blynco injury (R.214/269). Although
defendant's back looked uninjured and x-rays were normal, Minnaugh prescribed
narcotics for pain at defendant's request, including Stadal and Lortab (R.214/255-7, 260,

3

The evidence suggested that part of the motive behind the fraud was defendant's
desire for narcotics (R. 214/260,284-85,330-32, 345, 358-60,417,419; 215/485).
5

263-4, 268). The doctor did not obtain her earlier records from St. Mark's because he did
not know about them (R.214/269). Defendant never returned to this doctor (R.214/260).
Events of October 17. 1994: On October 17, defendant visited Dr. Eugene Seeman
complaining of right shoulder and upper back pain from the Blynco incident (R.214/273,
281-2, 290). During the entire course of her lengthy treatment by Dr. Seeman, she failed
to mention the domestic assault or her resultant medical treatment (R.214/282, 305). Dr.
Seeman never got any records from St. Mark's, but treated defendant based on her
incomplete account of her medical history (R. 214/281, 291-2). Defendant saw Dr.
Seeman one or two times a week through November 1995, and the doctor submitted his
bills to WCF (R.214/284, 288, 290; 215/549, 570). Her complaints expanded to include
severe headaches, of which she admitted she has a history (R.214/285, 293, 298-9). Dr.
Seeman prescribed several narcotics, sending the bills to WCF (R.214/284-5). He also
recommended that she not return to work (R.214/299).
Workers' Compensation Involvement: Paola Valente was the adjustor for
defendant's workers' compensation claim (R.214/232-3). Her duties included ensuring
that claims were compensable, monitoring that appropriate medication and treatment
were received and when or if claimants would return to work, and helping to manage all
treatment (R.214/233, 238-9, 241, 343). Paola spoke with defendant on October 17 and
asked her about her medical treatment and her medical history (R.214/237-8, 240-1).
Defendant claimed to have had no previous injuries and did not mention the domestic
6

abuse (R.214/240). Defendant explained that she had an appointment with Dr. Michael
Borne later that day (R.214/246; 215/567, 593). Paola told defendant to call afterward to
describe Dr. Borne's recommendations (R.214/245-7).
When defendant failed to call back, Paola called Dr. Borne and discovered that
defendant had not shown up for her appointment (R.214/247). Paola also discovered that
defendant had neither returned to work since the incident nor submitted the required
doctor's release (R.214/247-8, 329). The same day, Paola got a call from Dr. Seeman's
office seeking authorization for treating defendant (R.214/329-30).
Over the next three days, Paola received numerous requests for authorization to fill
various prescriptions (R.214/330-2, 358-9). She granted some requests and refused a
number of others, including requests for prescriptions of Stadol, Loritab, Hydrocodone,
and "several" others (R.214/359-60). Refusals were based, in part, on the fact that
prescriptions were written by doctors other than the treating physician, Dr. Seeman, and
WCF had no information from Dr. Seeman about the necessity of some of the drugs (R.
214/358).
Two such requests ultimately convinced Paola that defendant's claim warranted
further investigation (R.214/332-3, 345). On October 21, 1994, a pharmacy called for
authorization to fill a Stadol prescription (R.214/330-2). The following day, another
pharmacy called for authorization to fill another Stadol prescription (R.214/332, 358).
Aside from the fact that the prescriptions were from two different doctors, Paola also
7

noticed that the drug was a "rather strong medication" not normally prescribed for similar
injuries (R.214/345).
Paola had Dr. Jeffery Chung do an independent medical examination of defendant
on January 11, 1995 (R.214/345-7, 446-7). When he asked defendant about injuries prior
and subsequent to the Blynco incident, she mentioned only prior injuries unrelated to her
back (e.g., knee surgery, stomach ulcers) and denied any subsequent injuries (R.214/4478, 455-7). Based on her answers, the written report from her October 12 visit to St.
Mark's Hospital, reports from Dr. Seeman, and his examination of defendant, Dr. Chung
determined that defendant was taking too many narcotics and analgesics (R.214/448-9,
456-7). Because he found no reason to doubt that the Blynco incident was the only
possible source of the pain, Dr. Chung prescribed a work-hardening program for
defendant (R.214/347-8, 449-50, 460-1).4
Defendant also met with Paola on January 11 (R.214/333, 336, 346-7). She denied
receiving any of the written forms to release her medical records which Paola had
repeatedly mailed to her (R.214/333, 371), so Paola provided her with two new forms
during her visit: one released her medical records (R.214/334-35), and the second asked
4

A work-hardening program is an "intense personalized treatment program" that
runs eight hours a day, five days a week (R.214/389). It reacquaints a person who has
been off work with an eight-hour work day, includes "concentrated physical therapy" to
improve various injuries, and can show if an injury is as bad as is claimed (R.214/347-8,
389-90, 449-50, 460-1). Defendant's failure to follow through on this program resulted in
termination of her medical benefits, in part (R.214/348, 382-3). Her monetary benefits,
however, continued until Dr. Chung filed his second report (R.214/348).
8

defendant to list all the physicians, hospitals and clinics she had visited in the previous ten
years (R.214/336-7). In response, defendant listed four doctors and St. Mark's Hospital
(R.214/336-7). Defendant said these were all she could recall and refused Paola's
suggestion that she take the list home to check her records and ensure that the list was
complete (R.213/27-8; 214/337, 373-4).
Because of defendant's equivocal answer (R.214/374) and WCF's practice of
sending record requests to all hospitals and clinics with which all listed doctors are
associated, Paola sent her request to the hospital and doctors on defendant's list as well as
to twenty more area hospitals and clinics (R.214/337-9, 374). The response was "several
hundred medical records from the various places," including "several emergency room
i

reports" from 1994, many of which contradicted defendant's claim that she had suffered
no previous back or shoulder injury (R.214/339, 351-2). Paola received records from
Cottonwood and Holy Cross Hospitals concerning visits for claimed back injuries, and
from other hospitals for injuries unrelated to the back (R.214/337, 375-6). Between
March 1976 and October 19, 1994, defendant had been admitted to St. Mark's eighty
times, of which seventy-four were to the emergency room (R.214/407). The medical
visits during the calendar year in which the Blynco incident allegedly occurred include:
I
1/30/94: Cottonwood Hospital emergency room; claim was upper back injury
and severe headaches from moving furniture a day or two earlier (R.214/412-5,
420); treatment was a shot of Demurral and Phenergan, a prescription for a muscle
relaxant, and a prescription for a narcotic pain medicine (R.214/417);

9

2/11/94: Cottonwood Hospital emergency room; same back problem and
headaches which "flared up" due to something defendant had done (R.214/415-9,
420); treatment was a prescription for Thyroidal and an injection of Phenergan
(R.214/419);
3/16/94: Holy Cross Hospital emergency room; claim was headaches and upper
back problems after moving furniture (R.214/421-3); treatment was a muscle
relaxant; doctor believed narcotics were inappropriate (R. 214/423, 425-7);
5/18/94: Holy Cross Hospital; claim was upper back, neck and shoulder pain (R.
214/429-33); treatment was a muscle relaxant and an anti-inflammatory
(R.214/433);
10/12/94: St. Mark's Hospital emergency room; claim of upper back and right
shoulder pain from Blynco incident (R. 215/467-70, 484); treatment was four
narcotics pills at defendant's request (R. 215/485);
10/14/94: St. Mark's Hospital emergency room; claim of upper back and neck
injuries, among others, from assault (R. 214/248-9, 351); treatment was Stadal and
Lortab, both narcotics (R. 214/260).
Paola forwarded copies of the medical records to Dr. Chung and requested an
addendum to his original report (R.214/346, 352). In the addendum, Dr. Chung noted
"quite a few" reports of injuries of which he had no previous knowledge, including the
domestic assault (R.214/451-2). Based on the new information, he decided that any pain
defendant was suffering was unrelated to the alleged Blynco incident (R.214/452-3, 463).
Paola also sent the records to WCF's investigations department (R.215/486-8).
After reviewing the records, investigator Brett Mann met with defendant on February 27,
1995 (R.215/489-90). Mann was aware that the records showed that defendant had an
"extensive history" of back problems (R.215/493-4) and asked defendant more than ten
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times whether she had any shoulder or back injury prior to the Blynco incident
(R.215/491-3, 510). Defendant repeatedly denied any such injury (R.215/492, 499-500,
510). Mann asked at least twice whether defendant had been injured "in any way, shape
or form" after the Blynco incident, to which defendant responded, "no" (R.215/493, 496,
510, 512, 523). Defendant also denied having been in the hospital "in the last couple of
years" exclusive of the Blynco incident (R.215/496, 510, 512, 523). Once Mann
suggested he knew about injuries occurring after Blynco, defendant admitted the assault
and that she had been hospitalized five or six times in the last year (R.215/497-8, 512-3).
Mann spoke with defendant again by phone on March 3, 1995 (R.215/500-1), at
which time defendant claimed that any prior back problems she had involved the lower
back instead of the upper back, and that she saw Dr. Seeman before the assault instead of
after (R.215/502-5). Mann thereafter gave the information to the Utah Attorney
General's Office for criminal investigation (R.215/522).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Point I: WCF is not a state actor and is therefore not subject to the search and
seizure restrictions of the Fourth Amendment. There is no definitive test for this issue,
but significant guidance can be found in case law dealing with whether an entity is an
"arm of the state" under the Eleventh Amendment. Such a review looks at all aspects of
the entity's power and relationship to the state. A similar review of WCF, its history and
its operation under these cases establishes that WCF is essentially a private insurer, and
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its operation and solvency should not be jeopardized by unrealistically characterizing it as
a state agency for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
In the event WCF is deemed to be a state agency, reversal would not be warranted
because WCF's act of obtaining and reviewing defendant's medical records in connection
with her claim for benefits does not amount to a search and seizure within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment. Alternatively, WCF's act of providing the records to law
enforcement for criminal investigation was reasonably within the scope of the consent
granted by defendant. Defendant had received previous written warnings that workers'
compensation fraud was a crime under Utah law, knew that she was required to prove that
her injury was work-related before receiving benefits, and reasonably knew that an
evaluation of her eligibility would include a review for fraudulent conduct. Further,
defendant's interpretation contravenes strong public policy which encourages the
reporting of criminal activity.
Point II: It was inappropriate for the prosecutor to ask defendant if other witnesses
were lying. However, reversal is not warranted because no prejudice resulted. The
questions were brief and isolated, and defendant's responses avoided labeling anyone a
"liar," thereby diffusing any prejudice which might otherwise have resulted. Further, the
remaining evidence, much of which was corroborated, makes it highly unlikely that the
questions affected the outcome of the proceedings.
Point III: None of the three instances in which defendant claims the prosecutor
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misstated the evidence constitute plain error because, even if they were erroneous, the
errors were neither obvious nor prejudicial. First, whether defendant told the officer
investigating the assault about the resulting upper back pain had little, if any, impact on
whether defendant ever complained of such pain and ascribed it to the assault (established
by two other witnesses) and whether she thereafter sought to hide that fact from other
physicians or workers' compensation employees (established by numerous witnesses).
Second, the prosecutor's challenged cross-examination of defendant sought only to
clarify a misunderstanding arising from defendant's direct testimony. Even assuming the
questioning was error, it was not obvious, and it merely established what defendant had
already said: that she gave Paola Valente the information she requested without
mentioning the domestic assault.
Third, the prosecutor's closing argument about defendant's repeated denials of
hospitalization is fully in accord with the evidence. Even assuming error, the remarks did
not prejudice the proceedings when taken in context. The denial of hospitalization was
"part of the pattern" of conduct used by defendant to defraud WCF. The remainder of the
prosecutor's remarks correctly presented an appropriate, factually-supported,
unchallenged explanation of the overall, "ongoing" pattern (R.215/613), including
numerous other acts, omissions, and evidence which support the determination of an
intentional scheme to defraud (R.215/613-21). Consequently, reversal is not warranted.
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ARGUMENTS
POINT I
WCF IS NOT A STATE ACTOR FOR FOURTH AMENDMENT PURPOSES
BECAUSE STATE LAW VIEWS IT AS A PRIVATE INSURER, IT IS FREE FROM
STATE CONTROL, IT OPERATES IN THE SAME MANNER AND UNDER THE
SAME LEGAL RESTRICTIONS AS ALL PRIVATE WORKERS' COMPENSATION
INSURERS, AND IT HAS NO FINANCIAL TIES TO THE STATE
A.

WCF Is Not A State Actor For Fourth Amendment Purposes
1. Introduction:
Defendant argues that use of her medical records to facilitate a criminal fraud

prosecution violates her federal Fourth Amendment rights because obtaining the medical
records amounted to a constitutional seizure which exceeded the scope of her consent
(written release of the records) where the release form included the phrase, "This
information will be used for the sole purpose of evaluating my claim for workers
compensation benefits." Br. Apt. at 19-23. Alternatively, defendant argues that her
consent was involuntary, requiring suppression of the medical records and all derivative
information. Id. at 23-25.
As a necessary precursor, defendant contends that the Workers' Compensation
Fund is a state agency for Fourth Amendment purposes and is subject to the basic
constitutional restrictions surrounding a consensual search and seizure. Id. at 13-19.
This presents a question of first impression in this jurisdiction which, upon careful
review, should be decided against defendant.
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While no Utah cases have addressed this specific point, defendant offers six
factors she believes are determinative of the issue: 1) WCF was statutorily created; 2)
i

I

WCF boasts a board of directors appointed by the governor with the advice and consent
of the senate; 3) the directors are removable for cause by the governor; 4) WCF's officers
and employees have governmental immunity for good faith acts; 5) WCF's officers and
employees are exempt from certain statutes otherwise applicable to all governmental
agencies; and 6) WCF is a quasi-public corporation, which qualifies it as a governmental
actor for Fourth Amendment purposes in Puerto Rico. Id. at 15-17. Defendant claims
that these factors establish that "governmental action is implicated" in the existence and
continuance of WCF, thereby allegedly making WCF a state actor. Id. She sees the fact
that WCF "essentially operates" as a private insurance company as irrelevant. Id. at 17.
i

i

It is undisputed that the Fourth Amendment reaches beyond the area of law
enforcement. Michigan v. Tvler. 436 U.S. 499, 504, 98 S. Ct. 1942, 1947 (1978). It acts
in both the civil and criminal arenas to restrain "governmental action," i.e., "'activities of
sovereign authority.'" New Jersey v. T.L.O.. 469 U.S. 325, 335, 105 S. Ct. 733, 739
I
(1985) f quoting Burdeau v. McDowell 256 U.S. 465, 475, 41 S. Ct. 574, 576 (1921)). It
has been applied to public school officials, building inspectors, Occupational Safety and
Health Act inspectors, andfiremenentering privately owned premises for firefighting
purposes. See New Jersey, 469 U.S. at 335, 105 S. Ct. at 739 (citing to these cases).
However, there is no definitive test for determining whether any given entity
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outside of law enforcement is subject to the Fourth Amendment. In New Jersey v.
T.L.CL 469 U.S. 325, 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985), the United States Supreme Court provided
little analysis when it applied Fourth Amendment principles to searches of students
conducted by public school officials. Funding and regulatory ties between state and
public schools is well-known, and the Court's reference to the "statutes regulating school
disciplinary policies and establishing the authority of school officials over their students"
identifies a large part of the basis for equating the conduct of such officials to
"governmental action." 469 U.S. at 336, 105 S. Ct. at 740. These obvious and
unassailable ties do not exist in the case at hand.
In contrast to such obvious governmental ties, defendant claims that once
governmental action is implicated, the inquiry ends and the Fourth Amendment applies.
Br. Apt. at 17. She offers no authority, however, for the proposition that mere implication
of a minimal amount of governmental involvement will activate Fourth Amendment
restrictions. In fact, authority is to the contrary. Cf Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 31718, 91 S. Ct. 381, 386 (1971) (the home visitation required as part of the AFDC program
as structured by New York statutes and regulations does not fall within the Fourth
Amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures); United States v.
Cleveland. 38 F.3d 1092, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 1994) (Portland General Electric Company
search of power meter on private property, done with a police officer, was not subject to
the Fourth Amendment); Commonwealth v. Cote, 444 N.E.2d 1282, 1285 (Mass. App.
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1983) (Fourth Amendment does not apply to search by employees of public utility
employed by municipality; 'The mere fact of State regulation of a public utility does not
imply State action whenever the utility acts, in the absence of some relationship between
the State and the challenged action."); see also 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure:
A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 1.8 (a)-(h), at 216-90 (1996) (demonstrating the
difficulties in deciding how much and what kind of governmental involvement in private
or nonpolice matters will trigger Fourth Amendment protections).
With no articulated test, no law enforcement involvement, no obvious and
overwhelming tie between the State and WCF, and no case addressing the relationship
between state workers' compensation funds and the Fourth Amendment,5 this Court
^Defendant cites to a federal circuit case which purports to hold that merely
because the Puerto Rico Telephone Company is a quasi-public corporation, it is
automatically a government actor subject to the Fourth Amendment (Br. Apt. at 16).
Vega-Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 110 F.3d 174, 178 (1st Cir. 1997). However, the
court in that case offers no analysis on the point, and only one of the two cases on which
it relies includes any analysis. In Torres-Ponce v. Jimenez, 113 P.R.Dec. 58 (1982), the
Puerto Rico Supreme Court held that the Puerto Rico Telephone Company was a
"private-public corporation" which could be "considered a public or a private corporation,
for certain legal purposes, depending on the particular case." Translation at 91 (attached
in Add. B). The court held that it was a public corporation for purposes of applying to its
employees the benefits of the public personnel administration (id at 91-94) because of a
number of factors, none of which apply here:
—while the Puerto Rico Telephone Company ["Company"] was "incorporated as a
private corporation under the Delaware Corporation Law," the Telephone
Authority ["Authority"], which was "a public corporation of the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico," owned 100% of the stock in the Company (id at 87-88);
-the board of directors of the Company consisted of the entire Board of
Government of the Authority, with the Authority's executive director serving as
17

should look to the status of such fluids generally under other federal constitutional
provisions. See New Jersey. 469 U.S. at 336-37, 105 S. Ct. at 740 (in applying the Fourth
Amendment to public school officials, the United States Supreme Court noted that where
such officials were already viewed as state actors under both the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, it was unlikely that they could justifiably be found to be acting in any other
capacity under the Fourth Amendment).
Other courts have addressed similar questions relating to the Eleventh
Amendment. Lipofskv v. Steingut, 86 F.3d 15 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 117 S. Ct. 401
(1996); Austin v. State Industrial Insurance System. 939 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1991); Simon
v. State Compensation Insurance Authority, 946 P.2d 1298 (Colo. 1997), cert, denied,
118 S. Ct. 1827 (1998). This analysis involves review of numerous factors, some or all of
which are relevant to the instant inquiry. Those factors fit generally into three broad
categories: 1) how state law characterizes the entity; 2) whether the entity is autonomous
and free from the control of the state, and 3) whether a judgment against the entity would
ultimately be paid by the state. Simon, 946 P.2d at 1305. These categories include
consideration of numerous factors, including: the nature of the entity's functions, powers
and responsibilities (Austin, 939 F.2d at 678); the entity's relation to and control by other

President of the Company (kL at 88);
-the Authority had full discretion on whether to dissolve the Company (kL);
—the law provided a public purpose to operation of the Company (id at 88-89);
—the Company was exempt from taxes like other public agencies (id. at 89).
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units of government (id.); the entity's corporate status (i± at 678); the entity's ability to
sue or be sued (id); the entity's power to hold property (id); the State's authority to veto
regulations promulgated by the entity (Simon. 946 P.2d at 1305); the comingling of the
entity's funds with other state funds (Lipofsky. 86 F.3d at 17); and the financial influence
the state has over the entity (id at 16-17; Simon, 946 P.2d at 1305). The test itself
necessarily involves balancing the various factors. See Simon. 946 P.2d at 1300
(determining whether a government entity is an "arm of the state" requires "balancing the
entity's independent powers with those entirely dependent on the state."). "The greater
the state administrative and financial influence on the entity, the more likely it is that the
entity will be treated as an arm of the state." Id at 1305.
Because the balancing requires a review of a large number of factors
encompassing all aspects of the entity's power and relationship to the State, this Court
should decline defendant's invitation to ignore the function and purpose of WCF, and
properly should view the fund and its operations in their totality.
2. Trial Court Ruling:
This issue was addressed at least three times during the first day of trial: prior to
selecting a jury (R.213/20-50), again minutes later (R.213/69-73), and before opening
statements (R.213/79-84). After hearing testimony and argument, the trial court ruled in
essence that WCF is not a state agency but "essentially a private insurance company[,]"
and that the consent was knowingly and voluntarily given (R.213/50, 72-3, 83-4)
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(attached in Add. C).
3. WCF is Not a State Actor for Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure Purposes:
Assuming, arguendo, that WCF's review of defendant's medical records qualifies
as a search and seizure, the question is whether, after considering all relevant factors, it
can be said that WCF is so dependent on or involved with the State that its actions must
be seen as those of a state actor. A review of the history and development of WCF, its
connections with the State, and its responsibilities and duties establishes that WCF is not
a state actor for Fourth Amendment purposes.
a) How state law characterizes the entity: WCF, formerly known as the
State Insurance Fund, was statutorily created by the state legislature in 1917. Chez v.
Industrial Commission of Utah, 90 Utah 447, 449, 62 P.2d 549, 550 (Utah 1936).
However, in the last ten years, the legislature has moved toward privatizing WCF and
removing state control. It has moved the administrative control of WCF from various
state agencies over the years to a board of directors made up of policyholders (see
subsection 3b, infra). Utah Code Ann. § 35-3-5 (1994). In 1990, it removed from the
enabling legislation language labeling WCF "an independent state agency and a body
politic and corporate[.]" Compare Utah Code Ann. § 35-3-3 (1988) and Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-3-3 (1994). This leaves WCF with the legal status at the time of trial of "a non-
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profit, self-supporting, quasi-public corporation^]"6 Utah Code Ann. § 35-3-3. As a
quasi-public corporation, WCF is not covered by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2 (1993); it does not fit within the definition of either the
"state" or its "political subdivisions" as defined in the Act. Id.
The legislature expressly immunized the State from WCF debts. Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-3-4; see also Chez. 62 P.2d at 551. The legislature also expressly exempted WCF
from certain administrative provisions generally applicable to state agencies-including
the Government Records Access and Management Act—thereby demonstrating its
position that WCF not be considered or administered as a state agency. Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-3-18. It has provided that WCF can sue and be sued in its own name, as can any
private company. Utah Code Ann. § 35-3-3(1). Finally, WCF receives no public money,
and it pays its own administrative expenses from the premiums paid by its policyholders.
Hansen v. Utah State Retirement Board. 652 P.2d 1332, 1341 (Utah 1982).
The Utah Supreme Court also basically views WCF as a private insurer, and has
determined that state and federal due process and equal protection guarantees apply to

6

A quasi-public corporation is a corporation which is private in ownership but has
a public purpose. WCF is private in that it is owned by its policyholders. See Chez, 62
P.2d at 550 (WCF's assets belong to contributing employers, not the State and upon
liquidation anything not needed to pay contingencies would be returned to contributing
policyholders). It's public purpose is to insure "employers against liability for the
compensation, and [to] assur[e] to the persons entitled thereto the compensation, provided
by this title." Id Since 1986, WCF has served the additional purpose of being the insurer
of the residual workers' compensation market. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-1001 (1994).
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WCF. As early as 1936, the Court held that an indebtedness to the State Insurance Fund
was not an indebtedness to the State. Chez, 62 P.2d at 549. The Court noted that the
State Insurance Fund constituted "a common fund belonging to the participating
employers. It is therefore not derived from anything owing to the state nor paid out on
behalf of any state obligation". LdL at 550.
In 1977, the Court made clear that the legislature could not appropriate funds from
the State Insurance Fund to pay safety inspectors for the Industrial Commission (which
was the administrative agency over the State Insurance Fund at the time) without
violating due process. Gronning v. Smart, 561 P.2d 690, 692 (Utah 1977). The Court
held that the money in the workers' compensation fund was not public money and that, if
the appropriation were made, "it would amount to a seizure of trust funds for State
purposes without due process of law." Id,
In 1978, the Court was faced with a 1% tax levied by the Tax Commission on the
premiums collected by the State Insurance Fund, but not levied on private insurance
companies. State Tax Commission v. Department of Finance, 576 P.2d 1297, 1298 (Utah
1978). The Court held that the tax violated equal protection because it singled out the
State Insurance Fund and imposed on it a tax not imposed on any other insurers. IdL at
1299 (imposing the tax violated the Utah Constitution "[b]ecause all companies
furnishing workmen's compensation insurance are of a single class,... a law operating
exclusively upon one member of that class is constitutionally invalid as a special law.").
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In rejecting the tax, the Court said,
The Fund has the same rights to sue and be sued and make contracts that a private
insurer has. The Fund enjoys no immunities not provided to private insurers. The
only distinguishable feature is that the Fund is administered by a State agency, the
cost therefor being paid from the premiums. This feature is not a rational basis to
treat the Fund as a distinct classification.
Id.7 The Court further held that the funds, although publicly administered, amounted to a
private trust "to be used to meet liabilities of various employers when an employee is
entitled to compensation.'9 Id at 1298; see also Hansen, 652 P.2d at 1341.
Finally, in 1982, the Court rejected a claim by the Utah Attorney General that the
State Insurance Fund was a "state officer" for whom the Attorney General had exclusive
authority to act as legal advisor. Hansen. 652 P.2d at 1334. The Court held that the Fund
was not an executive department agency, that it "operates essentially as a private
insurance company[,]" and that it "receives no public moneys and pays its own
administrative expenses from the premiums received[.]" LdL at 1340-41.
The fact that employees of WCF are invested with immunity from civil liability
when they, in good faith, report a suspicion of fraud to an authorized agency is a neutral
factor in the overall equation inasmuch as private insurers are granted the same immunity.
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-31-105(1) (1994). Legislative creation of the Workers'

7

At the time, the State Insurance Fund was administered by the Finance
Commission. State Tax Commission. 576 P.2d at 1298. However, as of 1988, state
agency administration ceased and a governing board of directors was put into place,
which remains today. Utah Code Ann. § 35-3-5 (1988).
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Compensation Act is also a neutral factor inasmuch as the Act applies to WCF and
private insurers equally. See generally Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-101, et secu (1997).
The fact that WCF is the sole workers' compensation insurer for the state (Utah Code
Ann. § 35-1-49 (1994)) simply makes the State a policyholder, like all other
policyholders. WCF does not limit its policyholders to state employees, WCF is the
insurer of choice for all other policyholders, and WCF conducts its business in the best
interest of all its policyholders. See generally, Utah Code Ann. § 35-3-5(a) and § 35-3-6.
Further, the legislature's act of exempting WCF from certain statutes otherwise applying
to all governmental agencies (Utah Code Ann. § 35-3-18) represents its attempt, early in
WCF's existence, to reinforce its intent that WCF, despite its beginnings, is not a
governmental agency and hence is not bound by the same laws governing other agencies.
WCF differs from other private insurers in that the State has granted its employees
and officers immunity from civil liability for all good faith actions performed in the
administration and management of WCF. Utah Code Ann. § 35-3-8. This grant of
immunity merely gives to WCF liability protection similar to that available to private
corporations under Utah law (see Utah Code Ann. §§. 16a-10a-840(4) and 16a-10a-841
(Supp. 1994)) and justifies the unique burden on WCF of being the insurer of last resort.
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-1001 (1994). If more were intended, the legislature could
have expressly submitted WCF to coverage by the Governmental Immunity Act.
That some immunity has been granted WCF does not warrant a determination that
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state law views WCF to be a state actor. To submit the largest workers' compensation
provider in the state to federal constitutional provisions not applicable to other private
insurers simply because it must insure those who otherwise would not have such
insurance would do a disservice to those intended to benefit from the continuation of
WCF. It would severely hinder WCF's ability to ferret out ineligible claims and thereby
manage its funds for the benefit of its policyholders and the continuation of the program,
to the ultimate detriment of policyholders who have or will have legitimate claims.
Neither does the mandate change the fact that the legislature has repeatedly demonstrated
its intent to distance WCF from state ties. Instead, it represents the best way available to
the State to provide the service to more of its populace while at the same time distancing
itself from WCF and permitting WCF to carry out the mandate in good faith as it sees fit.
Accordingly, the characterization of WCF by state law, in the aggregate, weighs
against a finding that WCF is a state actor.
b) Whether the entity is autonomous and free from the control of the State: The
WCF is autonomous and largely free from administrative, financial and operational
control by the State—much more so than public school districts and state building
inspectors to which the Fourth Amendment has been applied.8 See generally Tyler, 436

8

Whatever control the state legislature maintains over WCF through its legislative
powers is limited by state and federal due process and equal protection guarantees. See
generally. State Tax Commission. 576 P.2d at 1298-99; Gronning. 561 P.2d at 690.
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U.S. at 506 (firemen); Marshall v. Barlow's. Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312-13, 98 S. Ct. 1816,
1820 (1978) (OSHA inspectors); Camara v. Municipal Court. 387 U.S. 523, 528, 87 S.
Ct. 1727, 1730 (1967) (building inspectors). WCF is regulated, like private insurers, by
the Department of Insurance, and is subject to all provisions of the Utah Insurance Code
as well as the rules of the Labor Commission. Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-1-105 (1994). As
with other private insurers, WCF has filed articles of incorporation and by-laws and has
obtained a license from the Department of Insurance. Nothing in the relevant statutes
suggests that WCF employees are paid by the State.
Administrative control of WCF has graduated from the Industrial Commission to
the Finance Commission to the department of Administrative Services, and, as of 1988, to
an appointed board of directors made up of policyholders. State Tax Commission, 576
P.2d at 1298; Chez. 62 P.2d at 550; Utah Code Ann. § 35-3-5 (1985); see also Utah Code
Ann. §§ 35-3-1 and -5. While the governor appoints part of the board (Utah Code Ann. §
35-3-5), the members do not serve at the governor's pleasure. They must meet certain
criteria which qualifies them for administering such an insurer, they must be
policyholders, and they cannot be removed without cause. Id This situation distances
WCF from its earlier ties to the State. Further, the fact that WCF money belongs solely to
its policyholders, and the fact that the board members can be removed only for cause,
suggest that the board must administer the company in the best interests of all the
policyholders, regardless of independent state interests. For example, all directors must
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represent different policyholders, one must be the executive director of the Department of
Administrative Services, one must be the chief executive officer of the fund, at least four
must boast previous experience in investments, risk management, occupational safety,
casualty insurance, or law, and none may have a competing interest in a competing
insurance carrier. Id. These requirements ensure that the directors can efficiently and
effectively run the company, and that they are not merely random appointments by the
governor meant to stack the deck in the State's favor.
WCF maintains absolutely no financial ties with the State. Any dividend WCF
may declare based on a surplus of funds in any fiscal period goes back to the
policyholders, not to the State. Utah Code Ann. § 35-3-16. WCF receives no public
money, but is self-supporting, paying its own expenses from the premiums it receives
from its policyholders. Utah Code Ann. § 35-3-3(1); Hansen. 652 P.2d at 1339. The
funds are, in essence, trust funds for an insurance program and are unavailable for use by
the State. See subpoint 3a, supra. By contrast, where state workers' compensation funds
in other states have been found to be state actors, their funds have invariably been mixed
with state funds and made available for payment of state obligations (Lipofsky, 86 F.3d at
17), or state legislation demonstrates a clear intent that the state workers' compensation
insurer is a state actor (Austin, 939 F.2d at 678).
c) Whether a judgment against the entity would ultimately be paid by the State:
As noted above, the funds held by WCF are considered to be entirely separate from state
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funds. See Hansen, 652 P.2d at 1341: State Tax Commission. 576 P.2d at 1298;
Gronning. 561 P.2d at 691-92; Chez. 62 P.2d at 550. "The state is not liable for the
expenses, liabilities, or debts of the Workers' Compensation Fund, and may not use any
assets of the Injury Fund for any purpose." Utah Code Ann. § 35-3-4. In addition, as a
licensed insurer, WCF is required to be a member of the Property and Casualty Guaranty
Association ["Association"]. Utah Code Ann. §§ 31A-28-201, -202, and -205 (1994).
The Association handles all insolvencies and liquidations which have commenced since
July 1, 1986 (Utah Code Ann. § 31A-28-219), and provides the means by which the
obligations of an insolvent member insurer are handled in this State for the protection of
the policyowners and insureds. Utah Code Ann. §§ 31A-28-201 and -202. The necessary
operating funds come directly from the member insurers as periodic assessments. Utah
Code Ann. § 31A-28-208. The Association is not a state agency (Utah Code Ann. §§
31A-28-204 and -205), and gets none of its funding from the State. Moreover, the
Association's failure "to perform its duties or to fulfill its stated purpose" does not result
in liability on the State's part. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-28-217(2). In light of the strict
separation of funds and liabilities, as well as the statutory mechanism for coverage of
insolvencies, it is highly unlikely that the State would pay a judgment against WCF.
After reviewing the history of WCF, its development since its inception, its
functioning, and the mechanisms in place in the event of its insolvency, it becomes clear
that whatever status might have applied to WCF at its inception has graduated to the point
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that WCF is essentially a private insurer on the same basic footing as other workers'
compensation insurers in the State. WCF has attained significant independence from the
State and would not be viewed as an arm of the state under the Eleventh Amendment.
See Simon. 946 P.2d at 1305. Consequently, it should be viewed as no less independent
for Fourth Amendment purposes, and the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to
suppress should be affirmed.
R

Assuming WCF Is Viewed As A State Actor For Fourth Amendment Purposes,
Reversal Is Not Warranted As No Constitutional Violation Occurred
1. No Fourth Amendment Analysis Applies as No Search is Implicated Here:
Even if WCF is deemed a state actor, defendant's claim fails because the act of

obtaining and reviewing defendant's medical records in connection with her workers'
compensation claim does not amount to a search and seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. Defendant's election to pursue workers' compensation benefits was
wholly voluntary on her part. The review of her medical records to evaluate her claim
and eligibility for the benefits is clearly connected to the continuation of her benefits.
Defendant need not permit the review of her medical records, at which point her benefits
are likely to be terminated. While it might generate a difficult choice for a defendant, it
does not equate with a search and seizure in the criminal law context as defendant
assumes. See Wyman, 400 U.S. at 317-18, 91 S. Ct. at 386 (finding that a home visit
required by regulations for state AFDC program did not constitute a "search" in the
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traditional criminal law context of the Fourth Amendment).
2. There was No Constitutional Violation Where the Scope of Consent
Reasonably Included Reporting a Suspicion of Fraud:
Even if this Court finds that WCF is a State actor for Fourth Amendment purposes
and that the review of defendant's medical records constitutes a search, reversal is not
warranted. The trial court determined that defendant signed a "complete release" for a
"full investigation" and that the consent was voluntary (R.213/50). Because a reasonable
interpretation of the consent under the facts at hand includes WCF's release of the
medical information to law enforcement for criminal investigation, WCF did not exceed
the scope of the consent, and suppression of the evidence was not warranted.
Scope of consent under the Fourth Amendment is a matter of "objective"
reasonableness — what the "typical reasonable person would have understood by the
exchange" by which consent was granted. See Florida v. Jimeno, 111 S. Ct. 1801, 180304 (1991); accord State v. Castner. 825 P.2d 699, 705 (Utah App. 1992). "^Whether the
search remained within the boundaries of the consent is a fact to be determined from the
totality of the circumstances.'" State v. Grovier. 808 P.2d 133, 137 (Utah App. 1991)
(quoting United States v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 892 (10th Cir. 1989)).
Instead of viewing the release form in isolation, this Court must view the release in
the context of the surrounding circumstances. State v. Archuleta, 925 P.2d 1275, 1277-78
(Utah App. 1996). After initiation of the workers' compensation claim, defendant began
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receiving temporary total disability benefit checks from WCF (R.214/242-3). She
admitted below to receiving and endorsing six checks between October 31, 1994, and
January 25, 1995 (R.215/573-5). "Right next" to defendant's endorsement on the back of
each of the checks was printed the following warning:
Workers' Compensation insurance fraud is a crime punishable by Utah law. Do
not endorse or attempt to cash this check unless you are entitled to payment for the
goods, services, disability benefits or health care services represented herein.
(R.214/319; 215/575). Defendant admitted reading the warning before she signed the
checks, said that she understood it, and reiterated that she knew that fraud was a crime
punishable by law (R.215/575, 577).
On January 11, 1995, defendant executed the written release of her medical
records. That release stated: "This information will be used for the sole purpose of
evaluating my claim for workers compensation benefits." Br. Apt. at Add. A (copy of
written release). Review of the medical records and further WCF investigation raised a
suspicion of fraud which WCF properly reported to the Utah Attorney General's Office,
as all insurers are encouraged to do. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-31-105.
Under these circumstances, WCF's use of the. medical records comports with the
consent granted by defendant. When an evaluation of a claim for workers' compensation
benefits reveals information suggesting that fraud has occurred, a reasonable and natural
consequence is further investigation and, if warranted, fraud prosecution. This is clearly
true where consent is given with express notice of the actionability of fraud.
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That defendant's consent was voluntary is also apparent. WCF gave defendant a
choice: consent to a limited review of her medical records in order to maintain any
possibility of receiving more benefits, or refuse to permit the review and relinquish any
possibility of more benefits.9 While such a choice may be difficult for a defendant, it is
not unconstitutional. See Wvman. 400 U.S. at 324, 91 S. Ct. at 389 (the fact that a choice
by defendant to refuse a home visit required by the AFDC program carried the
consequence that her aid would cease does not implicate anything of constitutional
magnitude); United States v. Davis. 482 F.2d 893, 913 (9th Cir. 1973) (choice open to all
prospective airline passengers to submit to a search of their person and possessions as a
condition to boarding or to forego their flight is an acceptable choice).
Moreover, a review of factors relevant to the issue of whether consent arose from
coercion shows that no coercion occurred here. Those factors include:
1) the absence of a claim of authority to search by the officers; 2) the absence of an
exhibition of force by the officers; 3) a mere request to search; 4) cooperation by

9

The fact that disclosure of a claimant's medical history is necessary to an
evaluation of every claim submitted to any workers' compensation insurer also suggests
that defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in those records once obtained by
WCF. Not only must a claimant release the records in order to receive benefits, see Wall
v. Industrial Com'n. 857 P.2d 964, 967 (Utah App. 1993) (placing on the claimant the
burden of establishing that claimed injuries are work-related); Utah Code Ann. §35-197(8)-(10), but society arguably is unwilling to recognize as reasonable anything more
than a reduced expectation of privacy in such records where disclosure is made necessary
through a claimant's affirmative choice to seek monetary benefits relating to a medical
problem. Compare Couch v. United States. 409 U.S. 322, 93 S. Ct. 611 (1973) with State
v. Thompson. 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991).
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the owner of the vehicle; and 5) the absence of deception or trick on the part of the
officer.
State v. Whittenback. 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980). Applied to this case, those factors
show none of the coercion claimed by defendant. First, there was no claim of authority to
search—defendant was simply given the permissible choice of releasing her records or
surrendering her benefits. Second, there was no exhibition of force by WCF. Third,
WCF proffered a mere request to obtain the records, leaving the choice to defendant.
Fourth, both defendant and Paola noted defendant's cooperation with WCF throughout
their dealings. Finally, there was no deception or trick by WCF to obtain the release.
Paola testified that her sole purpose in obtaining the release and the records was to
determine defendant's eligibility for benefits, as was represented to defendant (R.
214/335, 372-3). Any determination to seek criminal prosecution in this case arose later
and does not adversely reflect on the propriety of WCF's actions in obtaining the release.
Under the totality of the circumstances, and in the absence of any evidence of
coercion, WCF's release of the medical records to the State to pursue the evidence of
fraud therein should be deemed to be within the scope of defendant's consent.
3. Public Policy Supports WCF's Reporting of Fraud on the Evidence at Hand:
Finally, defendant's interpretation requires this Court to hold that even though
WCF found evidence of a crime, it could not report the finding because WCF allegedly
asked only to look for such evidence, not to report it. Such a result is absurd. .See
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generally. State v. Genovesi. 871 P.2d 547, 551 n.6 (Utah App. 1994) (noting the
absurdity of holding that an officer who finds evidence during a constitutional search
cannot remove the evidence merely because he asked to search for it, not to take it); see
also State v. Shepard. 955 P.2d 352, 357 (Utah App. 1998) (discovery and seizure of pipe
in plain view when, during routine traffic stop, defendant opened the door in response to
the officer's order to get out of the car was within the scope of the traffic stop). It is also
against public policy, which encourages people to report criminal activity to the
authorities. See Fox v. MCI Communications Corp.. 931 P.2d 857, 861 (Utah 1997)
(recognizing the "long-established proposition that public policy encourages citizens to
report crimes" and that effective implementation of the policy "requires the cooperation
of citizens" with such knowledge). To interpret the challenged release as restrictively as
defendant urges would seriously compromise WCF's fraud prevention efforts and the
public policy those efforts symbolize. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-31-105 (1994) and § 34A2-110 (11) & (12) (1997). The knowledge that workers' compensation fraud committed
against WCF could not be prosecuted because WCF cannot provide evidence of the fraud
to insurance regulators or law enforcement agencies.is an open invitation to defraud
WCF. This would affect the insurance costs for all of WCF's policyholders, reduce the
availability of benefits for employees with truly eligible claims, and put WCF in an
unequal position relative to other private workers compensation insurance providers who
would not suffer these effects as they remain free to report such suspicions of fraud.
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POINT II
ANY ERROR IN QUESTIONS POSED BY THE PROSECUTOR TO DEFENDANT
CONCERNING THE VERACITY OF OTHER WITNESSES WAS NOT
PREJUDICIAL IN THIS CASE AND DOES NOT WARRANT REVERSAL
Defendant contends that the prosecutor asked her about the credibility of other
witnesses twice during the trial. Br. Apt. at 32-33. She argues that such questioning was
erroneous and warrants reversal because of the harm necessarily resulting to her
credibility where that credibility was critical to the verdict. Id at 34-36.
The first challenged exchange occurred when the prosecutor tried to establish what
defendant was doing when the Blynco injury occurred:
[PROSECUTOR:] Okay. Well, she testified - this is my recollection, and the
Jury will give this the weight that they deem it deserves. She [Sharon Rowley] said
that this [type of accident] had never happened before. Is it your testimony that
she lied or misled the court?
A. I don't believe she used those specific words. She said, "By pulling on a blind
cord," to the best of my knowledge. That's all I believe she said.
(R.215/564) (emphasis added) (the relevant examination is attached in Add. D).
Defendant made no objection to this examination (R.215/564).
The second exchange occurred shortly thereafter:
[PROSECUTOR:] Okay. You also testified that you told Dr. Seeman, when you
saw him on October the 17th, about this [domestic] assault that happened three
days earlier?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you hear him testify repeatedly that he knew nothing about that until this
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case was convened?
A. Yes.
Q. He isn't lying?
A. I don't believe ~
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, objection . . . .
THE C O U R T : . . . . She can answer.
[PROSECUTOR]: Do you need me to repeat that question?
A. No, I understood.
No, I don't believe that Dr. Seeman was lying. But towards the end, Dr.
Seeman was having health problems and he had had strokes and stuff and he
wasn't keeping track of things in the office like he should have been. So he could
have forgotten, or, you know, I am not saying he was lying.
(R.215/568-9) (emphasis added). Add. D.
Defendant's claim of error as to the first challenged question is reviewed on appeal
under the plain error doctrine, requiring that any error be both obvious and harmful. State
v. Winward. 941 P.2d 627, 634 (Utah App. 1997). Reversal is warranted on the
preserved claim involving Dr. Seeman "'only if the likelihood of a different outcome is
sufficiently high that it undermines our confidence in the verdict.'" State v. Piansiaksone
954 P.2d 861, 871 (Utah 1998) (quoting State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1227 (Utah
1997)).
While it is "inappropriate" to ask a criminal defendant to comment on the veracity
of another witness, reversal is not automatic. State v. Taylor. 884 P.2d 1293, 1298-99
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(Utah App. 1994). It is necessary to examine the overall effect of the questioning in each
case to determine its impact. See id. at 1298-99 (reviewing the issue under the plain error
doctrine); State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 546 (Utah 1994) (reviewing the issue under an
ineffectiveness claim; clarifying that such questions are not per se reversible error).
In this case, the questioning was not lengthy and essentially served to clarify
defendant's testimony in relation to prior testimony of other witnesses. Any suggestion
that someone was committing perjury was effectively diffused by defendant's responses,
which did not identify anyone as a liar. Instead, defendant offered reasonable
explanations for the differing testimony that avoided labeling anyone as a "liar": Rowley
spoke about an injury caused by a blind cord, while defendant was allegedly injured by a
pulley jamming (R.213/262-4); Dr. Seeman might have forgotten defendant's mention of
the assault because of his health problems (R.215/569). In fact, the latter response may
have actually helped defendant's case by undermining Dr. Seeman's credibility. See
Goddard, 871 P.2d at 546.
Further, it was clear from the questions asked by the prosecutor throughout the

cross-examination that he was generally trying to elicit from defendant exactly what
defense counsel stated below was appropriate: that defendant's testimony on each point
was different than that previously given by a state's witness. Counsel simply failed to use
consistent phraseology. Aside from the two identified instances, the prosecutor asked the
following unchallenged similar questions:
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-whether it was defendant's testimony "that what really happened [whether
Debbie said to go to St. Mark's or to go home] is different from what she [Debbie]
testified to" (R.215/566);
-whether the testimony and records of the three doctors whom defendant heard
testify about pre-Blynco upper back injuries "seem to be pretty accurate" (R.
215/579-80);
-whether defendant had "[a]ny reason to believe that this transcript [of
defendant's February interview with Brett Mann] and his [Mann's] testimony was
inaccurate" (R.215/5 84);
—whether defendant could say if Dr. Minnaugh's report of his treatment of her
following the domestic assault "is accurate or not" (R.215/585).
Moreover, this was not a case in which the determination of guilt was based on the
jury's assessment of the victim's credibility versus the defendant's, as was the situation in
the cases cited by defendant in his prejudice argument. Br. Apt. at 35-36. The State
called fifteen witnesses; defendant alone testified for the defense. The jury weighed all
the evidence concerning what was and was not disclosed to various individuals at
different times, what problems defendant complained of and when, and what treatments
she received (see Point 111(C)). Much of the testimony from the State's witnesses was
corroborated by other witnesses or by written documentation. Therefore, the challenged
questioning is not likely to have had a significant impact on the jury's determination of
defendant's credibility, especially in light of defendant's responses. Accordingly, whether
reviewed for plain error or reversible error, the challenged exchanges do not undermine
confidence in the jury's verdict. See Taylor. 884 P.2d at 1299 (rejecting defendant's
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plain error claim upon finding that the prosecutor's cross-examination of defendant as to
another witness' veracity was neither obvious error nor prejudicial).
POINT III
THERE WAS NO PLAIN ERROR IN THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO SUA
SPONTE ACT ON THREE INSTANCES OF ALLEGED MISSTATEMENTS OF THE
EVIDENCE BY THE PROSECUTOR BECAUSE, EVEN ASSUMING ERROR, NO
INSTANCE WAS OBVIOUS OR PREJUDICIAL
Defendant claims that the trial court committed plain error when it failed to correct
the prosecutor's misrepresentation of evidence in three instances. Br. Apt. at 36-41.
Defendant's failure to object below to any of the challenged instances waives the claim
unless the remarks amount to plain error, which requires that any error be obvious and
harmful. Tavlor. 884 P.2d at 1298.
A±

No Plain Error Occurred In The Prosecutor's Opening Statement
Defendant claims that the prosecutor informed the jury in his opening statement

that they would hear specific evidence during trial which the prosecutor never adduced.
Specifically, she claims that the prosecutor told the jury that the evidence would show
that defendant told not only the ambulance driver but also the investigating police officer
that she had suffered upper back pain due to the assault by her ex-husband. Br. Apt. at
36-37. (the prosecutor's opening statement is attached in Add. E.)
The prosecutor's comment in his opening statement was not in accord with the
evidence later adduced (compare R.213/125 to 213/196-7, 201-2) (the officer's testimony
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is attached in Add. F). However, reversal is not warranted because the statement could
not have been obvious at the time it was made where the trial court could not have known
the evidence would not be forthcoming. Defendant relies on case authority prohibiting a
prosecutor from questioning a defendant during trial in a manner that "implies the
existence of a prejudicial fact" when the prosecutor has no ability to establish the fact's
existence. Br. Apt. at 39. That authority is inapposite to the situation involved in this
part of defendant's claim, where the prosecutor was not questioning defendant in his
opening remarks, and the fact that such evidence was not adduced does not establish that
it did not exist. Moreover, the brief comment escaped the notice of defense counsel as
well once the evidence was out, no further reference was made to it thereafter by either
counsel, and the jury received repeated warnings, both before and after the challenged
remark, that the statements of counsel were not evidence (R.213/133, 177).
Additionally, the comment was not harmful in the context of this case. The State
offered considerable evidence that defendant failed to tell various people about different
parts of her medical history, including her multiple complaints of upper back pain both
prior and subsequent to the Blynco incident. As it related to the domestic assault, the
evidence established that, while defendant failed to mention upper back pain to the
investigating officer immediately following the assault, she almost immediately thereafter
complained of such pain to the ambulance driver and to the treating physician upon her
arrival at the hospital, attributing it to her ex-husband having thrown her against a wall
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(R.213/213-4; 214/ 254-9). Thereafter, she failed to mention either the assault or the
resulting back pain to Dr. Seeman during the thirteen months she saw him (R.214/282),
and she omitted any reference to the upper back pain when she finally confessed to Paola
and Mann that she had been assaulted (R.215/497-500). In light of this evidence, the
question of whether or not she told the investigating officer of her upper back pain on the
night of the assault had little impact on whether she in fact complained of such pain after
the assault or whether she thereafter sought to hide that fact from subsequent treating
physicians or workers' compensation employees.
Further, while both parties mentioned defendant's reporting of the assault in their
closing arguments, neither one mentioned the prosecutor's misstatement from his opening
statements or led the jury to believe the evidence on the point was anything other than
what was adduced at trial. Defense counsel went over the domestic assault evidence,
correctly reflecting that defendant had mentioned to Officer Anjeweirden only pushing,
punching and pulling hair, with resulting injuries to the face and jaw (R.215/633-4). She
then noted that defendant reported the back pain to the ambulance driver and the treating
physician, offering alternative explanations or different interpretations of the evidence (R.
215/634-5). In rebuttal, the prosecutor properly indicated that the report to Officer
Anjeweirden basically involved the punching to defendant's face and jaw (R.215/647-8).
Both counsel focused their remarks in this area on the reports to the treating physician
and the ambulance driver, thereby minimizing any likelihood that the jury would
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remember the prosecutor's opening remark involving the officer and use it against
defendant in deliberations on this point.
Finally, not only did the court remind the jury repeatedly before opening
statements that what counsel said was not evidence, but defense counsel began her
opening statement by saying, "Judge Henriod, when he started off this jury trial and
during the jury selection and then prior to opening statements, indicated to you one very
important factor, and that is statements that were given by me, statements that are given
by [the prosecutor] are not evidence." (R.213/133). This sentiment was reiterated in the
written jury instructions (R. 177, jury instruction #17).
As the impact of the statement was minimal, at best, and the comment was never
emphasized or referenced by the parties thereafter, confidence in the jury verdict is not
undermined, and reversal is not warranted. See State v. Lafferty. 749 P.2d 1239, 1254-55
(Utah 1988) (refusing to reverse a capital conviction based on statements made in the
prosecutor's opening argument where the statements were not prejudicial), vacated on
other grounds, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991).
R

No Plain Error Occurred In The Prosecutor's Cross-Examination Of Defendant
Defendant claims plain error in the prosecutor's cross-examination of her, arguing

that the prosecutor's assertion that defendant had said on direct that she told Paola
Valente about the domestic assault "is wholly unsupported." Br. Apt. at 40. However,
contrary to defendant's claim, the prosecutor's questioning did not amount to unsupported
42

innuendo. Id at 39. When the previous testimony to which the prosecutor made
reference is reviewed in context, the prosecutor's questioning is reasonable.
The challenged questioning is based on defendant's direct examination testimony:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Okay. Now, you provided certain information to Miss
Valente; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. What kinds of information did you bring Miss Valente; do you recall?
A. To the best of my knowledge, what she asked for.
Q. Okay. Was there any information that Mrs. [sic] Valente asked you for that
you didn't provide her to your recollection?
A. No, there isn't.
(R.215/549-50) (the exchange is attached in Add. G). After asking the question and
emphasizing the response with a second question, defense counsel immediately changed
the subject and discussed several different topics over the next ten pages of transcript
(R.215/550-9). Only then did she bring out the fact that defendant did not tell Paola
Valente about the domestic assault. The questioning began, in relevant part:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Why didn't you disclose to Miss Valente or Mr. Mann
that you had been assaulted on October 14th prior to your interview?
A. I didn't feel that, you know, the fact that my husband hit me in my private life
was information that would benefit them in any way because it wasn't to the same
area that I was injured at work.
Q. Okay. When you told Mr. Mann and Miss Valente that you didn't have prior
back injuries, what was your intent? What were you thinking?
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A. That I didn't have any injuries to that area where I was injured at work
(Indicating).
(R.215/559-60) (the exchange is attached in Add. G).
This sequence of questioning could easily mislead the jury into believing
something unsupported by the evidence, as shown by the prosecutor's later questioning:
[PROSECUTOR:] Okay. You also testified that vou told Paola Valente, when you
talked to her by phone on October 17th, about the domestic violence assault that
happened three days earlier: is that your testimony?
A. I don't recall. I don't remember saying those specific words.
Q. Do you remember telling the Jury that you told Paola Valente all the
information she asked you for?
A. Yes. But Paola Valente didn't come out and say, "Has you — does your
husband beat you?" That's not something — you know, "Had you been
assaulted?", you know, she didn't ask me anything like that, no.
Q. Okay. But when you talked to her on the phone on October the 17th, you didn't
tell her about the fact that three days earlier you had been assaulted; did you?
A. I felt that it was irrelevant because it wasn't to the same area that I was hurt at
work.
Q. Okay. A few minutes ago I thought I heard you testify that vou told Paola
Valente about this assault. Did I misunderstand you or did your testimony change?
A. I may have misunderstood you. I don't know.
Q. But on October the 17th, you did not tell Paola; is that your testimony?
A. On October the 17th?
Q. That's right.
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A. I don't think that I even spoke to Paola Valente on October 17th.
(R.215/570-2) (emphasis added) (the exchange is attached in Add. H).
The prosecutor clearly interpreted defendant's initial testimony on direct to mean
that defendant disclosed the domestic assault to Paola because she gave Paola "what she
asked for" and could remember nothing that she did not provide (R.215/549-50). Paola
had already testified that she had asked defendant about her post-Blynco medical
treatment (R.214/238), thereby supporting the prosecutor's interpretation. The
prosecutor, and possibly some jurors, did not connect defendant's later testimony on
direct that the domestic assault was an exception to her earlier claim that she told Paola
everything she wanted. Moreover, the direct examination reasonably but incorrectly
implied that defendant failed to disclose the domestic assault only when both Paola and
Brett Mann jointly interviewed defendant in February; it makes no reference to the
contact defendant had with Paola over the previous four months. The format and
phraseology of the direct examination exchanges reasonably give rise to the prosecutor's
interpretation and, hence, justify his cross-examination to clarify the issue and prevent a
similar misinterpretation by jurors.
Moreover, the effect of the questioning was not prejudicial. The prosecutor
expressly acknowldged that he may have misunderstood the previous testimony, then
clarified the point of the questioning-that defendant did not tell Paola about the domestic
assault in October, which defendant had acknowledged, albeit less than clearly, in her
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direct examination (R.215/559-60). Hence, the jury was left with nothing more than
defendant had already established. Further, the claimed error was not raised, let alone
argued, by either counsel in closing arguments, rendering it unlikely that the exchange
had any effect beyond clarifying defendant's direct examination.
Viewed in context with defendant's testimony on direct, the challenged crossexamination was not erroneous and does not undermine confidence in the jury's verdict.
Accordingly, reversal is not warranted under the plain error doctrine. See Winward, 941
P.2d at 634-35 (no reversible error under the plain error doctrine in the prosecutor's
cross-examination clarifying a statement appellant made during his direct examination).
C.

No Plain Error Occurred In The Prosecutor's Closing Argument
Finally, defendant faults an argument made by the prosecutor a little more than

halfway through his initial closing remarks in which the prosecutor explained that despite
multiple questions by Brett Mann about whether defendant "had been in the hospital
recently [,]" defendant did not say that she had just been released from the hospital after a
month-long stay (R.215/61-13) (the prosecutor's closing remarks are attached in Add. I).
Because the prosecutor was mistaken in his assertion that Mann asked specifically
if defendant had been in the hospital recently, his argument, to the extent it is based on a
misinterpretation of the evidence, is erroneous (the exchange is attached in Add. J).
However, the error was not so obvious as to constitute plain error where it not only
generated no objection by defense counsel, but defense counsel failed to deem it
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important enough to even mention in his responsive closing argument.
Further, when the argument is viewed in the context of both the prosecutor's
closing remarks and the remaining evidence, it does not undermine confidence in the
jury's verdict. Eleven of the first eleven-and-one-half pages of the prosecutor's closing
argument are aimed at identifying not only the conflicting evidence between defendant
and most of the State's fifteen witnesses, but at how defendant's actions throughout her
dealings with WCF and various treating physicians conform to a pattern of conduct which
the prosecutor ultimately argues establishes that defendant "intentionally and knowingly
formed a scheme or artifice" (R.215/601-611, 613). Add. I. These points culminate in
the challenged remarks concerning hospitalization (R.215/612-3). Add. I. The
prosecutor closed those remarks by identifying the hospitalization denial as "part of the
pattern" of conduct defendant employed to defraud WCF (R.215/612-3). He then
launched immediately into an appropriate, factually-supported, unchallenged explanation
of the overall, "ongoing" pattern (R.215/613), and went on to articulate numerous other
acts, omissions, and evidence which support the determination of an intentional scheme to
defraud (R.215/613-21). Add. I. That evidence includes:
a. defendant's medical history, including —
—80 admissions to St Mark's hospital alone in the past eighteen years, at
least 74 of which were emergency room visits (R.214/407);
-medical reports showing four emergency room visits to hospitals other
than St. Mark's in 1994 before the Blynco incident, all involving claims of
upper back injury and severe headaches (R.214/412-23, 429-33);
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b. defendant's woefully incomplete list of doctors and hospitals on the WCF form
and her refusal to complete it using her records at home (R.214/336-7, 373-4);
c. defendant's limited disclosure of her medical problems to her multiple treating
physicians, the ambulance personnel, and WCF, and her repeated failure, despite
ample opportunity, to tell these people about the majority of her pre- and postBlynco injuries:
—Rebecca Dickinson (emergency room nurse): told only about the Blynco
incident (R.215/469-70, 481);
-Steve Anjeweirden (officer): told only about the assault and resulting
injuries (excluding back pain) (R.213/196-8, 201);
—Cal Kunz (ambulance driver): told about assault and resulting back pain,
Blynco incident, and previous ulcer problems (R.213/214, 216);
—Dr. Minnaugh: told only about assault and the resulting back pain (R.
214/254-5,259,267);
-Dr. Seeman: told only about the Blynco incident and previous migraines
over a 13-month period of treatment (R.214/273, 281-2, 288, 290, 299, 382; .
215/549,570);
—Dr. Chung: told about the Blynco incident, and previous medical problems
unrelated to her back (R.214/447, 455-7);
—Paola Valente: told only about the Blynco incident until four months into
the claim and after receipt of defendant's medical records (R.214/237-8);
d. defendant's false assertion to Brett Mann on March 3, 1995 that all prior back
injuries involved only her lower back (R.215/502-5);
e. defendant's receipt of two prescriptions for the same narcotic drug from two
different doctors in two days and the fact that the drug was stronger than was
normally warranted for minor injuries (R.214/330-2, 345, 358-9);
f. defendant's assertion to Mann on March 3, 1995 that she saw Dr. Seeman
before the domestic assault, compared with her trial testimony that she told him of
the assault the first time she saw him (R.215/502-5, 548);
g. defendant's claim to Paola that she would see Dr. Borne on Oct. 17 when she
had and kept an appointment with Dr. Seeman instead (R.214/246-7, 273, 281-2,
290; 215/567, 593);
h. defendant's decision to see an unknown doctor miles away from her home in
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lieu of a hospital-recommended doctor whose office was within 20 blocks of her
home (R.214/306; 215/544, 585-6, 594);
i. defendant's failure to appear for the work-hardening program (R.214/382-3;
215/594-5);
j . defendant's claim during her first interview with Brett Mann that she needed her
paperwork to clear up the confusion, and her subsequent failure to appear with that
paperwork at a later scheduled interview (R.215/516-7);
k. defendant's conduct while at Blynco suggesting that she did not want to work
there (R.213/150-1);
1. testimony from Cleverly, Rowley, and Dickenson that they could not imagine
how such an injury could occur (R.213/171-2, 176; 215/480-1);
m. testimony from Rowley that defendant admitted having back problems prior to
the Blynco incident and that the incident made them worse (R.213/173);
n. defendant's receipt of medical treatment for over a year for an injury several
witnesses considered to be very minor (R.214/273, 281-2, 288, 290, 330, 345, 44950; 215/480-1, 549, 570);
o. defendant's repeated receipt of narcotics for an injury several wits considered
very minor (R.214/284-5; 215/485).
When the challenged argument is reviewed in context and considered in light of
the wealth of remaining evidence against defendant, there is no reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable outcome for defendant in the absence of the argument. See State v.
Young, 853 P.2d 327, 345 (Utah 1993) (rejecting a claim of plain error in prosecutorial
statements because they were harmless in light of the strong proof of defendant's guilt
and the trial court's instructions that counsel's arguments were not evidence).
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D.

The Cumulative Error Doctrine Does Not Apply In This Case
Defendant claims that the cumulative effect of the errors compromised the

integrity of the verdict to his prejudice. Br. Apt. at 41. This Court will revers under the
cumulative error doctrine only if "'the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines
our confidence . . . that a fair trial was had.'" State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah
1993). As noted above (see subsections III(A)-(C), supra), defendant has identified only
one error, that being harmless. The cumulative error doctrine does not apply absent
multiple identifiable errors. Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 516 (Utah), cert, denied,
513 U.S. 966 (1994); Rasmussen v. Sharapata. 895 P.2d 391, 392 n.l (Utah App. 1995).
In any case, each of the three claimed errors constitutes, at most, harmless error.
Even in the aggregate, the minimal prejudice possibly arising does not undermine
confidence in the fairness of the trial, given the totality of the remaining evidence. State v.
Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606, 617 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 940 P.2d 1224 (Utah 1997).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm
defendant's conviction and sentence.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / f ^ d a y of June, 1998.

KRIS C. LEONARD
Assistant Attorney General
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31A-1-105. Presumption of jurisdiction.
(1) Any insurer, including the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, that provides coverage of a resident of this state, property located in this state, or a
business activity conducted in this state, or that engages in any activity described in Subsections
31A-15-102(2)(a) through (h), is doing an insurance
business in this state and is subject to the jurisdiction
of the insurance commissioner and the courts of this
state under Sections 31A-2-309 and 31A-2-310 to the
extent of that coverage or activity.
(2) Any person doing or purporting to do an insurance business in this state as defined in Subsection
31 A-1-301(44) is subject to the jurisdiction of the insurance commissioner and this title, unless the insurer can establish that the exemptions of Section
31A-1-103 apply.
(3) This section does not limit the jurisdiction of
the courts of this state under other applicable law.
1993

WORKERS COMPENSATION INSURANCE
CONTRACTS
31A-22-1001. Obligation to write workers compensation insurance.
The Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah shall
write all workers' compensation insurance for which
application is made to the Workers' Compensation
Fund of Utah. This requirement does not apply to any
other insurer.
1986
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PART 11
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY GUARANTY
ASSOCIATION
31A-28-201. Purpose.
The purpose of this part is to provide for an association of insurers that, as a condition of their authority
to transact insurance business in this state, shall
guarantee the payment of benefits and the continuation of coverages as provided for and limited in this
part1968
31A-28-202. S c o p e .
This part applies to protect resident policyowners
and insureds under all types of direct insurance, except life, title, surety, disability, credit (including
mortgage guarantee), ocean marine insurance, insurance of warranties or service contracts, financial
guarantee, and all insurance coverages guaranteed
by the United States Government.
1968
31A-28-203. Definitions.
As used in this part:

(1) "Covered claim" means an unpaid claim,
excluding unearned premiums, that arises out of
and is within the coverage and is not in excess of
the applicable limits of an insurance policy to
which this part applies, where the insurer who
issued the policy becomes an insolvent insurer,
and where the claimant or insured is a resident
of this state at the time of the insured event or
the property from which the claim arises is permanently located in this state. "Covered claim"
does not include any amount awarded as punitive
or exemplary damages or any amount due any
reinsurer, insurer, insurance pool, or underwriting association, as subrogation recoveries or otherwise, nor does it include any supplementary
payment obligation, including adjustment fees
and expenses, attorneys' fees and expenses, court
costs, interest, and bond premiums, prior to the
appointment of a liquidator.
(2) "Net direct written premiums" means direct gross premiums written in this state on insurance policies that this part applies to, less return premiums and dividends paid or credited to
policyholders on the direct business. "Net direct
written premiums" does not include premiums on
contracts between insurers or reinsurers.
(3) Other definitions applicable to this part are
given under Section 31A-28-105.
IWI

31A-28-204. Unlawful statements.
(1) It is unlawful to make any statement, written
or oral, regarding the coverages and protections provided by the association for the purpose of promoting
the purchase of any form of insurance.
(2) It is unlawful to indicate or imply that the association is an agency of the state or that the existence
of the association is in any way a guarantee by the
state or any of its instrumentalities to insure the payment of claims.
(3) The commissioner shall prescribe rules to prevent'
(a) use of the association as an inducement for
the sale of insurance;
(b) the dissemination of false or misleading information regarding the association and its limited guarantees; and
(c) the dissemination of information implying
that the association is an agency of the state and
that the state in any way insures the payment of
claims.
(4) Any person who violates Subsection (1) or (2) is
guilty of a class A misdemeanor. Any person who
violates a rule under Subsection (3) is liable to the
state for a civil penalty of not less than $250 or more
than $1,000.
IWI
31A'28-205. Creation of the association.
(1) The Utah Property and Casualty Insurance
Guaranty Association shall continue as a nonprofit
legal entity. All member insurers are, and remain,
members of the association as a condition of their
authority to transact insurance business in this state.
The association shall perform its functions under the
plan of operation established and approved under
Section 31A-28-209 and shall exercise its powers
through a board of directors established under Section 31A-28-206. For the purposes of administration
and assessment, the association shall maintain a
workers' compensation insurance account, an automobile insurance account, and a miscellaneous account for all other insurance to which this part applies(2) Meetings or records of the association shall be
open to the public upon a majority vote of the board of
directors of the association.
(3) The association is not an agency of the state.
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31A-28-206. Board of directors.
(1) The board of directors of the association consists of not less than five nor more than nine members, serving terms established in the plan of operation. The members of the board shall be selected by
member insurers, subject to the commissioner's approval. Vacancies on the board shall be filled for the
remaining period of the term by a majority vote of the
remaining board members, subject to the commissioner's approval.
(2) In approving selections or in appointing members to the board, the commissioner shall consider
whether all member insurers are fairly represented.
(3) Members of the board may be reimbursed from
the assets of the association for expenses incurred by
them as members of the board of directors. Other
than these expenses, the members of the board may
not otherwise be compensated by the association for
their services.
1985
31A-28-207. P o w e r s and duties of the association.
(1) (a) The association is obligated on the amount
of the covered claims existing prior to the determination of insolvency and rising within 30 days
after the determination of insolvency, or before
the policy expiration date if it is less than 30
days after the determination, or before the insured replaces the policy or causes its cancellation, if he does so within 30 days of the determination. The obligation includes only that amount
of each covered claim that is in excess of $100
and is less than $300,000. However, the association shall pay the full amount of any covered
claim arising out of a workmen's compensation
policy. In no event is the association obligated to
a policyholder or claimant in an amount in excess of the obligation of the insolvent insurer under the policy from which the claim arises.
(b) The association is considered as the insurer
to the extent of its obligation on the covered
claims, and to that extent, has all the rights, duties, and obligations of the insolvent insurer as if
the insurer had not yet become insolvent.
(c) The association shall allocate claims paid
and expenses incurred among the three accounts
separately, and assess member insurers separately for each account amounts necessary to
pay:
(i) the obligations of the association under
Subsection (l)(a) subsequent to an insolvency;
(ii) the expenses of handling covered
claims subsequent to an insolvency;
(iii) the cost of examinations under Section 31A-28-214; and
(iv) other expenses authorized by this
part.
(d) The association shall investigate claims
brought against the association and adjust, compromise, settle, and pay covered claims to the
extent of the association's obligation and deny all
other claims and may review settlements, releases, and judgments that the insolvent insurer
or its insureds were parties to in determining if
the settlements, releases, or judgments may be
properly contested.
(e) The association shall notify the persons the
commissioner requests under Subsection 31A-28210(2)(a).
(f) The association shall handle claims
through its employees or through one or more
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insurers or other persons designated as servicing
facilities. Designation of a servicing facility is
subject to the approval of the commissioner, but
this designation may be declined by a member
insurer.
(g) The association shall reimburse each servicing facility for obligations of the association
paid by the facility and for expenses incurred by
the facility while handling claims on behalf of
the association and shall pay the other expenses
of the association as authorized by this title.
(2) The association may:
(a) employ or retain the persons, including private legal counsel, necessary to handle claims
and perform other duties of the association;
(b) borrow funds necessary to implement the
purposes of this part in accord with the plan of
operation;
(c) sue or be sued;
(d) negotiate and become a party to the contracts necessary to carry out the purpose of this
part;
(e) perform any other acts necessary or proper
to accomplish the purposes of this chapter; or
(f) refund to the member insurers, in proportion to the contribution of each member insurer
to that account, the amount that the assets of the
account exceed the liabilities, if, at the end of any
calendar year, the board of directors finds that
the assets of the association in any account exceed the liabilities of that account as estimated
by the board of directors for the coming year.
(3) (a) Any person recovering under this part is
considered to have assigned his rights under the
policy to the association to the extent of his recovery from the association. Every insured or
claimant seeking the protection of this chapter
shall cooperate with the association to the same
extent the person would have been required to
cooperate with the insolvent insurer. The association has no cause of action against the insured
of the insolvent insurer for any sums the association has paid out except those causes of action the
insolvent insurer would have had if the sums had
been paid by the insolvent insurer. When an insolvent insurer operates on a plan with assessment liability, payments of claims of the association do not reduce the liability of the insurer to
the receiver, liquidator, or statutory successor for
unpaid assessments.
(b) The association shall have the right to recover from the following persons the amount of
any "covered claim" paid on behalf of such person
pursuant to the act:
(i) any insured whose net worth on December 31 of the year next preceding the
date the insurer becomes insolvent, exceeds
$50,000,000, and whose liability obligations
to other persons are satisfied in whole or in
part by payments made under this act; and
(ii) any person who is an affiliate of the
insolvent insurer and whose liability obligations to other persons are satisfied in whole
or in part by payments made under this action.
(c) The receiver, liquidator, or statutory successor of an insolvent insurer is bound by settlements of covered claims by the association or a
similar organization in another state. The court
having jurisdiction shall grant these settled
claims a priority equal to that which the claimant would have been entitled to in the absence of
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this chapter, against the assets of the insolvent
insurer. The expenses, including legal fees, of the
association or similar organization in handling
claims are given the same priority as the liquidator's expenses.
(d) The association shall periodically file with
the receiver or liquidator of the insolvent insurer, statements of the covered claims paid by
the association and estimates of anticipated
claims on the association. This filing preserves
the rights of the association for claims against
the assets of the insolvent insurer.
(e) The association need not pay any claim
filed after the final date under Sections
31A-27-315 and 31A-27-328, or similar statutes
of other states, for filing the same type of claim
with the liquidator of the insolvent insurer. 1989
31A-28-208. A s s e s s m e n t s .
(1) In order to provide the funds necessary to carry
out the powers and duties of the association, the
board of directors shall assess the member insurers,
separately for each account, at the time and in the
amount the board finds necessary. Assessments are
due not less than 30 days after written notice to the
member insurers and accrue interest at 10% per
annum, or the then legal rate of interest provided in
Section 15-1-1, whichever is greater, to the extent
unpaid after the due date.
(2) There are two classes of assessments as follows:

(a) Oass A assessments are made to meet ad'
ministrative costs and other general expenses.
Class A assessments may be made whether or
not they are related to a particular impaired or
insolvent insurer.
(b) Class B assessments for each account are
made in the amount necessary to carry out the
powers and duties of the association under Section 31A-28-108 for an impaired or insolvent
member insurer.
(3) The amount of any Class A assessment is determined by the board. The assessment may not exceed
$150 per member insurer in any one calendar year.
(4) Class B assessments against member insurers
for each account are in the proportion that the direct
written premiums of the member insurer for the preceding calendar year on the kinds of insurance in the
account bears to the net direct written premiums of
all member insurers for the preceding calendar year
on all kinds of insurance in the account.
(5) No member insurer may be assessed in any
year on any account for an amount greater than 2% of
that member insurer's net direct written premiums
for the preceding calendar year on the kinds of insurance in the account.
(6) If the maximum assessment, together with the
other assets of the association in any account, do not
provide in any one year in any account an amount
sufficient to make all necessary payments from that
account, the funds available shall be prorated and the
unpaid portion shall be paid as soon as funds become
available.
(7) The association may exempt or defer, in whole
or in part, the assessment of any member insurer, if
the assessment would cause the member insurer's financial statement to reflect amounts of capital or surplus less than the minimum amounts required for a
certificate of authority by any jurisdiction in which
the member insurer is authorized to transact insurance.
(8) Each member insurer may set off against any
assessment authorized payments made on covered
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claims and expenses incurred in the payment of the
claims by the member insurer, if they are chargeable
to the account for which the assessment is made. usi

31A-28-209. Plan of

operation.

(1) The association shall submit to the commissioner a plan of operation and any amendments necessary or suitable to assure the fair, reasonable, and
equitable administration of the association. The plan
of operation and amendments are effective upon approval in writing by the commissioner. Any amendments made after July 1, 1986, shall be made within
18o days of the changed circumstance.
(2) The plan of operation shall continue in force
until modified by the commissioner or superseded by
* Plan submitted by the association and approved by
th$ commissioner.
(3) All member insurers shall comply with the plan
of operation.
(4) The plan of operation shall, in addition to requirements enumerated elsewhere in this chapter:
(a) establish procedures for handling the assets of the association;
(b) establish the amount and method of reimbursing members of the board of directors under
Section 31A-28-206;
(c) establish regular places and times for meetings of the board of directors;
(d) establish procedures for records to be kept
of all financial transactions of the association, its
agents, and the board of directors;
(e) establish the procedures on how selections
for the board of directors shall be made and submitted to the commissioner;
(D establish any additional procedures for assessments under Section 31A-28-208; and
(g) contain any additional provisions which
are necessary or proper for the execution of the
powers and duties of the association.
(5) The plan of operation may provide that any or
all of the powers and duties of the association, except
those under Sections 31A-28-207 and 31A-28-208, are
delegated to a corporation, association, or other organisation. This corporation, association, or organization shall be reimbursed for any payments made on
behalf of the association and shall be paid for its performance of any function of the association. A delegation under this subsection takes effect only with the
approval of both the board of directors and the commissioner.
1966
31A-28-210.

Duties and p o w e r s of t h e commis-

sioner.
U) In addition to the duties and powers enumerated elsewhere in this part, the commissioner shall:
(a) notify the association of the existence of an

insolvent insurer not later than three days after
he receives notice of the determination of the insolvency;
(b) upon request of the board of directors, provide the association with a statement of the premiums in this state for each member insurer.
{2) (a) The commissioner may require that the association notify the insureds of the insolvent insurer and any other interested parties of the determination of insolvency and of their rights under this part. This notification shall be by mail at
their last known address, where available, but if
sufficient information for notification by mail is
not available, notice by publication in a newspaper of general circulation is sufficient.
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(b) The commissioner may suspend or revoke,
after notice and hearing, the certificate of authority to transact insurance in this state of any
member insurer that fails to pay an assessment
when due or fails to comply with the plan of operation or the rules adopted. As an alternative, the
commissioner may levy a fine on any member
insurer that fails to pay an assessment when due.
This fine shall not exceed 5% of the unpaid assessment per month, except that no fine may be
less than $100 per month.
(c) The commissioner may revoke the designation of any servicing facility if he finds claims are
being handled unsatisfactorily.
(3) Any final action or order of the commissioner
under this part is subject to judicial review in a court
of competent jurisdiction.
1965
31A-28-211.

Repealed.

1966

31A-28-212. C r e d i t s for a s s e s s m e n t s paid.
( D A member insurer may offset against its premium tax liability to this state an assessment described in Section 31A-28-208, but only up to 20% of
the amount of the assessment for each of the five
calendar years following the year in which the assessment was paid. If a member insurer ceases doing
business, all uncredited assessments may be credited
against its premium tax liabilities for the year it
ceases doing business.
(2) Any sums acquired by a member insurer as a
refund from the association which previously had
been offset against premium taxes as provided in
Subsection (1) shall be paid immediately by the member insurer to the State Tax Commission.
1986

31A-28-213. Miscellaneous provisions.
(1) (a) Any person who has a claim against an insurer under any provision in an insurance policy,
other than a policy of an insolvent insurer that is
also a covered claim, is required to first exhaust
his right under his policy. Any amount payable
on a covered claim under this part under an insurance policy is reduced by the amount of any
recovery under that insurance policy.
(b) Any person having a claim that may be
recovered under more than one insurance guaranty association or its equivalent shall first seek
recovery from the association of the place of residence of the insured. However, if this claim is a
first-party claim for damage to property with a
permanent location, he shall seek recovery first
from the association of the location of the property, and if this claim is a workmen's compensation claim, he shall seek recovery first from the
association of the residence of the claimant. Any
recovery under this part shall be reduced by the
amount of recovery from any other insurance
guaranty association or its equivalent.
(2) Nothing in this part shall be construed to reduce the liability for unpaid assessments of the insureds of an impaired or insolvent insurer operating
under a plan with assessment liability.
(3) Records shall be kept of all negotiations and
meetings in which the association or its representatives are involved to discuss the activities of the association in carrying out its powers and duties under
Section 31A-28-207. Records of these negotiations or
meetings shall be made public only upon the termination of a liquidation, rehabilitation, or conservation
proceeding involving the impaired or insolvent insurer, upon the termination of the impairment or insolvency of the insurer, or upon the order of a court of
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competent jurisdiction. This subsection does not limit
the duty of the association to render a report of its
activities under Section 31A-28-214.
(4) For the purpose of carrying out its obligations
under this part, the association is considered to be a
creditor of the impaired or insolvent insurer, except
to the extent of any amounts the association is entitled as subrogee under Section 31A-28-207.
(5) (a) Prior to the termination of any liquidation,
rehabilitation, or conservation proceeding, the
court may take into consideration the contributions of the respective parties, including the association, the shareholders, and the policyowners of
the insolvent insurer, and any other party with a
bona fide interest, in making an equitable distribution of the ownership rights of the insolvent
insurer. In making this determination, consideration shall be given to the welfare of the policyholders of the continuing or successor insurer.
(b) No distribution to stockholders, if any, of
an impaired or insolvent insurer may be made
until the total amount of valid claims of the association with interest on those claims for funds
expended in carrying out its powers and duties
under Section 31A-28-207 regarding this insurer
have been fully recovered by the association.
(6) A rehabilitator, liquidator, or conservator appointed under any section of this code may recover on
behalf of the insurer for excessive distributions paid
to affiliates, pursuant to Section 31A-27-322.
1986
31A-28-214. Examination of the association —
Annual report
The association is subject to examination and regulation by the commissioner. The board of directors
shall submit, not later than March 30 of each year, a
financial report for the preceding calendar year in a
form approved by the commissioner together with a
report of its activities during the preceding calendar
year.

1985

31A-28-215. Tax exemptions.
The association is exempt from payment of all fees
and taxes levied by this state or any of its subdivisions, except taxes levied on real property.
1985
31A-28-216. A s s e s s m e n t i n c l u s i o n in p r e m i u m s .
The rates and premiums charged for insurance policies t h a t are covered under this part shall include
amounts sufficient to reimburse amounts paid to the
association by the member insurer, less any amounts
returned to the member insurer by the association.
The rates and premiums charged are not considered
as excessive because they contain an amount reasonably calculated to recover assessments paid by the
member insurer. The insured shall be advised of the
nature of the increased rates or premiums.
1985
31A-28-217.

Immunity.

(1) There is no liability on the part of and no cause
of action of any nature shall arise against any member insurer or its agents or employees, the association
or its agents or employees, members of the board of
directors, or the commissioner or his representatives,
for any action or omission by them in effecting this
part.
(2) The state does not waive any defense under this
part, including the defense of governmental immunity. The state is not liable for any action or omission
of the association, its members, or their respective
agents or employees. The state is not liable for any
failure of the association to perform its duties or to
fulfill its stated purpose under this part.
1988
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31A-28-218. Stay of proceedings — Tteopening
default judgments.
All proceedings in which the insolvent insurer is a
party or is obligated to defend a party in any court in
this state sha)) be stayed for a period not }ess than 60
days nor more than six months from the date the
insolvency is determined to permit proper defense by
the association of all pending causes of action. As to
any covered claims arising from a judgment under
any decision, order, verdict, or finding based on the
default of the insolvent insurer or its failure to defend
an insured, the association either on its own behalf or
on behalf of the insured may apply to have the judgment, order, decision, verdict, or findings set aside by
the same court or administrator that made the judgment, order, decision, verdict, or finding and shall be
permitted to defend against the claim on the merits.
1987

31A-28-219. Prospective application.
This chapter applies to all liquidations commenced
after July 1, 1986. For each liquidation in process on
that date, the board of the Property and Casualty
Insurance Guaranty Association shall, in the event of
a conflict, apply to the court which issued the liquidation order for an order specifying the extent to which
this chapter applies to that liquidation. The court
shall apply this title instead of former Title 31 to the
maximum extent possible without affecting vested
rights or creating serious administrative difficulties.
1966

31A-28-220. Termination of association's operation.
(1) The commissioner shall by order terminate the
operation of the Utah Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Fund for any kind of insurance covered under this part when he finds there is in effect a
statutory or voluntary plan that:
(a) is a permanent plan that is adequately
funded or where adequate funding is provided; or
(b) extends, or will extend to residents and policyholders, protection and benefits regarding insolvent insurers which are not substantially less
favorable and effective to residents and policyholders than the protection and benefits provided
regarding the kinds of insurance covered under
this part.
(2) The commissioner shall, by the order under
Subsection (1), authorize discontinuance of future
payments by insurers to the Utah Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Fund regarding the kinds of
insurance that are the subject of the order. However,
the assessments and payments shall continue, as necessary, to liquidate covered claims of insurers who
are adjudged insolvent prior to the order and to pay
the related expenses not covered by any other plan.
(3) If the operation of the insurance guaranty association is terminated under Subsection CI), the association shall, as soon as possible, distribute the balance
of monies and assets remaining, after discharging the
functions of the association as to prior insurer insolvencies which were not covered by any other plan,
together with related expenses, to the insurers that
are then writing in this state policies of the kinds of
insurance covered by this part, and that had made
payments to the association. This reimbursement
shall be pro rata, based upon the aggregate of the
payments made by the respective insurers during the
period of five years next preceding the date of the
order. Upon completion of the distribution regarding
all of the kinds of insurance covered by this part, this
part shall terminate.
1966
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31A-28-221. Insolvencies — Recommendations
and reports of board of directors.
(1) Upon majority vote, the board of directors of the
association may make recommendations and provide
assistance to the commissioner for the detection and
prevention of insurer insolvencies, and may respond
to requests by the commissioner to discuss and make
recommendations regarding the status of any member insurer whose financial condition may be hazardous to policyholders or the public. These recommendations may not be considered public documents.
(2) The board of directors of the association may, at
the conclusion of any domestic insurer insolvency in
which the association was obligated to pay covered
claims, prepare a report on the history and causes of
the insolvency, based on the information available to
the association and submit the report to the commissioner.
1987
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31A-3M05. Immunity.
( D A person, insurer, or authorized agency is immune from civil action, civil penalty, or damages
when in good faith that person, insurer, or authorized
agency cooperates with, furnishes evidence, provides
or receives information regarding suspected insurance fraud to or received from:
(a) the department or any division of the department;
(b) any federal, state, or government agency
established to detect and prevent insurance
fraud; or
(c) any agent, employee, or designee of an entity listed in Subsection (l)(a) or (1Kb).
(2) A person, insurer, or authorized agency is immune from civil action, civil penalty, or damages if
that person, insurer, or authorized agency complies in
good faith with a court order to provide evidence or
testimony requested by the entities described in Subsections (l)(a) through (l)(c).
(3) This section does not abrogate or modify common law or statutory rights, privileges, or immunities enjoyed by any person or entity.
(4) Notwithstanding any other provision in this
section, a person, insurer, or service provider is not
immune from civil action, civil penalty or damages
under this section if that person commits the fraudulent insurance act that is the subject of the information.
1»4
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34A-2-101

UTAH LABOR CODE

(12) "Workers* Compensation Fund of Utah" means the
nonprofit, quasi-public corporation created in Title 31A,
Chapter 33, Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, 1*7

PART 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS
34A-2-101. Title.
This chapter shall be known as the "Workers' Compensation
Act."
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34A-2-102. Definition of terms.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Average weekly wages" means the average weekly
wages as determined under Section 34A-2-409.
(2) "Award" means a final order of the commission as to
the amount of compensation due:
(a) any injured employee; or
(b) the dependents of any deceased employee.
(3) "Compensation" means the payments and benefits
provided for in this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act.
(4) "Decision" means the ruling of an administrative
law judge or, in accordance with Section 34A-2-801, the
commissioner or Appeals Board and may include:
(a) an award or denial of medical, disability, death,
or other related benefits under this chapter or Chapter 3. Utah Occupational Disease Act; or
(b) another adjudicative ruling in accordance with
this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease
Act.
(5) "Director" means the director of the division, unless
the context requires otherwise.
(6) "Disability" means an administrative determination that may result in an entitlement to compensation as
a consequence of becoming medically impaired as to
function. Disability can be total or partial, temporary or
permanent, industrial or nonindustrial.
(7) "Division" means the Division of Industrial Accidents.
(8) "Impairment" is a purely medical condition reflecting any anatomical or functional abnormality or loss.
Impairment may be either temporary or permanent, industrial or nonindustrial.
(9) "Order" means an action of the commission that
determines the legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or other interests of one or more specific persons, but
not a class of persons.
(10) (a) "Personal injury by accident arising out of and
in the course of employment" includes any injury
caused by the willful act of a third person directed
against an employee because of the employee's employment.
(b) "Personal injury by accident arising out of and
in the course of employment" does not include a
disease, except as the disease results from the injury.
(11) "Safe" and "safety," as applied to any employment
or place of employment, means the freedom from danger
to the life or health of employees reasonably permitted by
the nature of the employment.

34A-2-103. Employers enumerated and defined Regularly employed — Statutory employers.
(1) (a) The state, and each county, city, town, and school
district in the state are considered employers under this
chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act
(b) For the purposes of the exclusive remedy in this
chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act
prescribed in Sections 34A-2-105 and 34A-3-102, the state
is considered to be a single ep-nloyer and includes any
office, department, agency, a- V" *y, commission, board,
institution, hospital, college, urn *rsity, or other instrumentality of the state.
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (4), each person,
including each public utility and each independent contractor,
who regularly employs one or more workers or operatives in
the same business, or in or about the same establishment,
under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written,
is considered an employer under this chapter and Chapter 3,
Utah Occupational Disease Act. As used in Subsection (2):
(a) "Regularly" includes all employments in the usual
course of the trade, business, profession, or occupation of
the employer, whether continuous throughout the year or
for only a portion of the year.
(b) "Independent contractor" means any person engaged in the performance of any work for another who,
while so engaged, is independent of the employer in all
that pertains to the execution of the work, is not subject to
the routine rule or control of the employer, is engaged only
in the performance of a definite job or piece of work, and
is subordinate to the employer only in effecting a result in
accordance with the employer's design.
(3) (a) The client company in an employee leasing arrangement under Title 58, Chapter 59, Employee Leasing
Company Licensing Act, is considered the employer of
leased employees and shall secure workers' compensation
benefits for them by complying with Subsection 34A-2201(1 Xa) or (b) and commission rules.
(b) Insurance carriers may underwrite workers' compensation secured in accordance with Subsection (3Xa)
showing the leasing company as the named insured and
each client company as an additional insured by means of
individual endorsements.
(c) Endorsements shall be filed with the division as
directed by commission rule.
(d) The division shall promptly inform the Division of
Occupation and Professional Licensing within the Department of Commerce if the division has reason to believe
that an employee leasing company is not in compliance
with Subsection 34A-2-201(l)(a) or (b) and commission
rules.
(4) (a) An agricultural employer is not considered an employer under this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, if:
(i) (A) the employer's employees are all members
of the employer's immediate family; and
(B) the employer has a proprietary interest in
the farm where they work; or
(ii) the employer employed five or fewer persons
other than immediate family members for 40 hours or
more per week per employee for 13 consecutive weeks
during any part of the preceding 12 months,
(b) A domestic employer who does not employ one
employee or more than one employee at least 40 hours per
week is not considered an employer under this chapter
and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act.
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»5» An employer of agricultural laborers or domestic aerr^tf who is not considered an employer under this chapter
r d Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, may come
sider this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease
fct. by complying with this chapter and Chapter 3, U t a h
Occupational Disease Act, and the rules of the commission.
•6> (a) If any person who is an employer procures any work
to be done wholly or in part for the employer by a
contractor over whose work the employer retains supervision or control, and this work is a part or process in the
trade or business of the employer, the contractor, all
persons employed by the contractor, all subcontractors
under the contractor, and all persons employed by any of
these subcontractors, are considered employees of the
original employer for the purposes of this chapter and
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act.
(b) Any person who is engaged in constructing, improving, repairing, or remodelling a residence that the person
owns or is in the process of acquiring as the person's
personal residence may not be considered an employee or
employer solely by operation of Subsection (6)(a).
(c) A partner in a partnership or an owner of a sole
proprietorship may not be considered an employee under
Subsection (6)(a) if the employer who procures work to be
done by the partnership or sole proprietorship obtains
and relies on either:
(i) a valid certification of the partnership's or sole
proprietorship's compliance with Section 34A-2-201
indicating that the partnership or sole proprietorship
secured the payment of workers' compensation benefits pursuant to Section 34A-2-201; or
(ii) if a partnership or sole proprietorship with no
employees other than a partner of the partnership or
owner of the sole proprietorship, a workers' compensation policy issued by an insurer p u r s u a n t to Subsection 31A-2M04(8)"stating that:
(A) the partnership or sole proprietorship is
customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession, or business;
and
(B) the partner or owner personally waives
the partner's or owner's entitlement to the benefits of this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, in the operation of the
partnership or sole proprietorship.
(d) A director or officer of a corporation may not be
considered an employee under Subsection (6)(a) if the
director or officer is excluded from coverage under Subsection 34A-2-104(4).
(e) A contractor or subcontractor is not an employee of
the employer under Subsection (6)(a), if the employer who
procures work to be done by the contractor or subcontractor obtains and relies on either:
(i) a valid certification of the contractor's or subcontractor's compliance with Section 34A-2-201; or
(ii) if a partnership, corporation, or sole proprietorship with no employees other t h a n a partner of the
partnership, officer of the corporation, or owner of the
sole proprietorship, a workers' compensation policy
issued by an insurer p u r s u a n t to Subsection 3LA-21104(8) stating that:
(A) the partnership, corporation, or sole proprietorship is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession, or business; and
(B) the partner, corporate officer, or owner
personally waives the partner's, corporate officer's, or owner's entitlement to the benefits of
this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational

34A-2-104
Disease Act, in the operation of the partnership's,
corporation's, or sole proprietorship's enterprise
under a contract of hire for services.
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34A-2-104.

"Employee," "worker," or "operative" de-

fined — Mining lessees and sublessees — Corporate officers and directors — Real estate
agents and brokers — Prison inmates.
(1) As used in this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, "employee," "worker," and "operative"
mean:
(a) each elective and appointive officer and any other
person, in the service of the state, or of any county, city,
town, or school district within the state, serving the state,
or any county, city, town, or school district under any
election or appointment, or underv-'. .* contract of hire,
express or implied, written or oral u >
*ding each officer
and employee of the state institutions of learning and
members of t h e National Guard while on state active
duty; and
(b) each person in the service of any employer, as
defined in Section 34A-2-103, who employs one or more
workers or operatives regularly in the same business, or
in or about the same establishment, under any contract of
hire, express or implied, oral or written, including aliens
and minors, whether legally or illegally working for hire,
but not including any person whose employment is casual
and not in the usual course of the trade, business, or
occupation of the employee's employer.
(2) Unless a lessee provides coverage as an employer under
this chapter and Chapter 3, any lessee in mines or of mining
property and each employee and sublessee of the lessee shall
be covered for compensation by the lessor under this chapter
and Chapter 3, and shall be subject to this chapter and
Chapter 3 and entitled to its benefits to the same extent as if
they were employees of the lessor drawing the wages paid
employees for substantially similar work. The lessor may
deduct from the proceeds of ores mined by the lessees an
amount equal to the insurance premium for that type of work.
(3) (a) A partnership or sole proprietorship may elect to
include any partner of the partnership or owner of the sole
proprietorship as an employee of the partnership or sole
proprietorship under this chapter and Chapter 3.
(b) If a partnership or sole proprietorship makes an
election under Subsection (3)(a). it shall serve written
notice upon its insurance carrier naming the persons to be
covered. A partner of a partnership or owner of a sole
proprietorship may not be considered an employee of the
partner's partnership or the owner's sole proprietorship
under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational
Disease Act, until this notice has been given.
(c) For premium rate making, the insurance carrier
shall assume the salary or wage of the partner or sole
proprietor electing coverage under Subsection (3Ha) to be.
100% of the state's average weekly wage.
(4) (a) A corporation may elect not to include any director
or officer of the corporation as an employee under this
chapter and. Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease A c t .
(b) If a corporation makes an election under Subsection
(4Xa), it shall serve written notice upon its insurance
carrier naming the persons to be excluded from coverage.
A director or officer of a corporation is considered an
employee under this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, until this notice has been given.
(5) As used in this chapter and Chapter 3, "employee,"
"worker," and "operative" do not include:
(a) a real estate sales agent or real estate broker, as
defined in Section 61-2-2, who performs services in that
capacity for a real estate broker if:
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(i) substantially all of the real estate sales agent's
or associated broker's income for services is from real
estate commissions;
(ii) the services of the real estate sales agent or
associated broker are performed under a written
contract specifying that the real estate agent is an
independent contractor; and
(iii) the contract states that the real estate sales
agent or associated broker is not to be treated as an
employee for federal income tax purposes; or
(b) an offender performing labor under Section 6413-16 or 64-13-19, except as required by federal statute or
**egulation.
1997
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34A«2-106. Injuries o r d e a t h c a u s e d b y wrongful i g |
of p e r s o n s o t h e r t h a n employer, officer, agent,
o r e m p l o y e e o f e m p l o y e r — Rights of eap l o y e r o r i n s u r a n c e carrier in c a u s e of actios
— M a i n t e n a n c e of a c t i o n — N o t i c e of intent i o n to p r o c e e d against third party — Right to
m a i n t a i n a c t i o n n o t i n v o l v i n g employee-en.
p l o y e r r e l a t i o n s h i p — D i s b u r s e m e n t of proc e e d s of r e c o v e r y — E x c l u s i v e remedy.
(1) When any injury or death for which compensation it
payable under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational
Disease Act is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of a person
other than an employer, officer, agent, or employee of the
employer:
34A«2-105. E x c l u s i v e r e m e d y a g a i n s t employer, or offi(a) the injujr T employee, or in case of death, the
cer, a g e n t , or e m p l o y e e — E m p l o y e e l e a s i n g
employee's dep** ~*:ts, may claim compensation; and
arrangements.
(b) the injured employee or the employees heirs or
ID The right to recover compensation pursuant to this
personal representative may have an action for damages
chapter for injuries sustained by an employee, whether resultagainst the third person.
ing it* death or not, shall be the exclusive remedy against the
(2) (a) If compensation is claimed and the employer or
employer and shall be the exclusive remedy against any
insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay compensation,
officer, agent, or employee of the employer and the liabilities of
the employer or insurance carrier:
the Employer imposed by this chapter shall be in place of any
(i) shall become trustee of the cause of action
and all other civil liability whatsoever, at common law or
against the third party; and
otherwise, to the employee or to the employee's spouse, widow,
(ii) may bring and maintain the action either in its
children, parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs, personal
own name or in the name of the injured employee, or
representatives, guardian, or any other person whomsoever,
the employee's heirs or the personal representative of
on amount of any accident or injury or death, in any way
the deceased.
contr ac ted, sustained, aggravated, or incurred by the em(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (2Xa), an employer or
ployee in the course of or because of or arising out of the
insurance carrier may not settle and release a cause of
employee's employment, and no action at law may be mainAction of which it is a trustee under Subsection (2Xa)
tained against an employer or against any officer, agent, or
without the consent of the commission.
employee of the employer based upon any accident, injury, or
(3) (a) Before proceeding against a third party, to give a
deatl^ of an employee. Nothing in this section, however, shall
person described in Subsections (3)(a)(i) and (ii) a reasonprevent an employee, or the employee's dependents, from
able opportunity to enter an appearance in the proceedfiling a claim for compensation in those cases in accordance
ing, the injured employee or, in case of death, the employwith Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act.
ee's heirs, shall give written notice of the intention to
(2) The exclusive remedy provisions of this section apply to
bring an action against the third party to:
both the client company and the employee leasing company in
(i) the carrier; and
an employee leasing arrangement under Title 58, Chapter 59,
(ii) any other person obligated for the compensaEmployee Leasing Company Licensing Act.
tion payments,
(3) (a) For purposes of this section:
(b) The injured employee, or, in case of death, the
(i) "Temporary employee"means an individual who
employee's heirs, shall give written notice to the carrier
for temporary work assignment is:
fcnd other person obligated for the compensation pay(A) an employee of a temporary staffing comments of any known attempt to attribute fault to the
pany; or
employer, officer, agent, or employee of the employer,
(B) registered by or otherwise associated with
(i) by way of settlement; or
a temporary staffing company.
(ii) in a proceeding brought by the injured em(ii) "Temporary staffing company" means a comployee, or, in case of death, the employee's heirs.
pany that engages in the assignment of individuals as
(4) For the purposes of this section and notwithstanding
temporary full-time or part-time employees to fill
Section 34A-2-103, the injured employee or the employee*!
assignments with a finite ending date to another heirs 0 r personal representative may also maintain an action
independent entity.
for damages against any of the following persons who do not
fb) If the temporary staffing company secures the pa.y- occupy an employee-employer relationship with the injured or
ihent of workers'compensation in accordance with Section deceased employee at the time of the employee's injury or
35A-3-201 for all temporary employees of the temporary deatl i:
staffing company, the exclusive remedy provisions of this
(a) a subcontractor;
Section apply to both the temporary staffing company and
(b) a general contractor;
the client company and its employees and provide the
(c) an independent contractor;
temporary staffing company the same protection that a
(d) a property owner; or
client company and its employees has under this section
(e) a lessee or assignee of a property owner.
ft>r the acts of any of the temporary staffing company's
(5) If any recovery is obtained against a third person, it
temporary employees on assignment at the client com- shall be disbursed in accordance with Subsections (5Xa)
pany worksite.
1997
through (c).
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ta> The reasonable expense of the action, including
attorneys' fees, shall be paid and charged proportionately
against the parties as their interests may appear. Any fee
chargeable to the employer or carrier is to be a credit upon
my fee payable by the injured employee or, in the case of
death, by the dependents, for any recovery had against
the third party.
ib> The person liable for compensation payments shall
be reimbursed, less the proportionate share of costs and
attorneys* fees provided for in Subsection (5)(a), for the
payments made as follows:
(i) without reduction based on fault attributed to
the employer, officer, agent, or employee of the employer in the action against the third party if the
combined percentage of fault attributed to persons
immune from suit is determined to be less than 40%
prior to any reallocation of fault under Subsection
78-27-39(2); or
(ii) less the amount of payments made multiplied
by the percentage of fault attributed to the employer,
officer, agent, or employee of the employer in the
action against the third party if the combined percentage of fault attributed to persons immune from
suit is determined to be 40% or more prior to any
reallocation of fault under Subsection 78-27-39(2).
(c) The balance shall be paid to the injured employee,
or the employee's heirs in case of death, to be applied to
reduce or satisfy in full any obligation thereafter accruing
against the person liable for compensation.
6» The apportionment of fault to the employer in a civil
ir.icn against a third party is not an action at law and does
:.:: impose any liability on the employer. The apportionment
.:' fault does not alter or diminish the exclusiveness of the
remedy provided to employees, their heirs, or personal representatives, or the immunity provided employ*' ^lrsuant to
Section 34A-2-105 or 34A-3-102 for injuries f\
Tied by an
employee, whether resulting in death or not. Any court in
which a civil action is pending shall issue a partial summary
judgment to an employer with respect to the employer's
jununity as provided in Section 34A-2-105 or 34A-3-102, even
•.rough the conduct of the employer may be considered in
locating fault to the employer in a third party action in the
aanner provided in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-43. 1997
WA-2-107. A p p o i n t m e n t of w o r k e r s ' c o m p e n s a t i o n advisory c o u n c i l — C o m p o s i t i o n — Terms of
members — Duties — Compensation.
1 > The commissioner shall appoint a workers' compensation advisory council composed of:
(a) the following voting members:
(i) five employer representatives; and
(ii) five employee representatives; and
(b) the following nonvoting members:
(i) a representative of the Workers' Compensation
Fund of Utah;
(ii) a representative of a private insurance carrier;
(iii) a representative of health care providers;
(iv) the Utah insurance commissioner; and
(v) the commissioner or the commissioner's designee.
(2) Employers and employees shall consider nominating
members of groups who historically may have been excluded
from the council, such as women, minorities, and individuals
«ith disabilities.
<3) (a) Except as required by Subsection (3Kb), as terms of
current council members expire, the commissioner shall
appoint each new member or reappointed member to a
four-year term beginning July 1 and ending June 30.
(b) Notwithstanding the requirements of Subsection
(3Xa), the commissioner shall, at the time of appointment
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or reappointment, adjust the length of terms to ensure
that the terms of council members are staggered so that
approximately half of the council is appointed every two
years.
(4) (a) When a vacancy occurs in the membership for any
reason, the replacement shall be appointed for the unexpired term.
(b) The commissioner shall terminate the terms of any
council member who ceases to be representative as designated by the member's original appointment.
(5) The council shall confer at least quarterly for the
purpose of advising the commission, the division, and the
Legislature on the Utah workers' compensation and occupational disease laws, the administration of them, and related
rules.
(6) The council shall offer advice on issues requested by the
commission, the division, and the Legislature and also make
recommendations to the commission and division regarding
workers' compensation, rehabilitation, and reemployment of
employees who are disabled because of an industrial injury or
occupational disease.
(7) The commissioner or the commissioner's designee shall
serve as the chair of the council and call the necessary
meetings.
(8) The commission shall provide staff support to the council.
(9) (a) (i) Members who are not government employees
may not receive compensation or benefits for their
services, but may receive per diem and expenses
incurred in the performance of the member's official
duties at the rates established by the Division of
Finance under Sections 63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107.
(ii) Members may decline to receive per diem and
expenses for their service,
(b) (i) State government officer and employee members
who do not receive salary, per diem, or expenses from
their agency for their service may receive per diem
and expenses incurred in the performance of their
official duties from the council at the rates established by the Division of Finance under Sections
63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107.
(ii) State government officer and employee members may decline to receive per diem and expenses for
their service.
1997
34A-2-108. Void a g r e e m e n t s b e t w e e n e m p l o y e r s a n d
employees.
(1) Except as provided in Section 34A-2-420, an agreement
by an employee to waive the employee's rights to compensation under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational
Disease Act, is not valid.
(2) An agreement by an employee to pay any portion of the
premium paid by his employer is not valid.
(3) Any employer who deducts any portion of the premium
from the wages or salary of any employee entitled to the
benefits of this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational
Disease Act:
(a) is guilty of a misdemeanor; and
(b) shall be fined not more than $100 for each such
offense.
1997
34A-2-109. I n t e r s t a t e a n d intrastate c o m m e r c e .
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), this chapter and
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, apply to employers
and their employees engaged in:
(a) intrastate commerce;
(b) interstate commerce; and
(c) foreign commerce.
(2) If a rule of liability or method of compensation is
established by the Congress of the United States as to inter-
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^te or foreign commerce, this chapter and Chapter 3 apply
°nly to the extent that:
(a) this chapter and Chapter 3 has a mutual connection
with intrastate work; and
(b) the connection to intrastate work is clearly separable and distinguishable from interstate or foreign commerce.
1907
34A-2-110. Workers' compensation insurance fraud —
Elements — Penalties — Notice.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Corporation" has the same meaning as in Subsection 76-2-201(3).
(b) "Intentionally" has the same meaning as in Subsection 76-2-103(1).
(c) "Knowingly" has the same meaning as in Subsection
76-2-103(2).
(d) "Person" has the same meaning as in Subsection
76-1-601(8).
(e) "Recklessly" has the same meaning as in Subsection
76-2-103(3).
(2) (a) Any person is guilty of workers'compensation insurance fraud if that person intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly:
(i) devises any scheme or artifice to obtain workers'
compensation insurance coverage, disability compensation, medical benefits, goods, professional services,
fees for professional services, or anything of value
under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational
Disease Act, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions; and
(ii) communicates or causes a communication with
another in furtherance of the scheme or artifice,
(b) Workers' compensation insurance fraud under Subsection (2Ha) is punishable in the manner prescribed by
Section 76-10-1801 for communication fraud.
(§) A corporation or association is guilty of the offense of
wo
*kers' compensation insurance fraud under the same Cond o n s as those set forth in Section 76-2-204.
H) The determination of the degree of any offense under
Subsection (2) shall be measured by the total value of all
Property, money, or other things obtained or sought to be
0Dt
ained by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (2),
exc
ept as provided in Subsection 76-10-1801(l)(e).
(
$) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary
ele^ e n t 0 f the offense described in Subsection (2).
(
§) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense
described in Subsection (2) to permanently deprive any person
°f Property, money, or anything of value is not a necessary
e e
l *nent of this offense.
O) An insurer or self-insured employer giving written no^ c e in accordance with Subsection (10) that workers'compens a t e insurance fraud is a crime is not a necessary element of
the offense described in Subsection (2).
<§) A scheme or artifice to obtain workers' compensation
h^-^rance coverage includes day scheme <rr&rti£ce ta make ar
cause to be made any false written or oral statement or
DUS
tness reorganization, incorporation, or change in ownersn
*J> intended to obtain insurance coverage as mandated by
this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, at
rat
*s that do not reflect the risk, industry, employer, or class
codts actually covered by the policy.
(§) A scheme or artifice to obtain disability compensation
incl uc ] es a scheme or artifice to collect or make a claim for
teroporary disability compensation as provided in Section
34A-2-410 while working for gain.
(1.0) (a) Each insurer or self-insured employer who, in
connection with this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, prints, reproduces, or furnishes a form

401

to any person upon which that person applies for im^.
ance coverage, reports payroll, makes a claim by reasoni
accident, injury, death, disease, or other claimed Ion,»
otherwise reports or gives notice to the insurer or te&
insured employer, shall cause to be printed or displayed a
comparative prominence with other content the stat*.
ment: *Any person who knowingly presents false «
fraudulent underwriting information, files or causes to be
filed a false or fraudulent claim for disability compear.
tion or medical benefits, or submits a false or fraudulent
report or billing for health care fees or other professional
services is guilty of a crime and may be subject to fine*
and confinement in state prison."
(b) Each insurer or self-insured employer who issues t
check, warrant, or other financial instrument in payment
of compensation issued under this chapter or Chapter 8,
Utah Occupational Disease Act, shall cause to be printed
or displayed in comparative prominence above the am
for endorsement the statement: "Workers' compensate
insurance fraud is a crime punishable by Utah law.'
(c) (i) The provisions of Subsections (10)(a) and (b)
apply only to the legal obligations of an insurer on
self-insured employer.
(ii) A person who violates Subsection (2) is guilty of
workers' compensation insurance fraud, and the failure of an insurer or a self-insured employer to fully
comply with the provisions of Subsections (lOXa)aad
(b) may not be:
(A) a defense to violating Subsection (2); or
(B) grounds for suppressing evidence.
(11) In the absence of malice, a person, employer, insurer, or
Sovernmental entity that reports a suspectedfraudulentad
f a t i n g to a workers' compensation insurance policy or claim
13
hot subject to any civil liability for libel, slander, or any
other relevant cause of action.
(12) In any action involving workers' compensation, this
sec
tion supersedes Title 31A, Chapter 31, Insurance Fraud
A<
*.
vm
34\-2-lll. Managed health care — Health care cost
containment.
, (l) Self-insured employers and workers' compensation carne
*s may adopt a managed health care program to provide
empi 0 y ee s the benefits of this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah
Occupational Disease Act, beginning January 1, 1993. Thi
Plan may include one or more of the following:
-° (i) A preferred provider program may be developed
. 'o long as the program allows a selection 'by the
employee of more thar one physician in the health
care specialty required for treating the specific problem of an industrial patient. If a preferred provider
program is developed by an employer, insurance
carrier, or self-insured entity, employees are required
to use preferred provider physicians and medical care
facilities. If a preferred provider program is not
developed, an industrial claimant may have free
choice of health care providers. Failure of an industrial claimant to use a preferred health care facility
as defined in Section 26-21-2 as part of a preferred
provider program, or failure to initially receive treatment from a preferred physician, may, if the claimant
has been notified of the program, result in the claimant being obligated for any charges in excess of the
preferred provider allowances.
(ii) Notwithstanding the requirements of Subsection (lXaXi), a self-insured entity or other employer
may:
(A) have its own health care facility on or near
its worksite or premises and continue to contrad
with other health care providers; or
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(B) operate a health care facility and require
employees to first seek treatment at the provided
health care or contracted facility.
(iii) An employee of an employer using a preferred
provider program or having its own health care
facility may procure the services of any qualified
practitioner:
(A) for emergency treatment, if a physician
employed in the program or at the facility is not
available for any reason;
(B) for conditions the employee in good faith
believes are nonindustrial; or
(C) when an employee living in a rural area
would be unduly burdened by traveling to a
preferred provider.
(b) (i) Other contracts with medical care providers or
medical review organizations may be made for the
following purposes:
(A) insurance carriers or self-insured employers may form groups in contracting for managed
health care services with medical providers;
(B) peer review;
(C) methods of utilization review;
(D) use of case management; and
(E) bill audit.
(ii) Insurance carriers may make any or all of the
factors in Subsection (D(bXi) a condition of insuring
entities in their insurance contract.
(2) As used in Subsection (1), "physician" means any health
are provider licensed under:
(a) Title 58, Chapter 5a, Podiatric Physician Licensing
Act;
(b) Title 58, Chapter 24a, Physical Therapist Practice
Act;
(c) Title 58, Chapter 67, Utah Medical Practice Act;
(d) Title 58, Chapter 68, Utah Osteopathic Medical
Practice Act;
(e) Title 58, Chapter 69, Dentist and Dental Hygienist
Practice Act;
(f) Title 58, Chapter 70, Physician Assistant Practice
Act;
(g) Title 58, Chapter 71, Naturopathic Physician Practice Act;
(h) Title 58, Chapter 72, Acupuncture Licensing Act;
and
(i) Title 58, Chapter 73, Chiropractic Physician Practice Act.
(3) Each workers' compensation insurance carrier writing
insurance in this state shall maintain a designated agent in
this state registered with the division.
(4) (a) In addition to managed health care plans, an insurance carrier may require an employer to establish a work
place safety program if the employer:
(i) has an experience modification factor of 1.00 or
higher, as determined by the National Council on
Compensation Insurance; or
(ii) is determined by the carrier to have a threeyear loss ratio of 100% or higher,
(b) A workplace safety program may include:
(i) a written workplace accident and injury reduction program that promotes safe and healthful working conditions, which is based on clearly stated goals
and objectives for meeting those goals; and
(ii) a documented review of the workplace accident
and injury reduction program each calendar year
delineating how procedures set forth in the program
are met.
(5) A written workplace accident and injury reduction propain permitted under Subsection UXbXi) should describe:
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(a) how managers, supervisors, and employees are responsible for implementing the program;
-(b) how continued participation of management will be~
established, measured, and maintained;
(c) the methods used to identify, analyze, and control
new or existing hazards, conditions, and operations;
(d) how the program will be communicated to all employees so that the employees are informed of workrelated hazards and controls;
(e) how workplace accidents will be investigated and
— corrective action implemented; and
(f) how safe work practices and rules will be enforced.
(6) The premiums charged to any employer who fails or
refuses to establish a workplace safety program pursuant to
Subsection (4Xb)(i) or (ii) may be increased by 5% over any
existing current rates and premium modifications charged
that employer.
1997
34A-2-112. A d m i n i s t r a t i o n of this c h a p t e r and Chapter
3.
(1) Administration of this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah
Occupational Disease Act, is vested in the commission to be
administered through the division, the Division of Adjudication, and for administrative appeals through the commissioner and the Appeals Board.
(2) The commission:
(a) has jurisdiction over every workplace in the state
and may administer this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah
Occupational Disease Act, and any rule or order issued
under these chapters, to ensure that every employee in
this state has a safe workplace in which employers have
secured the payment of workers' compensation benefits
for their employees in accordance with this chapter and
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act;
(b) through the division under the supervision of the
director, has the duty and full authority to take any
administrative action authorized under this chapter or
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act; and
(c) through the Division of Adjudication, commissioner,
and Appeals Board, provide for the adjudication and
review of an administrative action, decision, or order of
the commission in accordance with this title.
1997
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35.1-11

sion of Finance. The bond premiums shall be paid by
the state.
19*4

35*1-1. Industrial Commission — Number of
members — Appointment — Term —
Compensation.
(1) The Industrial Commission of Utah shall be
composed of three members appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the Senate.
(2) The commissioners* terms of office shall be six
years. The terms shall be staggered so that one term
expires each odd-numbered year on March 1 of that
year. Each commissioner shall hold office until a successor is appointed and has qualified.
(3) Not more than two members of the commission
shall belong to the same political party.
(4) T h e governor shall e'stablish the commissioners' salary within the salary range fixed by t h e
Legislature in Title 67, Chapter 22, State Officer
Compensation.
1992
35-1-2. Actions b y a n d against commission —
Service of process.
By its name "The Industrial Commission of U t a h "
said commission may sue and be sued. Service of summons or other process on any member of the commission, or on the secretary thereof, shall be deemed service on the commission.
1953
35-1-3. Commissioners — Removal from office.
The governor at any time may remove any member
of t h e commission for inefficiency, neglect of duty,
malfeasance or misfeasance in office or other good
and sufficient cause.
1953
35-1-4. Commissioners shall n o t hold other offices — Exceptions.
Each member of t h e Industrial Commission shall
devote his full time and attention to his official duties
and shall not hold any other office under the laws of
this state, except ex officio such offices or titles as
may be conferred upon him by law. No member shall
hold office under the laws of any other state or under
the government of t h e United States, and shall not
serve on any committee of any political party, but
this provision shall not be construed to prevent any
member from holding such nominal position or title
as may be required by law as a condition to participation by the state in any appropriation or allotment of
any money, property or service which may be made or
allotted for any of the functions of the commission, or
of t h e institutions under its supervision, nor shall
this provision be construed to prevent any member
from acting as head or chief of any of the divisions,
departments or bureaus which may be established for
the operation of the commission in the performance of
its duties, b u t in any such case no additional compensation shall be paid to the member of the commission
holding such office.
1953
35-1-5. Commissioners — Oath — B o n d .
Each commissioner, before entering upon the duties of his office, shall take and subscribe the constitutional oath of office, and file t h e same with the
Division of Archives. Each member of the commission
shall give a corporate surety bond in such amount
and in such form as shall be determined by the Division of Finance. All employees of the commission receiving or disbursing funds of the state shall give
corporate surety bonds to the state in such amount
and in such form as shall be determined by the Divi-

35-1-6. Chairman — Quorum.
The governor shall designate one of its members as
chairman. A majority of the commission shall constitute a quorum to transact business. A single vacancy
shall not impair the right of the remaining commissioners to exercise all the powers of the commission
while such vacancy exists.
1953
35-1-7. Office in Salt Lake City — S e s s i o n s at
any place.
The commission shall keep its office in Salt Lake
City, and shall be furnished necessary rooms and office furniture; but the commission may hold sessions
in any place within the state.
1977
35-1-8. Seal — Judicial notice — Copies of
records, evidence.
The commission shall have an official seal for the
authentication of its orders and proceedings, upon
which shall be engraved, "The Industrial Commission
of Utah" and such design as the commission may prescribe. Courts in this state shall take judicial notice of
the seal of the commission; and in all cases copies of
orders, proceedings, or record in its office, certified by
its secretary under its seal, shall be competent evidence. A description and an impression of such seal
shall be filed with the Division of Archives.
1934
35-1-9. Office hours — Sessions public —
Record of proceedings.
The office of the commission shall be open for the
transaction of business during all business hours of
every day except legal holidays. The sessions of the
commission shall be open to the public. All proceedings of the commission shall be shown on its records,
which shall be public records, and the vote of each
member shall be cast as his name is called by the
secretary, and each member's vote shall be recorded
as cast.
1953
35-1-10. Rules for procedure.
Subject to the provisions of this title, the commission shall adopt and publish rules and regulations
governing procedure before it, and shall prescribe
forms of notices and the manner of serving the same
in all claims for compensation, and may change the
same from time to time in its discretion. Such rules
and regulations shall include provisions for procedures in the nature of conferences in order to dispose
of cases informally, or to expedite claims adjudication, narrow issues and simplify the methods of proof
at hearings.
1965
35-1-11. Secretary — Assistants — Expenses.
The commission may employ a secretary, actuaries,
accountants, inspectors, examiners, experts, clerks,
physicians, stenographers and other assistants, and
fix their compensation. Such employment and compensation shall be first approved by the department
of finance and the compensation shall be paid by the
state. The members of the commission and its employees shall also be entitled to receive from the state
their actual and necessary expenses while traveling
on the business of the commission, and the members
of the commission may confer and meet with officers
of other states and officers of the United States, with
the approval of the governor if outside the state, on
any matters pertaining to their official duties. Such
expenses must be itemized and sworn to by the person
who incurred the expense and must be approved by
the commission.
1953
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35*1-12.

P l a c e s of e m p l o y m e n t to b e safe — Willful n e g l e c t — Penalty.
No employer shall construct or occupy or maintain
any place of employment that is not safe, or require
or knowingly permit any employee to be in any employment or place of employment which is not safe, or
fail to provide and use safety devices and safeguards,
or fail to obey and follow orders of the commission or
to adopt and use methods and processes reasonably
adequate to render such employment and place of employment safe, and no employer shall fail or neglect
to do every other thing reasonably necessary to protect the life, health, safety and welfare of his employees. Where injury is caused by the willful failure
of an employer to comply with the law or any lawful
order of the industrial commission, compensation as
provided for in this title shall be increased fifteen per
cent, except in case of injury resulting in death. 1953
35-1-13. Misconduct of e m p l o y e e s .
No employee shall remove, displace, damage, destroy or carry away any safety device or safeguard
provided for use in any employment or place of employment, or interfere in any way with the use
thereof by any other person; nor shall any employee
interfere with the use of any method or process
adopted for the protection of any employee in his employment or place of employment, or fail or neglect to
follow and obey orders and to do every other thing
reasonably necessary to protect the life, health, safety
and welfare of employees.
1953
35-1-14. P e n a l t y for failure to u s e safety device.
Where injury is caused by the willful failure of the
employee to use safety devices where provided by the
employer, or from the employee's willful failure to
obey any order or reasonable rule adopted by the employer for the safety of the employee, or from the intoxication of the employee, compensation provided for
herein shall be reduced fifteen per cent, except in case
of injury resulting in death.
1953
35-1-15. Right o f visitation.
Any commissioner or any employee of the commission may enter any place of employment for the purpose of collecting facts and statistics or examining the
provisions made for the health, safety and welfare of
the employees therein, and may bring to the attention of every employer any law, or any order of the
commission, and any failure on the part of such employer to comply therewith. No employer shall refuse
to admit any commissioner or any employee of the
commission to his place of employment.
1953
35-1-16.

Powers and duties of commission —
Fees.
(1) The commission has the duty and the full
power, jurisdiction, and authority to determine the
facts and apply the law in this or any other title or
chapter that it administers and to:
(a) supervise every employment and place of
employment and to administer and enforce all
laws for the protection of the life, health, safety,
and welfare of employees;
(b) ascertain and fix reasonable standards, and
prescribe, modify, and enforce reasonable orders,
for the adoption of safety devices, safeguards, and
other means or methods of protection, to be as
nearly uniform as possible, as necessary to carry
out all laws and lawful orders relative to the protection of the life, health, safety, and welfare of
employees in employment and places of employment;
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(c) ascertain, fix, and order reasonable standards for the construction, repair, and maintenance of places of employment as shall make
them safe;
(d) investigate, ascertain, and determine reasonable classifications of persons, employments,
and places of employment as necessary to carry
out the purposes of this title;
(e) promote the voluntary arbitration, mediation, and conciliation of disputes between employers and employees;
(f) establish and conduct free employment
agencies, and license, supervise, and regulate
private employment offices, and bring together
employers seeking employees and working people seeking employment, and make known the
opportunities for employment in this state;
(g) collect, collate, and publish statistical and
other information relating to employees, employers, employments, and places of employment
and such other statistics as it considers proper,
and
(h) ascertain and adopt reasonable standards
and rules, prescribe and enforce reasonable orders, and take such other actions as may be appropriate for the protection of life, health, safety,
and welfare of all persons with respect to all prospects, tunnels, pits, banks, open cut workings,
quarries, strip mine operations, ore mills, and
surface operations or any other mining operation, whether or not the relationship of employer
and employee exists, but the commission may not
assume jurisdiction or authority over adopted
standards and regulations or perform any mining
inspection or enforcement of mining rules and
regulations so long as Utah's mining operations
are governed by federal regulations.
(2) Unless otherwise provided by statute, the commission may adopt a schedule of fees assessed for services provided by the commission. The fee shall be
reasonable and fair, and shall reflect the cost of services provided. Each fee established in this manner
shall be submitted to and approved by the Legislature as part of the commission's annual appropriations request. The commission may not charge or collect any fee proposed in this manner without approval by the Legislature. Prior to submitting any
proposed fee to the Legislature, the commission shall
conduct a public hearing on the proposed fee.
1994
35-1-17.

Appointment of state council — Composition — Terms of m e m b e r s — Membership nominations — Compensation.
(1) The Industrial Commission shall appoint a
state council composed of:
(a) five employer representatives;
(b) five employee representatives; and
(c) three members, one representing the
Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, one representing a private insurance carrier, and one
representing health care providers, all of whom
are nonvoting.
(2) The Utah insurance commissioner shall serve
on the state council as an ex officio nonvoting member.
(3) Employers and employees shall consider nominating members of groups who historically may have
been excluded from the council, such as women, minorities, and the disabled.
(4) Each council member shall be appointed for a
two-year term beginning July 1 and ending June 30.
The first term shall begin July 1, 1992. The commis-
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sion shall terminate the terms of any council member
who ceases to be representative as designated by his
original appointment. The council shall confer at
least quarterly for the purpose of advising the commission and the Legislature on the Utah workers'
compensation and occupational disease laws, the administration of them, and related rules.
(5) The council shall offer advice on issues requested by the commission and the Legislature and
also make recommendations to the commission regarding workers* compensation, rehabilitation, and
reemployment of employees who are disabled because
of an industrial injury or occupational disease. Members of the council shall serve without pay, but they
shall be entitled to all necessary expenses incurred in
attending any meetings called by the council or commission.
1993
35-1-18. C h a i r m a n of council — Voting p o w e r s
— Calling meetings.
The chairman of the Industrial Commission of
Utah shall be ex officio chairman without vote of the
state council herein provided for, and shall be
charged with the responsibility of calling the necessary meetings.
1953

35-1-28

sion of time for compliance with any order, if it finds
such extension of time necessary.
lsss
35-1-22. Hearing o n i s s u e of l a w f u l n e s s .
Any employer, or other person interested either because of ownership in or occupation of any property
affected by any such order or otherwise, may petition
for a hearing on the reasonableness and lawfulness of
any order of the commission provided for in this title.
1953

35-1-23. Petition for h e a r i n g — Contents.
Such hearing shall be on verified petition filed with
the commission, setting out specifically and in full
detail the order upon which a hearing is desired and
every reason why such order is unreasonable or unlawful and every issue to be considered by the commission on the hearing. The petitioner shall be
deemed to have waived all objection to any irregularities and illegalities in the order upon which a hearing
is sought other than those set forth in the petition.
1953

35-1-24. Hearing — Procedure.
Upon receipt of such petition, if the issues presented therein have theretofore been adequately considered, the commission shall determine the same by
35-1-19. Investigation of places of employment confirming, without hearing, its previous determina— Violations of rules or orders — Tem- tion, or, if necessary to determine the issue presented,
the commission shall order a hearing thereon and
porary injunction.
(1) Upon complaint by any person that any em- consider and determine the matter at such time as
ployment or place of employment, regardless of the shall be prescribed. Notice of the time and place of
number of persons employed, is not safe or is injuri- such hearing shall be given to the petitioner and to
ous to the welfare of any employee, the commission such other persons as the commission may find dishall proceed, with or without notice, to make such rectly interested therein. If the order complained of is
investigation as may be necessary to determine the found to be unlawful or unreasonable, the commismatter complained of. After such investigation, the sion shall substitute therefor such other order as may
1953
commission shall enter such order relative thereto as be lawful and reasonable.
may be necessary to render such employment or place
of employment safe and not injurious to the welfare of 35-1-25. Extension of time for compliance.
Whenever at the time of final determination upon
the employees therein. For any Utah mine subject to
the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act, the sole such hearing it shall be found that further time is
duty of the commission shall be to notify the appro- necessary for compliance with the order of the compriate federal agency of the complaint. Whenever the mission, it shall grant such time as may be reason1953
commission shall believe that any employment or ably necessary therefor.
place of employment is not safe or is injurious to the 35-1-26. Hearing condition precedent to action.
welfare of any employee, it may, of its own motion,
No action, proceeding or suit to set aside, vacate or
summarily investigate the same, with or without no- amend any such order of the commission, or to enjoin
tice, and issue such order as it may deem necessary to the enforcement thereof, shall be brought unless the
render such employment or place of employment safe. plaintiff shall have so applied to the commission for a
(2) Notwithstanding any other penalty provided in hearing thereon, and in the petition therefor shall
this title, if any employer, after receiving notice, fails have presented every issue presented by such action,
or refuses to obey the rules, regulations, or order of proceeding or suit.
1953
the commission relative to the protection of the life,
health, safety, or welfare of any employee, the district 35-1-27. Witnesses — Oaths — Subpoena — Cer• tiflcates.
court of Utah is empowered, upon petition of the comEach of the commissioners and the secretary of the
mission to issue, ex parte and without bond, a temporary injunction restraining the further operation of commission, for the purposes mentioned in this title,
the employer's business.
isss shall have power to administer oaths, certify to official acts, issue subpoenas, compel attendance of wit35-1-20. Orders of commission — Presumed nesses and the production of papers, books, accounts,
documents and evidence.
1953
lawful.
All orders of the commission within its jurisdiction
shall be presumed reasonable and lawful until they 35-1-28. Witnesses' fees.
Each witness who shall appear before the commisare found otherwise in an action brought for that pursion by its order shall receive for his attendance the
pose, or until altered or revoked by the commission.
fees and mileage provided for witnesses in civil
1953
causes in the district court, which shall be audited
35-1-21. When effective — Time for compliance. and paid by the state in the same manner as other
All general orders of the commission shall take ef- expenses are audited and paid, upon the presentation
fect thirty days after their publication, unless other- of properly verified vouchers approved by the chairwise provided, and special orders shall take effect as man of the commission. But no witness subpoenaed at
therein directed. The commission shall, upon applica- the instance of parties other than the commission
tion of any employer or any person, grant an exten- shall be entitled to compensation from the state for
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attendance or travel, unless the commission shall certify that his testimony was material to the matter
investigated.
1953
35-1-29. D e p o s i t i o n s .
The commission or any party may in any investigation cause depositions of witnesses residing within or
without the state to be taken as in civil actions. 1953
35-1-30. R e c o r d o f p r o c e e d i n g s before commission.
A full and complete record shall be kept of all proceedings before the commission on any investigation.
Testimony shall be recorded and may be transcribed
when required by the commission for further analysis, investigation, hearing, or court proceedings.
Transcription requested by any party to the proceeding shall be provided at the requesting party's expense.
1990
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such action. The commission shall be served with
summons as in other civil actions. The answer of the
commission shall be filed within ten days after service of summons upon it, and with its answer it shall
file a certified transcript of its record in such matter.
Upon the filing of such answer the action shall be at
issue, and shall be assigned for trial by the court,
upon the application of either party, at the earliest
possible date.
1953

35-1-31. Investigations through representatives.
For the purpose of making any investigation with
regard to any employment or place of employment
the commission shall have power to appoint, by an
order in writing, any member of the commission, or
any other competent person who is a resident of the
state, as an agent, whose duties shall be prescribed in
such order. In the discharge of his duties such agent
shall have every power of an inquisitorial nature
granted in this title to the commission, and the same
powers as a referee appointed by a district court with
regard to taking evidence. The commission may conduct any number of such investigations contemporaneously through different agents, and may delegate
to such agents the taking of evidence bearing upon
any investigation or hearing. The recommendations
made by such agents shall be advisory only and shall
not preclude the taking of further evidence or further
investigation if the commission so orders.
1953

35-1-35. Consideration of all i s s u e s b y commission a condition precedent.
If upon the trial of such action it shall appear that
all issues arising in such action have not theretofore
been presented to the commission in the petition filed
as provided in Section 35-1-23, or that the commission has not theretofore had ample opportunity to
hear and determine any of the issues raised in said
action, or for any reason has not in fact heard and
determined the issues raised, the court shall, unless
the parties to such action stipulate to the contrary,
before proceeding to render judgment transmit to the
commission a full statement of such issue or issues
not adequately considered, and shall stay further proceedings in such action for fifteen days from the date
of such transmittal, and may thereafter grant such
further stay as may be necessary. Upon the receipt of
such statement the commission shall consider the issues not theretofore considered, and may alter, modify, amend or rescind its order complained of, and
shall report its order thereon to the court, within ten
days from the receipt of the statement from the court,
for further hearing and consideration. The court shall
thereupon order the pleadings to be so amended as to
raise the issues resulting from such alteration, modification, amendment or rescission of the commission's
order, and shall thereafter proceed with the action in
the manner provided by law for other civil actions.

35-1-32. Attorney retained b y commission —
Duties of attorney general and county
and city attorneys.
The commission may employ or retain counsel to
represent the commission in proceedings to enforce
actions of the commission or to defend the commission from actions brought against it. Upon the request of the commission, the attorney general, the
county attorney, or city attorney of the locality in
which any investigation, hearing, or trial is pending,
in which the employee resides, or in which the employer resides or is doing business, shall aid in the
representation of the commission.
i990

35-1-36. A c t i o n s t o set aside orders — Exclusive
jurisdiction of the S u p r e m e Court, district courts a n d the Court of Appeals.
No court, except the district court, Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court, has jurisdiction to review, vacate, set aside, reverse, revise, correct,
amend, or annul any order of the commission requiring protection of life, health, safety, or welfare of employees in any employment or places of employment,
or to suspend or delay the execution or operation
thereof, or to enjoin, restrain, or interfere with the
commission in the performance of its official duties.

35-1-33. Orders not to b e set aside o n technicalities.
A substantial compliance with the requirements of
this title shall be sufficient to give effect to the orders
of the commission, and they shall not be declared inoperative, illegal or void for any omission of a technical nature.
1953
35-1-34. Actions to set aside orders.
Any employer or other person in interest, being
dissatisfied with any order of the commission requiring protection of life, health, safety or welfare of employees in any employment or places of employment,
may commence an action against the commission as
defendant in the district court of the county where
the property, plant or place of employment affected
by such order lies, to set aside, vacate or amend any
such order, on the ground that the order is unreasonable or unlawful, and the district court is vested with
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and determine

1953

19SS

35-1-37. Stay of proceedings — Supersedeas
bond.
The pendency of an action to set aside, vacate or
amend an order of the commission shall not of itself
stay the operation of an order of the commission; but
during the pendency of the action the district court in
its discretion may stay, in whole or in part, the operation of the commission's order. No order so staying or
suspending an order of the commission shall be made
by the court otherwise than upon three days' notice
and after a hearing. In case the order is stayed, the
order of the court shall not become effective until a
supersedeas bond shall have been executed and filed
in the action and approved by the court or the clerk
thereof, payable to the state of Utah and sufficient in
amount and security to ensure the prompt payment
by the party complaining of all damages caused by
the delay in the enforcement of the order of the commission.
1953
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35-1-38. Proceedings preferred on trial calendars.
All actions and proceedings under this title, and all
actions or proceedings to which the commission or the
state may be a party, in which any question arises
under this title, or under or concerning any order of
the commission, shall be advanced for trial or hearing
over all other civil causes, except election and public
utility causes, irrespective of position on the calendar. The same preference shall be granted upon application of the commission in any action or proceeding
in which it may be allowed to intervene.
1953

35-1-42

commission specifying the information demanded and
served by certified mail, refuses to furnish to the commission the annual statement required by this section, or who refuses to furnish other information as
may be required by the commission under authority
of this section, or who willfully furnishes a false or
untrue statement shall be liable to a penalty of not to
exceed $500 for each offense to be recovered in a civil
action brought by and in the name of the commission.
All such penalties when collected shall be paid into
the combined injury benefit fund.
1994

35-1-42. Employers enumerated and defined —
Regularly employed — Statutory employers.
(1) (a) The state, and each county, city, town, and
school district in the state are considered employers under this title.
(b) For the purposes of the exclusive remedy in
this title prescribed in Sections 35-1-60 and
35-2-3, the state is considered to be a single employer and includes any office, department,
agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, college, university, or other instrumentality of the state.
(2)
Except as provided in Subsection (4), each per35-1-40. E a c h day's default a separate offense.
Every day during which any person or corporation son, including each public utility and each indepenfails to observe and comply with any order of the com- dent contractor, who regularly employs one or more
mission, or to perform any duty imposed by this title workers or operatives in the same business, or in or
shall constitute a separate and distinct offense. 1953 about the same establishment, under any contract of
hire, express or implied, oral or written is considered
35-1-41. Furnishing information to commission an employer under this title. As used in this subsec— Employers' annual report — Rights tion:
of commission — Examination of em(a) "Regularly" includes all employments in
ployers under oath — Penalties.
the usual course of the trade, business, profession, or occupation of the employer, whether con(1) Every employer shall furnish the commission,
tinuous throughout the year or for only a portion
upon request, all information required by it to carry
of the year.
out the purposes of this title. In the month of July of
each year every employer shall prepare and mail to
(b) "Independent contractor" means any perthe commission a statement containing the following
son engaged in the performance of any work for
information:
another who, while so engaged, is independent of
the employer in all that pertains to the execution
(a) the number of persons employed during the
of the work, is not subject to the rule or control of
preceding year from July 1, to June 30, inclusive;
the employer, is engaged only in the performance
(b) the number of such persons employed at
of a definite job or piece of work, and is subordieach kind of employment;
nate to the employer only in effecting a result in
(c) the scale of wages paid in each class of emaccordance with the employer's design.
ployment, showing the minimum and maximum
(3) (a) The client company in an employee leasing
wages paid; and
arrangement under Title 58, Chapter 59, Em(d) the aggregate amount of wages paid to all
ployee Leasing Company Licensing Act, is conemployees.
sidered the employer of leased employees and
(2) The information shall be furnished on blanks to
shall secure workers' compensation benefits for
be prepared by the commission and furnished to emthem by complying with Subsection 35-l-46(l)(a)
ployers free of charge upon request. Every employer
or (b) and commission rules.
shall cause the blanks to be properly filled out so as to
(b) Insurance carriers may underwrite such a
answer fully and correctly all questions therein prorisk showing the leasing company as the named
pounded, and shall give all the information therein
insured and each client company as an additional
sought, or, if unable to do so, the employer shall give
insured by means of individual endorsements.
to the commission, in writing, good and sufficient reasons for the failure.
(c) Endorsements must be filed with the commission as directed by rule.
(3) The commission may require the information
required by this title to be furnished to be made un(4) (a) An agricultural employer is not considered
der oath and returned to the commission within the
an employer under this title if:
period fixed by it or by law. The commission, or any
(i) his employees are all members of his
member thereof, or any person employed by the comimmediate family and he has a proprietary
mission for that purpose, shall have the right to exinterest in the farm where they work; or
amine, under oath, any employer, his agents or em(ii) he employed five or fewer persons
ployees, for the purpose of ascertaining any informaother than immediate family members for 40
tion that the employer is required by this title to furhours or more per week per employee for 13
nish to the commission.
consecutive weeks during any part of the
preceding 12 months.
(4) Any employer who, within a reasonable time to
(b) A domestic employer who does not employ
be fixed by the commission and after the receipt of
one employee or more than one employee at least
written notice signed by at least two members of the

35-1-39. Violation of judgments, orders, decrees
or provisions of act — Grade of offense.
If any employer, employee or other person violates
any provision of this title, or does any act prohibited
hereby, or fails or refuses to perform any duty lawfully imposed, or fails, neglects or refuses to obey any
lawful order given or made by the commission, or any
judgment or decree made by any court in connection
with the provisions of this title, such employer, employee or other person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
1953
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40 hours per week is not considered an employer
under this title.
(5) An employer of agricultural laborers or domestic servants who is not under this title has the right
and option to come under it by complying with its
provisions and the rules of the commission.
(6) (a) If any person who is an employer procures
any work to be done wholly or in part for him by
a contractor over whose work he retains supervision or control, and this work is a part or process
in the trade or business of the employer, the contractor, all persons employed by him, all subcontractors under him, and all persons employed by
any of these subcontractors, are considered employees of the original employer.
(b) A general contractor may not be considered
to have retained supervision or control over the
work of a subcontractor solely because of the customary trade relationship between general contractors and subcontractors.
(c) A portion of a construction project subcontracted to others may be considered to be a part
or process in the trade or business of the general
building contractor, only if the general building
contractor, without regard to whether or not it
would need additional employees, would perform
the work in the normal course of its trade or business.
(d) Any person who is engaged in constructing,
improving, repairing, or remodelling a residence
that he owns or is in the process of acquiring as
his personal residence may not be considered an
employee or employer solely by operation of Subsection (a).
(e) A partner in a partnership or an owner of a
sole proprietorship may not be considered an employee under Subsection (a) if:
(i) the person is not included as an employee under Subsection 35-l-43(3)(a); or
(ii) the person is included as an employee
under Subsection 35-l-43(3)(a), but his employer fails to insure or otherwise provide
adequate payment of direct compensation,
which failure is attributable to an act or
omission over which the person had or
shared control or responsibility.
(f) For purposes of Subsection (e)(ii):
(i) a partner of a partnership and an
owner of a sole proprietorship are presumed
to have had or shared control or responsibility for any failure to insure ox otherwise provide adequate payment of direct compensation, the burden of proof being on any person
seeking to establish the contrary; and
(ii) evidence affirmatively establishing
that a partner of a partnership or an owner
of a sole proprietorship had or shared control
or responsibility for any failure to insure or
otherwise provide adequate payment of direct compensation may only be overcome by
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
(g) A director or officer of a corporation may
not be considered an employee under Subsection
(a) if the director or officer is excluded from coverage under Subsection 35-l-43(3)(b).
iro
35-1*43. "Employee," "worker" or "workmen, n
and "operative" defined — Mining leasees and sublessees — Partners and
sole proprietors —> Corporate officers
and directors — Real estate agents and
brokers.
(1) As used in this chapter, "employee,* "worker"
or "workmen/* and "operative" mean:
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(a) each elective and appointive officer and
any other person, in the service of the state, or of
any county, city, town, or school district within
the state, serving the state, or any county, city,
town, or school district under any election or appointment, or under any contract of hire, express
or implied, written or oral, including each officer
and employee of the state institutions of learning
and members of the National Guard while on
state active duty; and
(b) each person in the service of any employer,
as defined in Section 35-1-42, who employs one or
more workers or operatives regularly in the same
business, or in or about the same establishment,
under any contract of hire, express or implied,
oral or written, including aliens and minors,
whether legally or illegally working for hire, but
not including any person whose employment is
casual and not in the usual course of the trade,
business, or occupation of his employer.
(2) Unless a lessee provides coverage as an employer under this chapter, any lessee in mines or of
mining property and each employee and sublessee of
the lessee shall be covered for compensation by the
lessor under this chapter, and shall be subject to this
chapter and entitled to its benefits to the same extent
as if they were employees of the lessor drawing such
wages as are paid employees for substantially similar
work. The lessor may deduct from the proceeds of ores
mined by the lessees an amount equal to the insurance premium for that type of work.
(3) (a) A partnership or sole proprietorship may
elect to include as an employee under this chapter any partner of the partnership or the owner of
the sole proprietorship. If a partnership or sole
proprietorship makes this election, it shall serve
written notice upon its insurance carrier and
upon the commission naming the persons to be
covered. No partner of a partnership or owner of
a sole proprietorship is considered an employee
under this chapter until this notice has been
given. For premium rate making, the insurance
carrier shall assume the salary or wage of the
employee to be 150% of the state's average
weekly wage.
(b) A corporation may elect not to include any
director or officer of the corporation as an employee under this chapter. If a corporation makes
this election, it shall serve written notice upon
its insurance carrier and upon the commission
naming the persons to be excluded from coverage. A director or officer of a corporation is considered an employee under this chapter until this
notice has been given.
(4) As used in this chapter, "employee," "worker"
or "workman," and "operative" do not include a real
estate agent or real estate broker, as defined in Section 61-2-2, who performs services in that capacity for
a real estate broker if:
(a) substantially all of the real estate agent's
or associated broker's income for services is from
real estate commissions;
(b) the services of the real estate agent or associated broker are performed under a written contract specifying that the real estate agent is an
independent contractor; and
(c) the contract states that the real estate
agent or associated broker is not to be treated as
an employee for federal income tax purposes.
(5) As used in this chapter, "employee," "worker"
or "workman," and "operative" do not include an offender performing labor under Section 64-13-16 or

345

LABOR — INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

64-13-19, except as required by federal statute or regulation.
1993
35-1-44. Definition of terms.
The following terms as used in this title shall be
construed as follows:
(1) "Average weekly earnings" means the average weekly earnings arrived at by the rules
provided in Section 35-1-75.
(2) "Award" means the finding or decision of
the commission as to the amount of compensation
due any injured, or the dependents of any deceased, employee.
(3) "Compensation" means the payments and
benefits provided for in this title.
(4) "Disability" means becoming medically impaired as to function. Disability can be total or
partial, temporary or permanent, industrial or
nonindustrial.
(5) "General order" means an order applying
generally throughout the state to all persons, employments, or places of employment of a class under the jurisdiction of the commission. All other
orders of the commission shall be considered special orders.
(6) "Impairment" is a purely medical condition
reflecting any anatomical or functional abnormality or loss. Impairment may be either temporary or permanent, industrial or nonindustrial.
(7) "Order" means any decision, rule, regulation, direction, requirement or standard of the
commission, or any other determination arrived
at, or decision made, by the commission.
(8) (a) "Personal injury by accident arising out
of and in the course of employment" includes
any injury caused by the willful act of a third
person directed against an employee because
of his employment.
(b) The term does not include a disease,
except as the disease results from the injury.
(9) "Safe" and "safety," as applied to any employment or place of employment, means the
freedom from danger to the life, health, or welfare of employees reasonably permitted by the
nature of the employment.
(10) "Welfare" means comfort, decency, and
moral well-being.
1991
35-1-45.

Compensation for industrial accidents
to be paid.
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is
injured and the dependents of each such employee
who is killed, by accident arising out of and in the
course of his employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid compensation for loss sustained
on account of the injury or death, and such amount
for medical, nurse, and hospital services and medicines, and, in case of death, such amount of funeral
expenses, as provided in this chapter. The responsibility for compensation and payment of medical,
nursing, and hospital services and medicines, and funeral expenses provided under this chapter shall be
on the employer and its insurance carrier and not on
the employee.
I9ss
35-1-46.

Employers to secure workers' compensation benefits for employees —
Methods — Failure — Notice — Injunction — Violation.
(1) Employers, including counties, cities, towns,
and school districts, shall secure the payment of
workers' compensation benefits for their employees:

35-1-46.10

(a) by insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of this compensation with the Workers'
Compensation Fund of Utah, which payments
shall commence within 30 days after any final
award by the commission;
(b) by insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of this compensation with any stock corporation or mutual association authorized to transact the business of workers' compensation insurance in this state, which payments shall commence within 30 days after any final award by
the commission; or
(c) by furnishing annually to the commission
satisfactory proof of financial ability to pay direct
compensation in the amount, in the manner, and
when due as provided for in this title, which payments shall commence within 30 days after any
final award by the commission. In these cases the
commission may in its discretion require the deposit of acceptable security, indemnity, or bond to
secure the payment of compensation liabilities as
they are incurred, and may at any time change or
modify its findings of fact herein provided for, if
in its judgment this action is necessary or desirable to secure or assure a strict compliance with
all the provisions of law relating to the payment
of compensation and the furnishing of medical,
nurse, and hospital services, medicines, and burial expenses to injured employees and to the dependents of killed employees. The commission
may in proper cases revoke any employer's privilege as a self-insurer.
(2) The commission is authorized and empowered
to maintain a suit in any court of the state to enjoin
any employer, within the provisions of this chapter,
from further operation of the employer's business,
where the employer has failed to provide for the payment of benefits in one of the three ways provided in
this section. Upon a showing of failure to so provide,
the court shall enjoin the further operation of the
employer's business until the payment of these benefits has been secured by the employer as required by
this section. The court may enjoin the employer without requiring bond from the commission.
(3) If the commission has reason to believe that an
employer of one or more employees is conducting a
business without securing the payment of compensation in one of the three ways provided in this section,
the commission may give such employer five days'
written notice by registered mail of such noncompliance and if the employer within said period does not
remedy such default, the commission may file suit as
provided in this section and the court is empowered,
ex parte, to issue without bond a temporary injunction restraining the further operation of the employer's business.
1989
35-1-46.10. Notice of n o n c o m p l i a n c e to employer — Enforcement p o w e r of commission — Penalty.
(1) In addition to the remedies specified in Section
35-1-46, if the commission has reason to believe that
an employer of one or more employees is conducting
business without securing the payment of benefits in
one of the three ways provided in Section 35-1-46, the
commission may give that employer written notice of
the noncompliance by certified mail to the last known
address of the employer.
(2) If the employer does not remedy the default
within 15 days after delivery of this notice, the commission may issue an order requiring the employer to
appear before the commission and show cause why
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the employer should not be ordered to comply with
the provisions of Section 35-1-46.
(3) If it is found that the employer has failed to
provide for the payment of benefits in one of the three
ways provided in Section 35-1-46, the commission
may order any employer to comply with the provisions of Section 35-1-46.
(4) The commission may also impose, at the time of
the hearing, a penalty against the employer of not
more than one and one-half times the amount of the
premium the employer would have paid for workers'
compensation insurance had that employer been insured by the Workers* Compensation Fund of Utah
during the period of noncompliance.
(5) This penalty shall be deposited in the Uninsured Employers' Fund created by Section 35-1-107
and used for the purposes of that fund.
1987
35-1-46.20. Requirements of a n y order of the
c o m m i s s i o n — Court e n f o r c e m e n t
(1) Any order issued by the commission under authority of Section 35-1-46.10 shall:
(a) be in writing;
(b) be sent by certified mail to the last-known
address of the employer;
(c) state the findings and order of the commission; and
(d) specify its effective date, which may be immediate or may be at a later date.
(2) The order of the commission, upon application
by the commission made on or after the effective date
of the order to a court of general jurisdiction in any
county in this state, may be enforced by an order to
comply entered ex parte and without notice by the
court.
1994
35-1-46.30. Employer's penalty for violation —
Notice of n o n c o m p l i a n c e — Proof required — Admissible e v i d e n c e — Criminal prosecution.
(1) Any employer who fails to comply, and every
officer of a corporation or association which fails to
comply, with the provisions of Section 35-1-46 is
guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Each day's failure to
comply is a separate offense. All funds, fines, or penalties collected or assessed shall be deposited in the
Uninsured Employers' Fund created by Section
35-1-107 and used for the purposes of that fund. If the
commission has sent written notice of noncompliance
by certified mail to the last-known address of the employer, corporation, or officers of a corporation or association, and the employer, corporation, or officers
do not within ten days provide to the commission
proof of compliance, the notice and failure to provide
proof constitutes prima facie evidence that the employer, corporation, or officers were in violation of
this section.
(2) If the commission has reason to believe that an
employer of one or more employees is conducting
business without securing the payment of compensation in one of the three ways provided in Section
35-1-46, the commission may give the employer, or in
the case of an employer corporation, the corporation
or the officers of the corporation, notice of noncompliance by certified mail to the last-known address of
the employer, corporation, or officers, and if the employer, corporation, or officers do not, within ten
days, provide to the commission proof of compliance,
the employer and every officer of an employer corporation is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Each day's
failure to comply is a separate offense. All funds,
fines, or penalties collected or assessed shall be depos-
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ited in the Uninsured Employers' Fund created by
Section 35-1-107 and used for the purposes of that
fund.
(3) All forms and records kept by the Industrial
Commission or its designee pursuant to Section
35-1-47 are admissible as evidence to establish noncompliance under this section.
(4) The commission is authorized and empowered
to prosecute a criminal action in the name of the state
to enforce the provisions of this title.
1994

35-1-47. Notification of workers* compensation
insurance coverage to Industrial Commission — Cancellation requirements
— Penalty for violation.
(1) Every insurance carrier writing workers' compensation insurance coverage in this state or for this
state, regardless of the state in which the policy is
written, shall file notification of that coverage with
the Industrial Commission or its designee within 30
days after the inception date of the policy on forms
prescribed by the Workers' Compensation Division of
the Industrial Commission. These policies will be in
effect from inception until canceled by filing with the
commission or its designee a notification of cancellation on forms prescribed by the Workers' Compensation Division within ten days after the cancellation of
a policy. Failure to notify the commission or its designee will result in the continued liability of the carrier
until the date that notice of cancellation is received
by the commission or its designee. Filings shall be
made within 30 days of the reinstatement of a policy,
the changing or addition of a name or address of the
insured, or the merger of an insured with another
entity. All filings shall include the name of the insured, the principal business address, any and all assumed name designations, the address of all locations
within this state where business is conducted, and
after July 1, 1987, all federal employer identification
numbers or federal tax identification numbers. Noncompliance with the provisions of this section is
grounds for revocation of an insurance carrier's certificate of authority in addition to the grounds specified
in Title 31 A.
(2) The commission may assess an insurer up to
$150, payable to the Uninsured Employers' Fund, if
the insurer fails to comply with the provisions of this
section.
1986
35-1-48.

Repealed.

1977

35-1-49.

State department, commission, board,
or other a g e n c y to pay premiums direct to Workers' Compensation Fund
of Utah.
Each department, commission, board or other
agency of the state shall pay the insurance premium
on its employees direct to the Workers' Compensation
Fund of Utah.
iss*
35-1-50,35-1-51. Repealed.
35-1-52.

1988, 1990

Agreements in addition to compensation and benefits.
(1) (a) Subject to the approval of the commission,
any employer securing the payment of workers'
compensation benefits for its employees under
Section 35-1-46 may enter into or continue any
agreement with his employees to provide compensation or other benefits in addition to the
compensation and other benefits provided by this
title.
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(b) An agreement may not be approved if it
requires contributions from the employees, unless it confers benefits in addition to those provided under this title at least commensurate with
the contributions.
(c) An agreement for additional benefits may
be terminated by the commission, after a hearing
on reasonable notice to the interested parties, if
it appears that the agreement is not fairly administered, or if its operation discloses defects
threatening its solvency, or if for any substantial
reason it fails to accomplish the purposes of this
title.
(d) If the agreement is terminated, the commission shall determine the proper distribution
of any remaining assets.
(2) (a) Any employer who makes a deduction from
the wages or salary of any employee to pay for
the statutory benefits of this title is guilty of a
class A misdemeanor.
(b) However, subject to the supervision of the
commission, nothing in this title may be construed as preventing the employer and his employees from entering into mutual contracts and
agreements respecting hospital benefits and accommodations, medical and surgical services,
nursing, and medicines to be furnished to the employees as provided in this title if no direct or
indirect profit is made by any employer as a result of the contract or agreement.
(3) The purpose and intent of this section is that,
where hospitals are maintained and medical and surgical services and medicines furnished by the employer from payments by, or assessments on, his employees, the payments or assessments may not be
more or greater than necessary to make these benefits self-supporting for the care and treatment of his
employees. Money received or retained by the employer from the employees for the purpose of these
benefits shall be paid and applied to these services.
Any hospitals so maintained in whole or in part by
payments or assessment of employees are subject to
the inspection and supervision of the commission as
to services and treatment rendered to the employees.
1992

35-1-53. Assessment on employers and counties,
cities, towns, or school districts paying
compensation direct.
(1) (a) An employer, including a county, city,
town, or school district, who by authority of the
commission under Section 35-1-46 is authorized
to pay compensation direct shall pay annually,
on or before March 1, an assessment of the same
percentage as required by law to be paid by an
insurance company upon its premiums, based
upon an amount equivalent to premiums, that
would be paid by the employer, if insured in the
Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah; the assessment is to be computed and collected by the
State Tax Commission and paid by it into the
state treasury as provided in Subsection
59-9-101(2).
(b) An employer whose total assessment obligation under Subsection (1) for the preceding
year was $10,000 or more shall pay the assessment in quarterly installments in the same manner provided in Section 59-9-104 and subject to
the same penalty provided in Section 59-9-104 for
not paying or underpaying an installment
(2) The State Tax Commission shall have access to
all the records of the office of the Industrial Commis-

35-1-56

sion for the purpose of computing and collecting any
amounts described in this section.
1994
35-1-54.

E m p l o y e e injured outside state — Entitled to c o m p e n s a t i o n — Limitation of
time.
If an employee who has been hired or is regularly
employed in this state receives personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of such employment outside of this state, he, or his dependents in
case of his death, shall be entitled to compensation
according to the law of this state. This provision shall
apply only to those injuries received by the employee
within six months after leaving this state, unless
prior to the expiration of such six months period the
employer has filed with the Industrial Commission of
Utah notice that he has elected to extend such coverage a greater period of time.
1953
35-1-55.

Exemptions o n e m p l o y e e s temporarily
in state — Conditions — E v i d e n c e of
insurance.
(1) Any employee who has been hired in another
state and his employer are exempt from this chapter
while the employee is temporarily within this state
doing work for his employer if:
(a) the employer has furnished workers' compensation insurance coverage under the workers'
compensation or similar laws of the other state;
(b) the coverage covers the employee's employment while in this state; and
(c) (i) the extraterritorial provisions of this
chapter are recognized in the other state and
employers and employees who are covered in
this state are likewise exempted from the application of the workers' compensation or
similar laws of the other state; or
(ii) the Workers Compensation Fund of
Utah is an admitted insurance carrier in the
other state or has agreements with such a
carrier and is able to furnish workers' compensation insurance or similar coverage to
Utah employers and their subsidiaries or affiliates doing business in the other state.
(2) The benefits under the workers' compensation
or similar laws of the other state are the exclusive
remedy against an employer for any injury, whether
resulting in death or not, received by an employee
while working for the employer in this state.
(3) A certificate from an authorized officer of the
industrial commission or similar department of the
other state certifying that the employer is insured in
the other state and has provided extraterritorial coverage insuring his employees while working in this
state is prima facie evidence that the employer carries compensation insurance.
1993
35-1-56.

Compliance with act — Notice to em-

ployees.
Each employer providing insurance, or electing directly to pay compensation to his injured, or the dependents of his killed employees, as herein provided,
shall post in conspicuous places about his place of
business typewritten or printed notices stating, that
he has complied with the provisions of this title and
all the rules and regulations of the commission made
in pursuance thereof, and if suet is the case, that he
has been authorized by the commission directly to
compensate such employees or dependents; and the
same, when so posted, shall constitute sufficient notice to his employees of the fact that he has complied
with the law as to securing compensation to his employees and their dependents.
1977
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35-1-57. N o n c o m p l i a n c e — Penalty.
Employers who shall fail to comply with the provisions of Section 35-1-46 shall not be entitled to the
benefits of this title during the period of noncompliance, but shall be liable in a civil action to their employees for damages suffered by reason of personal
injuries arising out of or in the course of employment
caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of the
employer or any of the employer's officers, agents or
employees, and also to the dependents or personal
representatives of such employees where death results from such injuries. In any such action the defendant shall not avail himself of any of the following
defenses: the defense of the fellow-servant rule, the
defense of assumption of risk, or the defense of contributory negligence. Proof of the injury shall constitute prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of
the employer and the burden shall be upon the employer to show freedom from negligence resulting in
such injury. And such employers shall also be subject
to the provisions of Sections 35-1-58 and 35-1-59. In
any civil action permitted under this section against
the employer the employee shall be entitled to necessary costs and a reasonable attorney fee assessed
against the employer.
18*4
35-1-58.

Rights of e m p l o y e e s w h e r e employer
fails to comply.
Any employee, whose employer has failed to comply with the provisions of Section 35-1-46, who has
been injured by accident arising out of or in the
course of his employment, wheresoever such injury
occurred, if the same was not purposely self-inflicted,
or his dependents in case death has ensued, may, in
lieu of proceeding against his employer by civil action
in the courts as provided in the last preceding section
[Section 35-1-57], file his application with the commission for compensation in accordance with the
terms of this title, and the commission shall hear and
determine such application for compensation as in
other cases; and the amount of compensation which
the commission may ascertain and determine to be
due to such injured employee, or his dependents in
case death has ensued, shall be paid by such employer
to the persons entitled thereto within ten days after
receiving notice of the amount thereof as so fixed and
determined by the commission.
1943
35-1-59.

Docketing a w a r d s in district court —
Enforcing j u d g m e n t
An abstract of any award may be filed in the office
of the clerk of the district court of any county in the
state, and must be docketed in the judgment docket of
the district court thereof. The time of the receipt of
the abstract must be noted by him thereon and entered in the docket. When so filed and docketed the
award shall constitute a lien from the time of such
docketing upon the real property of the employer situated in the county, for a period of eight years from
the date of the award unless previously satisfied. Execution may be issued thereon within the same time
and in the same manner and with the same effect as
if said award were a judgment of the district court.
In cases where the employer was uninsured at the
time of the injury, the county attorney for the county
in which the applicant or the employer resides, depending on the district in which the final award is
docketed, shall enforce the judgment when requested
by the industrial commission. Where the action to
enforce a judgment is initiated by other counsel, reasonable attorney's fees and court costs shall be allowed in addition to the award.
I97t
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35-1-60.

Exclusive remedy against employer, or
officer, agent or e m p l o y e e — Occupational d i s e a s e excepted.
The right to recover compensation pursuant to the
provisions of this title for injuries sustained by an
employee, whether resulting in death or not, shall be
the exclusive remedy against the employer and shall
be the exclusive remedy against any officer, agent, or
employee of the employer and the liabilities of the
employer imposed by this act shall be in place of any
and all other civil liability whatsoever, at common
law or otherwise, to the employee or to his spouse,
widow, children, parents, dependents, next of kin,
heirs, personal representatives, guardian, or any
other person whomsoever, on account of any accident
or injury or death, in any way contracted, sustained,
aggravated, or incurred by the employee in the course
of or because of or arising out of his employment, and
no action at law may be maintained against an employer or against any officer, agent, or employee of
the employer based upon any accident, injury, or
death of an employee. Nothing in this section, however, shall prevent an employee, or his dependents,
from filing a claim with the Industrial Commission of
Utah for compensation in those cases within the provisions of the Utah Occupational Disease Act, as
amended.
1994
35-1-61.
35-1-62.

Repealed.

1971

Injuries or death caused by wrongful
acts of persons other than employer,
officer, agent, or employee of said employer — Rights of employer or insura n c e carrier in c a u s e of action — Maintenance of action — Notice of intention
to proceed against third party — Right
to maintain action not involving employee-employer relationship — Disbursement of p r o c e e d s of recovery —
Exclusive remedy.
(1) When any injury or death for which compensation is payable under this title shall have been caused
by the wrongful act or neglect of a person other than
an employer, officer, agent, or employee of the employer, the injured employee, or in case of death, his
dependents, may claim compensation and the injured
employee or his heirs or personal representative may
also have an action for damages against the third
person.
(2) If compensation is claimed and the employer or
insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay compensation, the employer or insurance carrier shall become
trustee of the cause of action against the third party
and may bring and maintain the action either in its
own name or in the name of the injured employee, or
his heirs or the personal representative of the deceased, provided the employer or carrier may not settle and release the cause of action without the consent of the commission.
(3) (a) Before proceeding against the third party,
the injured employee, or, in case of death, his
heirs, shall give written notice of the intention to
the carrier and other person obligated for the
compensation payments, to give the person a reasonable opportunity to enter an appearance in
the proceeding.
(b) The injured employee, or, in case of death,
his heirs, shall give written notice to the carrier
and other person obligated for the compensation
payments of any known attempt to attribute
fault to the employer, officer, agent, or employee
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35-1-65J

of the employer by way of settlement or in a pro- 35-1-64. Compensation — None for first three
ceeding brought by the injured employee, or, in
days after injury unless disability excase of death, his heirs.
tended.
(4) For the purposes of this section and notwithNo compensation shall be allowed for the first three
standing the provisions of Section 35-1-42, the in- days after the injury is received, except the disbursejured employee or his heirs or personal representative ments hereinafter authorized for medical, nurse and
may also maintain an action for damages against hospital services, and for medicines and funeral exsubcontractors, general contractors, independent con- penses, provided, however, if the period of total temtractors, property owners or their lessees or assigns, porary disability lasts more than fourteen days, comnot occupying an employee-employer relationship pensation shall also be payable for the first three
with the injured or deceased employee at the time of days after the injury is received.
1973
his injury or death.
(5) If any recovery is obtained against a third per- 35-1-65. Temporary disability — A m o u n t of
p a y m e n t s — State average w e e k l y
son, it shall be disbursed as follows:
w a g e defined.
(a) The reasonable expense of the action, in(1) In case of temporary disability, the employee
cluding attorneys' fees, shall be paid and charged
2
proportionately against the parties as their inter- shall receive 66 /3% of that employee's average
weekly
wages
at
the
time of the injury so long as such
ests may appear. Any'fee chargeable to the employer or carrier is to be a credit upon any fee disability is total, but not more than a maximum of
payable by the injured employee or, in the case of 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of
the injury per week and not less than a minimum of
death, by the dependents, for any recovery had $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5
against the third party.
for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up
(b) The person liable for compensation pay- to a maximum of four such dependent children, not to
ments shall be reimbursed, less the proportionate exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at
share of costs and attorneys' fees provided for in the time of the injury, but not to exceed 1007c of the
Subsection (5)(a), for the payments made as fol- state average weekly wage at the time of the injury
lows:
per week. In no case shall such compensation benefits
(i) without reduction based on fault attrib- exceed 312 weeks at the rate of 100% of the state
uted to the employer, officer, agent, or em- average weekly wage at the time of the injury over a
ployee of the employer in the action against period of eight years from the date of the injury.
the third party if the combined percentage of
In the event a light duty medical release is obfault attributed to persons immune from suit tained prior to the employee reaching a fixed state of
is determined to be less than 40% prior to recovery, and when no such light duty employment is
any reallocation of fault under Subsection available to the employee from the employer, tempo78-27-39(2); or
rary disability benefits shall continue to be paid.
(ii) less the amount of payments made
(2) The "state average weekly wage" as referred to
multiplied by the percentage of fault attrib- in Chapters 1 and 2 of this title shall be determined
uted to the employer, officer, agent, or em- by the commission as follows: on or before June 1 of
ployee of the employer in the action against each year, the total wages reported on contribution
the third party if the combined percentage of reports to the department of employment security unfault attributed to persons immune from suit der the commission for the preceding calendar year
is determined to be 40% or more prior to any shall be divided by the average monthly number of
reallocation of fault under Subsection insured workers determined by dividing the total in78-27-39(2).
sured workers reported for the preceding year by
(c) The balance shall be paid to the injured em- twelve. The average annual wage thus obtained shall
ployee or his heirs in case of death, to be applied be divided by 52, and the average weekly wage thus
to reduce or satisfy in full any obligation thereaf- determined rounded to the nearest dollar. The state
ter accruing against the person liable for com- average weekly wage as so determined shall be used
pensation.
as the basis for computing the maximum compensa(6) The apportionment of fault to the employer in a tion rate for injuries or disabilities arising from occucivil action against a third party is not an action at pational disease which occurred during the twelvelaw and does not impose any liability on the em- month period commencing July 1 following the June
ployer. The apportionment of fault does not alter or 1 determination, and any death resulting therefrom.
diminish the exclusiveness of the remedy provided to
1981
employees, their heirs, or personal representatives, or
the immunity provided employers pursuant to Sec- 35-1-65.1. Temporary partial disability —
Amount of payments.
tion 35-1-60 for injuries sustained by an employee,
(1) If the injury causes temporary partial disability
whether resulting in death or not. Any court in which
a civil action is pending shall issue a partial sum- for work, the employee shall receive weekly compenmary judgment to an employer with respect to the sation equal to:
(a) 66 2/3% of the difference between the ememployer's immunity as provided in Section 35-1-60,
ployee's average weekly wages before the accieven though the conduct of the employer may be condent and the weekly wages the employee is able
sidered in allocating fault to the employer in a third
to earn after the accident, but not more than
party action in the manner provided in Sections
100% of the state average weekly wage at the
78-27-37 through 78-27-43.
19M
time of injury; plus
(b) $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each
35*1-63. J u d g m e n t s in favor of commission —
dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a
Preference.
All judgments obtained in any action prosecuted by
maximum of four such dependent children, but
the commission or by the state under the authority of
only up to a total weekly compensation that does
this title shall have the same preference against the
not exceed 100% of the state average weekly
assets of the employer as claims for taxes.
19SS
wage at the time of injury.
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(2) The commission may make an award for temporary partial disability for work at any time prior to
eight years after the date of the injury to an employee:
^N ^Ytt^fe 'gfay'ataaX t&Tt&Vttoit T%?M\\.\T\% {TORI
the injury is not finally healed and fixed eight
years after the date of injury; and
(b) who files an application for hearing under
Section 35-1-98.
(3) The duration of weekly payments may not exceed 312 week3 nor continue more than eight years
after the date of the injury. Payments shall terminate
vtrhen the disability ends or the injured employee dies.
1990

35-1-66. Permanent partial disability — Scale of
payments.
An employee who sustained a permanent impairment as a result of an industrial accident and who
files an application for hearing under Section 35-1-98
rtiay receive a permanent partial disability award
from the commission.
Weekly payments may not in any case continue
after the disability ends, or the death of the injured
person.
In the case of the following injuries the compensation shall be 662/3% of that employee's average
v/eekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more
than a maximum of 66%% of the state average
v/eekly wage at the time of the injury per week and
tvQt less than a minimum of $45 oer week plus $5 for
a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent child
ijnder the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four
dependent children, but not to exceed 662/3% of the
$tate average weekly wage at the time of the injury
per week, to be paid in routine pay periods not to
exceed four weeks for the number of weeks stated
against such injuries respectively, and shall be in addition to the compensation provided for temporary
total disability and temporary partial disability:
For the loss of:
Number of Weeks
(A) Upper extremity
(1) Arm
(a) Arm and shoulder (forequarter
amputation)
218
(b) Arm at shoulder joint, or above
deltoid insertion
187
(c) Arm between deltoid insertion and
elbow joint, at elbow joint, or below
elbow joint proximal to insertion of
biceps tendon
178
(d) Forearm below elbow joint distal
to insertion of biceps tendon
168
(2) Hand
(a) At wrist or midcarpal or midmetacarpal amputation
168
(b) All fingers except thumb at metacarpophalangeal joint
101
(3) Thumb
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or
with resection of carpometacarpal
bone
67
(b) At interphalangeal joint
50
(4) Index finger
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or
with resection of metacarpal bone ... .42
(b) At proximal
interphalangeal
joint
34
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint. .18
(5) Middle finger
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or
with resection of metacarpal bone ... .34
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(b) At proximal
interphalangeal
joint
27
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint. .15
(6) Ring finger
resection of metacarpal bone
17
'(b) At proximal
interphalangeal
joint
13
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint... 8
(7) Little finger
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or
with resection of metacarpal bone
8
(b) At proximal
interphalangeal
joint
6
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint... 4
(B) Lower extremity
(1) Leg
(a) Hemipelvectomy (leg, hip and pelvis)
156
(b) Leg at hip joint or three inches or
less below tuberosity of ischium
125
(c) Leg above knee with functional
stump, at knee joint or Gritti-Stokes amputation or below knee with short stump
(three inches or less below intercondylar
notch)
112
(d) Leg below knee with functional
stump
88
(2) Foot
(a) Footatankle
88
(h\ Foat nartial amnjitaJ&ux CGbapart's)
66
(c) Foot midmetatarsal amputation
44
(3) Toes
(a) Great toe
(i) With resection of metatarsal
bone
26
(ii) At
metatarsophalangeal
joint
16
(iii) At interphalangeal joint ..12
(b) Lesser toe (2nd — 5th)
(i) With resection of metatarsal
bone
4
(ii) At
metatarsophalangeal
joint
3
(iii) At proximal interphalangeal
joint
2
(iv) At distal interphalangeal
joint
1
(c) All toes at metatarsophalangeal
joint
26
(4) Miscellaneous
(a) One eye by enucleation
120
(b) Total blindness of one eye
100
(c) Total loss of binaural hearing . 109
(C) Permanent and complete loss of use shall
'be d^ e m ^ equivalent toloss ol ftie member. Partial 1QSS o r partial loss of use shall be a percentage of the complete loss or loss of use of the member. This paragraph, however, shall not apply to
the items listed in (B)(4).
For any permanent impairment caused by an
industrial accident that is not otherwise provided
for in the schedule of losses in this section, permanent partial disability compensation shall be
awa rded by the commission based on the medical
evidence. Compensation for any such impairment
shall* ** closely as possible, be proportionate to
the specific losses in the schedule set forth in this
section. Permanent partial disability compensation nW not in any case exceed 312 weeks,
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which shall be considered the period of compensation for permanent total loss of bodily function.
Permanent partial disability compensation may
not be paid for any permanent impairment that
existed prior to an industrial accident.
The amounts specified in this section are all
subject to the limitations as to the maximum
weekly amount payable as specified in this section, and in no event shall more than a maximum
of 662/3% of the state average weekly wage at the
time of the injury for a total of 312 weeks in
compensation be required to be paid.
1991
35-1-66.1.

L o s s of hearing — Occupational hear-

ing loss due to noise to be compensated.
(1) Permanent hearing loss caused by exposure to
harmful industrial noise or by direct head injury
shall be compensated according to the terms and conditions of this chapter.
(2) No claim for compensation for hearing loss for
harmful industrial noise shall'be paid under this
chapter unless it can be demonstrated by a professionally controlled sound test that the employee has
been exposed to harmful industrial noise as defined
in Section 35-1-66.2 while employed by the employer
against whom the claim is made.
1991
35-1-66.2. Harmful industrial noise defined.
(1) Harmful industrial noise is defined as the
sound emanating from equipment and machines during employment exceeding the following permissible
sound levels, dBA slow response, and corresponding
durations per day, in hours:

Sound Level

90
92
95
97
100
102
105
110
115

Duration

8
6
4
3
2
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.25 (

(2) Harmful industrial noise is also defined as
sound that results in acoustic trauma such as sudden
instantaneous temporary noise or impulsive or impact noise exceeding 140 dB peak sound pressure
levels.
(3) The Utah Occupational Safety and Health Division of the commission may conduct tests to determine the intensity of noise at places of employment.
The administrative law judge may consider such
tests, and any other tests taken by authorities in the
field of sound engineering, as evidence of harmful
industrial noise.
1991
35-1-66.3. Loss of hearing defined.
Loss of hearing is defined as binaural hearing loss
measured in decibels with frequencies of 500, 1,000,
2,000, and 3,000 cycles per second (Hertz). If the average decibel loss at 500, 1,000, 2,000, and 3,000 cycles
per second (Hertz) is 25 decibels or less, usually no
hearing impairment exists.
1991
35-1-66.4. Measuring hearing l o s s .
(1) The degree of hearing loss shall be established,
no sooner than six weeks after termination of exposure to the harmful industrial noise, by audiometric
determination of hearing threshold level performed
by medical or paramedical professionals recognized
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by the commission, as measured from 0 decibels on an
audiometer calibrated to ANSI-S3.6-1969, American
National Standard "Specifications for Audiometers"
(1969).
(2) In any evaluation of occupational hearing loss,
only hearing levels at frequencies of 500, 1,000,
2,000, and 3,000 cycles per second (Hertz) shall be
considered. The individual measurements for each
ear shall be added together and then shall be divided
by four to determine the average decibel loss in each
ear. To determine the percentage of hearing loss in
each ear, the average decibel loss for each decibel of
loss exceeding 25 decibels shall be multiplied by 1.5%
up to the maximum of 100% which is reached at 91.7
decibels.
(3) Binaural hearing loss is determined by multiplying the percentage of hearing loss in the better ear
by five, then adding the percentage of hearing loss in
the poorer ear and dividing by six. The resultant figure is the percentage of binaural hearing loss.
iwi
35-1-66.5.

Loss of hearing — Compensation for
permanent partial disability.
Compensation for permanent partial disability for
binaural hearing loss shall be determined by multiplying the percentage of binaural hearing loss by 109
weeks of compensation benefits as provided in this
chapter. Where an employee files one or more claims
for hearing loss the percentage of hearing loss previously found to exist shall be deducted from any subsequent award by the commission. In no event shall
compensation benefits be paid for total or 100% binaural hearing loss exceeding 109 weeks of compensation benefits.
1991

35-1-66.6.

Loss of hearing — Time for filing
claim.
An employee's occupational hearing loss must be
reported to the employer pursuant to Section 35-1-97
within 180 days of the date the employee first suffered altered hearing and knew, or in the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have known, that the
hearing loss was caused by employment.
1991

35-1-66.7.

Loss of hearing — Extent of employer's Lability.
An employer is liable only for the hearing loss of an
employee which arises out of and in the course of the
employee's employment for that employer. If previous
occupational hearing loss or nonoccupational hearing
impairment is established by competent evidence, the
employer shall not be liable for the prior hearing loss
so established, whether or not compensation has previously been paid or awarded. The employer is liable
only for the difference between the percentage of
hearing loss presently established and that percentage of prior hearing loss established by preemployment audiogram or other competent evidence. The
date for compensation for occupational hearing loss
shall be determined by the date of direct head injury
or the last date when harmful industrial noise contributed substantially in causing the hearing loss.
1991

35-1-67.

P e r m a n e n t total disability — A m o u n t
of p a y m e n t s — Rehabilitation.
(1) (a) In cases of permanent total disability
caused by an industrial accident, the employee
shall receive compensation as outlined in this
section.
(b) Permanent total disability for purposes of
this chapter requires a finding by the commission
of total disability, as measured by the substance
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nent total disability compensation rate under
of the sequential decision-making process of the
Subsection (2).
Social Security Administration under Title 20 of
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation
the Code of Federal Regulations as revised.
spall be recouped by the employer or its insur(c) The commission shall adopt rules that conance carrier by reasonably offsetting the overform to the substance of the sequential decisionpayment against future liability paid before or
making process of the Social Security Adminisafter the initial 312 weeks.
tration under 20 C.F.R. Subsections 404.1520(b),
(5) Notwithstanding the minimum rate estab(c), (d), (e), and (f)(1) and (2), as revised.
(2) For permanent total disability compensation lished "in Subsection (2), the compensation payable by
its insurance carrier, or the Employers'
during the initial 312-week entitlement, compensa- the employer*
111,811106
Fund, after an employee has received
tion shall be 66 *h% of the employee's average weekly Reins
m
wage at the time of the injury, limited as follows: compensation fr° the employer or the employer's
carrier for any combination of disabilities
(a) Compensation per week may not be more insurance
nt n
than 85% of the state average weekly wage at the amou i §> to 312 weeks of compensation at the applicable total disability compensation rate, shall be retime of the injury.
(b) Compensation per week may not be less duced* to the extent allowable by law, by the dollar
than the sum of $45 per week, plus $5 for a de- amount of 50% of the Social Security retirement benpendent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent child efits received by the employee during the same peunder the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of riod.
(6) (a) A finding by the commission of permanent
four such dependent minor children, but not extfltal disability is not final, unless otherwise
ceeding the maximum established in Subsection
agreed to by the parties, until:
(2)(a) nor exceeding the average weekly wage of
(i) the commission reviews a summary of
the employee at the time of the injury.
reemployment activities undertaken pursu(c) After the initial 312 weeks, the minimum
ant to Title 35, Chapter 10, Utah Injured
weekly compensation rate under Subsection
Worker Reemployment Act;
(2Kb) shall be 36% of the current state average
(ii) the employer or its insurance carrier
weekly wage, rounded to the nearest dollar.
submits to the commission a reemployment
(3) For claims resulting from an accident or disease
plan as prepared by a qualified rehabilitaarising out of and in the course of the employee's
tion provider reasonably designed to return
employment on or before June 30, 1994:
the employee to gainful employment or the
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liaemployer or its insurance carrier provides
ble for the initial 312 weeks of permanent total
the commission notice that the employer or
disability compensation except as outlined in
its insurance carrier will not submit a plan;
Section 35-1-69 as in effect on the date of injury.
and
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may
(iii) the commission, after notice to the
not be required to pay compensation for any comparties, holds a hearing, unless otherwise
bination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in
stipulated, to consider evidence regarding rethis section and Sections 35-1-65, 35-1-65.1,
habilitation and to review any reemploy35-1-66, and 35-1-66.1 through 35-1-66.7 in exment plan submitted by the employer or its
cess of the amount of compensation payable over
insurance carrier under Subsection (6)(a)(ii).
the initial 312 weeks at the applicable perma(b) Prior to the finding becoming final, the
nent total disability compensation rate under
commission shall order the initiation of permaSubsection (2).
nent total disability compensation payments to
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation
provide for the employee's subsistence. The comshall be reimbursed to the employer or its insurmission shall order the payment of any undisance carrier by the Employers' Reinsurance
puted disability or medical benefits due the emFund and shall be paid out of the Employers' Reployee. The employer or its insurance carrier
insurance Fund's liability to the employee.
ghall be given credit for any disability payments
(d) After an employee has received compensaagainst its ultimate disability compensation liation from his employer, its insurance carrier, or
bility under Chapter (1) or (2).
the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combi(c) The commission may not order an employer
nation of disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of
or its insurance carrier to submit a reemploycompensation at the applicable permanent total
ment plan. If the employer or its insurance cardisability compensation rate, the Employers' Rerier voluntarily submits a plan:
insurance Fund shall pay all remaining perma(i) The plan may include retraining, edunent total disability compensation.
cation, medical and disability compensation
(e) Employers' Reinsurance Fund payments
Vfetft&to, 5F>\> ?>\%tfeitfeiA. *«rm«&, t>t YnrenaWA comments '-rcnTnfe&a'tfcty aSter tYi* feYwp\^«T
tives calculated to facilitate reemployment
or its insurance carrier has satisfied its liability
funded by the employer or its insurance carunder Subsection (3) or Section 35-1-69.
rier.
(4) For claims resulting from an accident or disease
(ii) The plan shall include payment of reaarising out of and in the course of the employee's
sonable disability compensation to provide
employment on or after July 1, 1994:
for the employee's subsistence during the re(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liahabilitation process.
ble for permanent total disability compensation.
(iii) The employer or its insurance carrier
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may
shall diligently pursue the reemployment
not be required to pay compensation for any complan. The employer's or insurance carrier's
bination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in
failure to diligently pursue the reemploythis section and Sections 35-1-65, 35-1-65.1,
ment plan shall be cause for the commission
35-1-66, and 35-1-66.1 through 35-1-66.7, in exon its own motion to order a final finding of
cess of the amount of compensation payable over
permanent total disability.
the initial 312 weeks at the applicable perma-

353

LABOR — INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

(d) If a preponderance of the evidence shows
that successful rehabilitation is not possible, the
commission shall order that the employee be paid
weekly permanent total disability compensation
benefits.
(7) The period of benefits commences on the date
the employee became permanently totally disabled,
as determined by the commission based on the facts
and evidence, and ends with the death of the employee or when the employee is capable of returning
to regular, steady work.
(8) When an employee has been rehabilitated or
the employee's rehabilitation is possible but the employee has some loss of bodily function, the award
shall be for permanent partial disability.
(9) As determined by the commission, an employee
is not entitled to disability compensation, unless the
employee fully cooperates with any evaluation or reemployment plan under this title.
(10) (a) The loss or permanent and complete loss of
the use of both hands, both arms, both feet, both
legs, both eyes, or any combination of two such
body members constitutes total and permanent
disability, to be compensated according to this
section.
(b) A finding of permanent total disability pursuant to Subsection (10)(a) is final.
1994
35-1-68.

Employers' Reinsurance Fund — In-

jury causing death — Burial expenses
— Payments to dependents.
(1) There is created an Employers' Reinsurance
Fund for the purpose of making payments for industrial accidents or occupational diseases occurring on
or before June 30, 1994. The payments shall be made
in accordance with Title 35, Chapters 1 and 2. The
Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall have no liability
for industrial accidents or occupational diseases occurring on or after July 1, 1994. This fund shall succeed to all monies previously held in the "Special
Fund," the "Combined Injury Fund," or the "Second
Injury Fund." Whenever this code refers to the "Special Fund," the "Combined Injury Fund," or the "Siecond Injury Fund" that reference is considered to be
the Employers' Reinsurance Fund. The state treasurer shall be the custodian of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, and the commission shall make provisions for and direct its distribution. Reasonable costs
of administration or other fees may be paid from the
fund.
(2) The state treasurer shall:
(a) receive workers' compensation premium
assessments from the State Tax Commission; and
(b) invest the Employers' Reinsurance Fund to
ensure maximum investment return for both
long and short term investments in accordance
with Section 51-7-12.5.
(3) The commission may employ or retain counsel
to represent the Employers' Reinsurance Fund in proceedings brought to enforce claims against or on behalf of the fund. Upon request of the commission, the
attorney general shall aid in representation of the
fund.
(4) The liability of the state, its departments, agencies, instrumentalities, elected or appointed officials,
or other duly authorized agents, with respect to payment of any compensation benefits, expenses, fees,
medical expenses, or disbursement properly chargeable against the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, is
limited to the cash or assets in the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, and they are not otherwise, in any
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way, liable for the operation, debts, or obligations of
the Employers' Reinsurance Fund.
(5) If injur}' causes death within a period of 312
weeks from the date of the accident, the employer or
insurance carrier shall pay the burial expenses of the
deceased as provided in Section 35-1-81, and further
benefits in the amounts and to the persons as follows:
(a) (i) If there are wholly dependent persons at
the time of the death, the payment by the
employer or its insurance carrier shall be 66
2
h% of the decedent's average weekly wage
at the time of the injury, but not more than a
maximum of 85% of the state average
weekly wage at the time of the injury per
week and not less than a minimum of $45
per week, plus $5 for a dependent spouse,
plus $5 for each dependent minor child under
the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four
such dependent minor children, but not exceeding the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, and not exceeding 85% of the state average weekly
wage at the time of the injury per week.
Compensation shall continue during dependency for the remainder of the period between the date of the death and the expiration of 312 weeks after the date of the injury.
(ii) The payment by the employer or its
insurance carrier to wholly dependent persons during dependency following the expiration of the first 312-week period described
in Subsection (5)(a)(i) shall be an amount
equal to the weekly benefits paid to those
wholly dependent persons during that initial
312-week period, reduced by 50% of any
weekly federal Social Security death benefits
paid to those wholly dependent persons.
(iii) The issue of dependency shall be subject to review by the commission at the end
of the initial 312-week period and annually
thereafter. If in any such review it is determined that, under the facts and circumstances existing at that time, the applicant is
no longer a wholly dependent person, the applicant may be considered a partly dependent or nondependent person and shall be
paid such benefits as the commission may
determine under Subsection (5Xb)(ii).
(iv) For purposes of any dependency determination, a surviving spouse of a deceased
employee shall be conclusively presumed to
be wholly dependent for a 312-week period
from the date of death of the employee. This
presumption shall not apply after the initial
312-week period and, in determining the
then existing annual income of the surviving
spouse, the commission shall exclude 50% of
any federal Social Security death benefits received by that surviving spouse.
(b) (i) If there are partly dependent persons at
the time of the death, the payment shall be
66 %h% of the decedent's average weekly
wage at the time of the injury, but not more
than a maximum of 85% of the state average
weekly wage at the time of the injury per
week and not less than a minimum of $45
per week. Compensation shall continue during dependency for the remainder of the period between the date of death and the expiration of 312 weeks after the date of injury
as the commission in each case may determine. Compensation may not amount to
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more than a maximum of $30,000. The benefits provided for in this subsection shall be in
keeping with the circumstances and conditions of dependency existing at the date of
injury, and any amount awarded by the commission under this subsection shall be consistent with the general provisions of this
title.
(ii) Benefits to persons determined to be
partly dependent under Subsection (5)(a)(iii)
shall be determined by the commission in
keeping with the circumstances and conditions of dependency existing at the time of
the dependency review and may be paid in
an amount not exceeding the maximum
weekly rate that partly dependent persons
would receive if wholly dependent.
(iii) Payments- under this section shall be
paid to such persons during their dependency by the employer or its insurance carrier,
(c) If there are wholly dependent persons and
also partly dependent persons at the time of
death, the commission may apportion the benefits as it considers just and equitable; provided,
that the total benefits awarded to all parties concerned do not exceed the maximum provided for
by law.

1994

35-1-69. Payments from Employers' Reinsurance Fund.
If an employee, who has at least a 10% whole person permanent impairment from any cause or origin,
subsequently incurs an additional impairment by an
accident arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment during the period of July 1,
1988, to June 30, 1994, inclusive, and if the additional impairment results in permanent total disability, the employer or its insurance carrier and the Employers' Reinsurance Fund are liable for the payment
of benefits as follows:
(1) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the first $20,000 of medical benefits and
the initial 156 weeks of permanent total disability compensation as provided in this title.
(2) Reasonable medical benefits in excess of
the first $20,000 shall be paid in the first instance by the employer or its insurance carrier.
Then, as provided in Subsection (5), the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall reimburse the
employer or its insurance carrier for 50% of those
expenses.
(3) After the initial 156-week period under
Subsection (1), permanent total disability compensation payable to an employee under this title
becomes the liability of and shall be paid by the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund.
(4) If it is determined that the employee is permanently and totally disabled, the employer or
its insurance carrier shall be given credit for all
prior payments of temporary total, temporary
partial, and permanent partial disability compensation made as a result of the industrial accident. A n y overpayment by the employer or its
insurance carrier shall be reimbursed by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund under Subsection (5).
(5) Upon receipt of a duly verified petition, the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall reimburse
the employer or its insurance carrier for the Employers' Reinsurance Fund's share of medical
benefits and compensation paid to or on behalf of
an employee. A request for Employers' Reinsur-
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ance Fund reimbursements shall be accompanied
by satisfactory evidence of payment of the medical or disability compensation for which the reimbursement is requested. Each request is subject to review as to reasonableness by the commission. The commission may determine the
manner of reimbursement.
(6) If, at the time an employee is determined to
be permanently and totally disabled, the employee has other actionable workers' compensation claims, the employer or insurance carrier
that is liable for the last industrial accident resulting in permanent total disability shall be liable for the benefits payable by the employer as
provided in this section and Section 35-1-67. The
employee's entitlement to benefits for prior actionable claims shall then be determined separately on the facts of those claims. Any previous
permanent partial disability arising out of those
claims shall then be considered to be impairments that may give rise to Employers' Reinsurance Fund liability under this section.
1994
35-1-70. Additional benefits in special cases.
If any wholly dependent persons, who have been
receiving the benefits of this title, at the termination
of such benefits are yet in a dependent condition, and
under all reasonable circumstances should be entitled
to additional benefits, the industrial commission
may, in its discretion, extend indefinitely such benefits; but the liability of the employer or insurance
carrier involved shall not be extended, and the additional benefits allowed shall be paid out of the special
fund provided for in Subdivision (1) of Section
35-1-68.
1953
35-1-71. Dependents — Presumption.
The following persons shall be presumed to be
wholly dependent for support upon a deceased employee:
(1) Children under the age of 18 years, or over
if physically or mentally incapacitated and dependent upon the parent, with whom they are
living at the time of the death of such parent, or
who is legally bound for their support.
(2) For purposes of payments to be made under
Subsection 35-l-68(2)(a)(i), a surviving husband
or wife shall be presumed to be wholly dependent
upon a spouse with whom he or she lived at the
time of the employee's death.
In all other cases, the question of dependency, in
whole or in part, shall be determined in accordance
with the facts in each particular case existing at the
time of the injury or death of such employee, except
for purposes of dependency reviews under Subsection
35-l-68(2)(a)(iii). No person shall be considered as a
dependent unless he or she is a member of the family
of the deceased employee, or bears the relation of husband or wife, lineal descendant, ancestor, or brother
or sister. The word "child" as used in this title shall
include a posthumous child, and a child legally
adopted prior to the injury. Half brothers and half
sisters shall be included in the words "brother or sister" as above used.
1967
35-1-72. Repealed.

1993

35-1-73. Benefits in case of death — Distribution
of award to dependents — Death of dependents — Remarriage of surviving
spouse.
The benefits in case of death shall be paid to such
one or more of the dependents of the decedent for the
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benefit of all the dependents, as may be determined
by the commission, which may apportion the benefits
among the dependents in such manner as it deems
just and equitable. Payment to a dependent subsequent in right may be made, if the commission deems
it proper, and shall operate to discharge all other
claims therefor. The dependents, or persons to whom
benefits are paid, shall apply the same to the use of
the several beneficiaries thereof in compliance with
the finding and direction of the commission. In all
cases of death where the dependents are a surviving
spouse and one or more minor children, it shall be
sufficient for the widow or widower to make application to the commission on behalf of that individual
and the minor children; and in cases where all of the
dependents are minors, the application shall be made
by the guardian or next friend of such minor dependents. The commission may, for the purpose of protecting the rights and interests of any minor dependents it deems incapable of doing so, provide a
method of safeguarding any payments due them.
Should any dependent of a deceased employee die
during the period covered by such weekly payments,
the right of such dependent to compensation under
this title shall cease. Should a surviving spouse, who
is a dependent of a deceased employee and who is
receiving the benefits of this title remarry, that individual's sole right after such remarriage, to further
payments of compensation shall be the right to receive in a lump sum the balance of the weekly compensation payments unpaid from the time of remarriage to the end of six years or 312 weeks from the
date of the injury from which death resulted, but in
no event shall such amount exceed 52 weeks of compensation at the weekly compensation rate the surviving spouse was receiving at the time of such remarriage. If there are other dependents remaining at
the time of remarriage, benefits payable under this
title shall be paid to such person as the commission
may determine, for the use and benefit of the other
dependents, the weekly benefits to be paid at intervals of not less than four weeks.
1977
35-1-74.

Increase of award to children and dep e n d e n t s p o u s e — Effect of death,
marriage, majority, or termination of
d e p e n d e n c y of children — Death, divorce, or remarriage of spouse.
In all cases where an award is made to, or increased because of a dependent spouse or dependent
minor child or children, as provided in this title, such
award or increase in amount of the award shall cease
at the death, marriage, attainment of the age of eighteen years, or termination of dependency of such
minor child or children or upon the death, divorce or
remarriage of the spouse of the employee, subject to
those provisions relative to the remarriage of a
spouse as provided in Section 35-1-73.
1979
35-1-75.

A v e r a g e w e e k l y w a g e — Basis of com*
putation.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this act, the
average weekly wage of the injured employee at the
time of the injury shall be taken as the basis upon
which to compute the weekly compensation rate and
shall be determined as follows:
(a) If at the time of the injury the wages are
fixed by the year, the average weekly wage shall
be that yearly wage divided by 52.
(b) If at the time of the injury the wages are
fixed by the month, the average weekly wage
shall be that monthly wage divided by 4 V3.
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(c) If at the time of the injury the wages are
fixed by the week, that amount shall be the average weekly wage.
(d) If at the time of the injury the wages are
fixed by the day, the weekly wage shall be determined by multiplying the daily wage by the
number of days and fraction of days in the week
during which the employee under a contract of
hire was working at the time of the accident, or
would have worked if the accident had not intervened. In no case shall the daily wage be multiplied by less than three for the purpose of determining the weekly wage.
(e) If at the time of the injury the wages are
fixed by the hour, the average weekly wage shall
be determined by multiplying the hourly rate by
the number of hours the employee would have
worked for the week if the accident had not intervened. In no case shall the hourly wage be multiplied by less than 20 for the purpose of determining the weekly wage.
(f) If at the time of the injury the hourly wage
has not been fixed or cannot be ascertained, the
wage for the purpose of calculating compensation
shall be the usual wage for similar services
where those services are rendered by paid employees.
(g) (i) If at the time of the injury the wages are
fixed by the output of the employee, the average weekly wage shall be the wage most
favorable to the employee computed by dividing by 13 the wages, not including overtime or premium pay, of the employee
earned through that employer in the first,
second, third, or fourth period of 13 consecutive calendar weeks in the 52 weeks immediately preceding the injury.
(ii) If the employee has been employed by
that employer less than 13 calendar weeks
immediately preceding the injury, his average weekly wage shall be computed as under
Subsection (l)(g)(i), presuming the wages,
not including overtime or premium pay. to
be the amount he would have earned had he
been so employed for the full 13 calendar
weeks immediately preceding the injury and
had worked, when work was available to
other employees, in a similar occupation.
(2) If none of the methods in Subsection (1) will
fairly determine the average weekly wage in a particular case, the commission shall use such other
method as will, based on the facts presented, fairly
determine the employee's average weekly wage.
(3) When the average weekly wage of the injured
employee at the time of the injury is determined as in
this section provided, it shall be taken as the basis
upon which to compute the weekly compensation
rate. After the weekly compensation has been computed, it shall be rounded to the nearest dollar.
1994
35-1-76.

Likelihood of increase to be considered.
If it is established that the injured employee was of
such age and experience when injured that under
natural conditions his wages would be expected to
increase, that fact may be considered in arriving at
his average weekly wage.
1953
35-1-77.

Medical panel — Medical director or
medical consultants — Discretionary
authority of commission to refer c a s e
— Findings and reports — Objections
to report — Hearing — E x p e n s e s .
(1) (a) Upon the filing of a claim for compensation
for injury by accident, or for death, arising out of
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and in the course of employment, and if the employer or its insurance carrier denies liability,
the commission may refer the medical aspects of
the case to a medical panel appointed by the commission.
(b) When a claim for compensation based upon
disability or death due to an occupational disease
is filed with the commission, the commission
shall, except upon stipulation of all parties, appoint an impartial medical panel.
(c) A medical panel shall consist of one or more
physicians specializing in the treatment of the
disease or condition involved in the claim.
(d) As an alternative method of obtaining an
impartial medical evaluation of the medical aspects of a controverted case, the commission may
employ a medical director or medical consultants
on a full-time or part-time basis for the purpose
of evaluating the medical evidence and advising
the commission with respect to its ultimate factfinding responsibility. If all parties agree to the
use of a medical director or medical consultants,
they shall be allowed to function in the same
manner and under the same procedures as required of a medical panel.
(2) (a) The medical panel, medical director, or
medical consultants shall make such study, take
such X-rays, and perform such tests, including
post-mortem examinations if authorized by the
commission, as it may determine to be necessary
or desirable.
(b) The medical panel, medical director, or
medical consultants shall make a report in writing to the commission in a form prescribed by the
commission, and also make such additional findings as the commission may require. In occupational disease cases, the panel shall certify to the
commission the extent, if any, of the disability of
the claimant from performing work for remuneration or profit, and whether the sole cause of the
disability or death, in the opinion of the panel,
results from the occupational disease and
whether any other causes have aggravated, prolonged, accelerated, or in any way contributed to
the disability or death, and if so, the extent in
percentage to which the other causes have so contributed.
(c) The commission shall promptly distribute
full copies of the report to the applicant, the employer, and its insurance carrier by certified mail
with return receipt requested. Within 15 days
after the report is deposited in the United States
post office, the applicant, the employer, or its insurance carrier may file with the commission
written objections to the report. If no written objections are filed within that period, the report is
considered admitted in evidence.
(d) The commission may base its finding and
decision on the report of the panel, medical director, or medical consultants, but is not bound by
the report if other substantial conflicting evidence in the case supports a contrary finding.
(e) If objections to the report are filed, the commission may set the case for hearing to determine the facta and issues involved. At the hearing, any party so desiring may request the commission to have the chairman of the medical
panel, the medical director, or the medical consultants present at the hearing for examination
and cross-examination. For good cause shown,
the commission may order other members of the
panel, with or without the chairman or the medi-
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cal director or medical consultants, to be present
at the hearing for examination and cross-examination.
(D The written report of the panel, medical director, or medical consultants may be received as
an exhibit at the hearing, but may not be considered as evidence in the case except as far as it U
sustained by the testimony admitted.
(g) The expenses of the study and report of the
medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants and the expenses of their appearance before the commission shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund.
1994

35-1-78. Continuing jurisdiction of commission
to modify award — Authority to destroy records — Interest on award —
No authority to change statutes of limitation.
(1) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission
over each case shall be continuing. The commission,
after notice and hearing, may from time to time modify or change its former findings and orders. Records
pertaining to cases that have been closed and inactive
for ten years, other than cases of total permanent
disability or cases in which a claim has been filed as
in Section 35-1-98, may be destroyed at the discretion
of the commission.
(2) Awards made by the Industrial Commission
shall include interest at the rate of 8% per annum
from the date when each benefit payment would have
otherwise become due and payable.
(3) (a) This section may not be interpreted as modifying in any respect the statutes of limitations
contained in other sections of this chapter or Title 35, Chapter 2, Utah Occupational Disease
Act.
(b) The commission has no power to change
the statutes of limitation referred to in Subsection (3)(a) in any respect.
1994
35-1-79. Lump-sum payments.
The commission, under special circumstances and
when the same is deemed advisable, may commute
periodical benefits to one or more lump-sum payments.
1953
35-1-80. Compensation exempt from execution.
Compensation before payment shall be exempt
from all claims of creditors, and from attachment or
execution, and shall be paid only to employees or
their dependents.
1953
35-1-81.

A w a r d s — Medical, nursing, hospital

and burial expenses —
means and appliances.

Artificial

(1) In addition to the compensation provided in this
chapter the employer or the insurance carrier shall
pay reasonable sums for medical, nurse, and hospital
services, for medicines, and for artificial means, appliances, and prostheses necessary to treat the injured employee.
(2) If death results from the injury, the employer or
the insurance carrier shall pay the burial expenses in
ordinary cases as established by rule.
(3) If a compensable accident results in the breaking of or loss of an employee's artificial means or appliance including eyeglasses, the employer or insurance carrier shall provide a replacement of the artificial means or appliance.
(4) The commission may require the employer or
insurance carrier to maintain the artificial means or
appliances or provide the employee with a replace-
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ment of any artificial means or appliance for the reason of breakage, wear and tear, deterioration, or obsolescence.
(5) The commission may, in unusual cases, order
the payment of additional sums for burial expenses or
to provide for artificial means or appliances as the
commission considers just and proper.
1994
35-1-82,35-1-82.51.

Repealed.

1985, 1987

35-1-82.52. Appointment of l a w j u d g e s — P o w e r
and authority.
(1) The commission shall appoint one or more administrative law judges.
(2) The commission or any administrative law
judge may call, preside at, and conduct hearings and
adjudicative proceedings.
(3) (a) The commission and any administrative
law judge may issue subpoenas.
(b) Failure to respond to a properly issued subpoena may result in a contempt citation and offenders may be punished as provided in Section
78-32-15.
1987
35-1-82.53. R e v i e w of administrative order —
Finality of commission's order.
(1) Any party in interest who is dissatisfied with
the order entered by an administrative law judge
may seek review of that order with the commission by
complying with the commission's rules governing
that review.
(2) The order of the commission on review is final,
unless set aside by the Court of Appeals.
1988
35-1-82.54,35-1-82.55.

Repealed.

1988

35-1-82.56. Notice to parties of order or award.
All parties in interest shall be given due notice of
the entry of any administrative law judge's order or
any order or award of the commission. The mailing of
the copy of said order or award to the last known
address shown in the files of the commission of any
party in interest and to the attorneys or agents of
record in the case, if any, shall be deemed to be notice
of such order.
1975
35-1-83 to 35-1-85.

Repealed.

1987

35-1-85.1. Depositions of w i t n e s s e s authorized.
The commission or any party to a proceeding under
this act may cause depositions of witnesses to be
taken as in civil actions.
1965
35-1-86.

Court of Appeals may review commission's actions.
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review,
reverse, or annul any order of the commission, or to
suspend or delay the operation or execution of any
order.
1988
35-1-87. Attorneys* fees.
In all cases coming before the Industrial Commission in which attorneys have been employed, the commission is vested with full power to regulate and fix
the fees of such attorneys.
1953
35-1-88.

R u l e s of e v i d e n c e and procedure before commission and hearing examiner
— Admissible e v i d e n c e .
Neither the commission nor its hearing examiner
shall be bound by the usual common-law or statutory
rules of evidence, or by any technical or formal rules
of procedure, other than as herein provided or as
adopted by the commission pursuant to this act. The
commission may make its investigation in such man-
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ner as in its judgment is best calculated to ascertain
the substantial rights of the parties and to carry out
justly the spirit of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
The commission may receive as evidence and use as
proof of any fact in dispute all evidence deemed material and relevant including, but not limited to the
following:
(a) Depositions and sworn testimony presented
in open hearings.
(b) Reports of attending or examining physicians, or of pathologists.
(c) Reports of investigators appointed by the
commission.
(d) Reports of employers, including copies of
time sheets, book accounts or other records.
(e) Hospital records in the case of an injured or
diseased employee.
1965
35-1-89. Injuries to minors.
A minor shall be deemed sui juris for the purposes
of this title, and no other person shall have any cause
of action or right to compensation for an injury to
such minor workman, but in the event of the award of
a lump sum of compensation to a minor employee,
such sum shall be paid only to his legally appointed
guardian.
1953
35-1-90.

Void agreements b e t w e e n employers
and e m p l o y e e s .
No agreement by an employee to waive his rights
to compensation under this title shall be valid. No
agreement by an employee to pay any portion of the
premium paid by his employer shall be valid. Any
employer who deducts any portion of such premium
from the wages or salary of any employee entitled to
the benefits of this title is guilty of a misdemeanor,
and shall be fined not more than $100 for each such
offense.
1953
35-1-91. Physical examinations.
Any employee claiming the right to receive compensation under this title may be required by the
commission, or its medical examiner, to submit himself for medical examination at any time, and from
time to time, at a place reasonably convenient for
such employee, and such as may be provided by the
rules of the commission. If such employee refuses to
submit to any such examination, or obstructs the
same, his right to have his claim for compensation
considered, if his claim is pending before the commission, or to receive any payments for compensation
theretofore granted, shall be suspended during the
period of such refusal or obstruction.
1953
35-1-92.

Autopsy in death c a s e s — Authority of
commission — Certified pathologist —
Public record — Attending physicians
— Penalty for refusal to permit — Liability.
On the filing of a claim for compensation for death
within the provisions of this act where, in the opinion
of the commission it is necessary to accurately and
scientifically ascertain the cause of death, an autopsy
may be ordered by a majority of the commission and
shall be made by a person designated by the commission. The commission shall determine who shall pay
the charge of the certified pathologist making the autopsy. Any person interested may designate a duly
licensed physician to attend such autopsy, and the
findings of the certified pathologist performing the
autopsy shall be filed with the commission and shall
be a public record. All proceedings for compensation
shall be suspended upon refusal of a claimant or
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claimants to permit such autopsy when so ordered.
Where an autopsy has been performed pursuant to an
order of a majority of the commission no cause of action shall lie against any person, firm or corporation
for participating in or requesting such autopsy. 1975
35-1-93.

Employee removing from place of
treatment
An injured employee who desires to leave the locality in which he has been employed during the treatment of his injury, or to leave this state, shall report
to his attending physician for examination, notifying
the commission in writing of such intention to leave,
accompanying such notice with a certificate from the
attending physician setting forth the exact nature of
the injury, the condition of the employee, together
with a statement of the probable length of time disability will continue. Thereafter, and with the written consent of the commission, the employee may
leave the locality in which he was employed; otherwise no compensation shall be allowed during such
absence.
1953
35-1-94.

Employer's records subject to examination — Penalty.
All books, records, and payrolls of an employer
showing, or reflecting in any way upon, the amount of
his wage expenditure shall always be open for inspection by the commission, or any of its auditors, inspectors, or assistants, for the purpose of ascertaining the
correctness of the wage expenditure, the number of
individuals employed, and such other information as
may be necessary for the uses and purposes of the
commission in its administration of the law. If an
employer refuses to submit any books, records, or
payrolls for inspection, after being presented with
written authority from the commission, he is liable
for a penalty of $100 for each offense. This penalty
shall be collected by a civil action and paid into the
Uninsured Employers' Fund.
1994
35*1-95.

Repealed.

1984

35-1-96. Interstate and intrastate commerce.
The provisions of this title shall apply to employers
and their employees engaged in intrastate and also in
interstate and foreign commerce for whom a rule of
liability or method of compensation has been or may
be established by the Congress of the United States,
only to the extent that their mutual connection with
intrastate work may and shall be clearly separable
and distinguishable from interstate or foreign commerce.
1958
35-1-97. Reporting of industrial injuries.
(1) Any employee sustaining an injury arising out
of and in the course of employment shall provide notification to his employer promptly of the injury. If the
employee is unable to provide notification, the employee's next-of-kin or attorney may provide notification of the injury to his employer.
(2) Any employee who fails to notify his employer
or the commission within 180 days of an injury is
barred for any claim of benefits arising from the injury.
(3) An employer's or physician's injury report filed
with the commission, employer, or insurance carrier
or the payment of any medical or disability benefits
by the employer or the employer's insurance carrier
constitutes notification of an injury.
(4) (a) Each employer shall file a report with the
commission within seven days after the occurrence of an injury, after the employer's first
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knowledge of the occurrence, or after the employee's notification of the same, on forms or by
methods prescribed by the commission, of any
work-related fatality or any work-related injury
resulting in medical treatment, loss of consciousness, loss of work, restriction of work, or transfer
to another job.
(b) Each employer shall file a subsequent report with the commission of any previously reported injury that later resulted in death. The
subsequent report shall be filed with the commission within seven days following the death or the
employer's first knowledge or notification of the
death. No report is required for minor injuries,
such as cuts or scratches that require first-aid
treatment only, unless a treating physician files,
or is required to file, the Physician's Initial Report of Work Injury or Occupational Disease with
the commission.
(5) Each employer shall provide the employee with
a copy of the report submitted to the commission. The
employer shall also provide the employee with a
statement, as prepared by the commission, of his
rights and responsibilities related to the industrial
injury.
(6) Each employer shall maintain a record in a
manner prescribed by the commission of all work-related fatalities or work-related injuries resulting in
medical treatment, loss of consciousness, loss of work,
restriction of work, or transfer to another job.
(7) Any employer who refuses or neglects to make
reports, to maintain records, or to file reports with
the commission as required by this section is guilty of
a class C misdemeanor and subject to citation under
Section 35-9-9 and a civil assessment as provided under Section 35-9-21, unless the commission finds that
the employer has shown good cause for submitting a
report later than required by this section.
(8) All physicians, surgeons, and other health providers, excluding hospitals, attending injured employees shall comply with all the rules, including the
schedule of fees, for their services as adopted by the
commission, and shall make reports to the commission at any and all times as required as to the condition and treatment of an injured employee or as to
any other matter concerning industrial cases they are
treating.
(9) A copy of the physician's initial report shall be
furnished to the commission, the employee, and the
employer or its insurance carrier.
(10) Any physician, surgeon, or other health provider, excluding any hospital, who refuses or neglects
to make any report or comply with this section is
guilty of a class C misdemeanor for each offense, unless the commission finds that there is good cause for
submitting a late report.
1994
35-1-98. Claims a n d benefits.
(1) Except with respect to prosthetic devices, in
nonpermanent total disability cases an employee's
medical benefit entitlement ceases if the employee
does not incur medical expenses reasonably related to
the industrial accident, and submit those expenses to
his employer or insurance carrier for payment, for a
period of three consecutive years.
(2) A claim for compensation for temporary total
disability benefits, temporary partial disability benefits, permanent partial disability benefits, or permanent total disability benefits is barred, unless an application for hearing is filed with the commission
within six years after the date of the accident.
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(3) A claim for death benefits is barred unless an
application for hearing is filed within one year of the
date of death of the employee.
iwo

35-1-107

payment of workers' compensation benefits to any
person entitled to them, if that person's employer is
individually, jointly, or severally liable to pay the
benefits, but becomes or is insolvent, appoints or has
35-1-99,35-1-100. Repealed.
lses, 1990 appointed a receiver, or otherwise does not have sufficient funds, insurance, sureties, or other security to
35-1-101. Attorney general and county attor- cover workers' compensation liabilities. This fund
neys — Duties.
succeeds to all monies previously held in the Default
Upon the request of the commission the attorney Indemnity Fund. If it becomes necessary to pay benegeneral, or any county attorney, shall institute and fits, the fund is liable for all obligations of the emprosecute the necessary actions or proceedings for the ployer as set forth in Title 35, Chapters 1 and 2, with
enforcement of any order of the commission or of any the exception of penalties on those obligations.
of the provisions of this chapter, or defend any suit,
(2) Funds for the Uninsured Employers' Fund shall
action or proceeding brought against the commission,
or the members thereof in their official capacity. 1979 be provided under Subsection 59-9-101(2). The state
treasurer is the custodian of the Uninsured Em35-1-102. Expenses in acquiring information au- ployers' Fund, and the commission shall make provisions for and direct its distribution.
thorized.
The commission may make necessary expenditures
(3) Reasonable costs of administration or other fees
to obtain statistical and other information provided may be paid from the fund.
for herein.
is«s
(4) The state treasurer shall:
(a) receive workers' compensation premium
35-1-103. Biennial report to governor.
assessments from the State Tax Commission; and
On or before the 1st day of December preceding the
(b) invest the Uninsured Employers' Fund to
regular session of the Legislature the commission,
ensure maximum investment return for both
under the oath of at least two of its members, shall
long and short term investments in accordance
make a report to the governor for the preceding bienwith Section 51-7-12.5.
nial period, which shall include a statement of the
(5)
The commission shall employ counsel to reprenumber of awards made by it, and a general statement of the causes of accidents leading to the injuries sent the Uninsured Employers' Fund in all proceedfor which the awards were made, a detailed state- ings brought to enforce claims against or on behalf of
ment of the disbursements from the expense fund, the fund. Upon the request of the commission, the
and the condition of its respective funds, together attorney general, city attorney, or county attorney of
with any other matters which the commission deems the locality in which any investigation, hearing, or
proper to call to the attention of the governor, includ- trial under this title is pending, or in which the eming any recommendations it may have to make; and it ployee resides or an employer resides or is doing busishall be the duty of the commission from time to time ness, shall aid in the representation of the fund.
(6) To the extent of the compensation and other
to publish and distribute among employers and employees such general information as to the business benefits paid or payable to or on behalf of an emtransacted by the commission as in its judgment may ployee or the employee's dependents from the Uninbe useful.
1953 sured Employers' Fund, the fund, by subrogation, has
all the rights, powers, and benefits of the employee or
35-1-104. Publication of orders, rules, and rates. the employee's dependents against the employer failThe commission shall cause to be printed, in proper ing to make the compensation payments.
form for distribution to the public, its orders, classifi(7) The receiver, trustee, liquidator, or statutory
cations, rules, regulations and rules of procedure, and successor of an insolvent employer is bound by settleshall furnish the same to any person upon application ments of covered claims by the fund. The court with
therefor. The expense of such publication shall be au- jurisdiction shall grant all payments made under this
dited and paid as are other expenses of the commis- section a priority equal to that to which the claimant
sion. The director of finance shall publish the rates would have been entitled in the absence of this secfixed by it for insurance in the Workers' Compensa- tion against the assets of the insolvent employer. The
tion Fund of Utah.
1986 expenses of the fund in handling claims shall be accorded the same priority as the liquidator's expenses.
35-1-105. Injunction prohibited.
(8) The commission shall periodically file with the
No injunction shall issue suspending or restraining receiver, trustee, or liquidator of the insolvent emany order, award, or classification adopted by the ployer or insurance carrier statements of the covered
commission, or any action of the state auditor, state claims paid by the fund and estimates of anticipated
treasurer, attorney general or the auditor or trea- claims against the fund which shall prest^-ve the
surer of any county, required to be taken by them or rights of the fund for claims against the assets of the
any of them by any of the provisions of this title; but insolvent employer.
nothing herein shall affect any right or defense in
(9) When any injury or death for which compensaany action brought by the commission or the state in
tion
is payable from the Uninsured Employers' Fund
pursuance of authority contained in this title.
1953
has been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of
another person not in the same employment, the fund
35-1-106. Partial invalidity — Saving clause.
Should any section or provision of this title be de- has the same rights as allowed under Section 35-1-62.
(10) The fund, subject to approval of the Workers'
cided by the courts to be unconstitutional or invalid
the same shall not affect the validity of the title as a Compensation Division of the Industrial Commission
whole or any part thereof other than the part so de- of Utah, shall discharge its obligations by adjusting
cided to be unconstitutional.
19SS its own claims or by contracting with an adjusting
company, risk management company, insurance company, or other company that has expertise and capa35-1-107. U n i n s u r e d E m p l o y e r s ' F u n d .
(1) There is created an Uninsured Employers' bilities in adjusting and paying workers' compensaFund. The fund has the purpose of assisting in the tion claims.
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(11) For the purpose of maintaining this fund, the
commission, upon rendering a decision with respect
to any claim for workers' compensation benefits in
which an uninsured employer was duly joined as a
party, shall order the uninsured employer to reimburse the Uninsured Employers' Fund for all benefits
paid to or on behalf of an injured employee by the
Uninsured Employers' Fund along with interest,
costs, and attorneys' fees. The commission shall impose a penalty against the uninsured employer of
15% of the value of the total award in connection with
the claim, and shall direct that the additional penalty
be paid into the Uninsured Employers' Fund. Awards
may be docketed as other awards under this chapter.
(12) The liability of the state, the Industrial Commission, and the state treasurer, with respect to payment of any compensation benefits, expenses, fees, or
disbursement properly chargeable against the fund,
is limited to the assets in the fund, and they are not
otherwise in any way liable for the making of any
payment.
(13) The commission may make reasonable rules
for the processing and payment of claims for compensation from the fund.
(14) In the event it becomes necessary for the Uninsured Employers' Fund to pay benefits under this
section to any employee of an insolvent self-insured
employer, the Uninsured Employers' Fund may assess all other self-insured employers amounts necessary to pay:
(a) the obligations of the fund subsequent to
an insolvency;
(b) the expenses of handling covered claims
subsequent to an insolvency;
(c) the cost of examinations under Subsec<*on
(15); and
(d) other expenses authorized by this section.
The assessments of each self-insured employer
shall be in the proportion that the manual premium of the self-insured employer for the preceding calendar year bears to the manual premium
of all self-insured employers for the preceding
calendar year. Each self-insured employer shall
be notified of his assessment not later than 30
days before it is due. No self-insured employer
may be assessed in any year an amount greater
than 2% of that self-insured employer's manual
premium for the preceding calendar year. If the
maximum assessment does not provide in any
one year an amount sufficient to make all necessary payments from the fund for one or more insolvent self-insured employers, the unpaid portion shall be paid as soon as funds become available. All self-insured employers are liable under
this section for a period not to exceed three years
after the self-insured employer's voluntary or involuntary termination of self-insurance privileges within this state. This subsection does not
apply to claims made against an insolvent selfinsured employer if the insolvency occurred prior
to July 1, 1986.
(15) It is the duty of all self-insured employers to
notify the Industrial Commission of any information
indicating that any self-insured employer may be insolvent or in a financial condition hazardous to its
employees or the public. Upon receipt of that notification and with good cause appearing, the Industrial
Commission may order an examination of that selfinsured employer. The cost of the examination shall
be assessed against all self-insured employers as provided in Subsection (14). The results of the examination shall be kept confidential.
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(16) In any claim against an employer by the Uninsured Employers' Fund, or by or on behalf of the
employee to whom or to whose dependents compensation and other benefits are paid or payable from the
fund, the burden of proof is on the employer or other
party in interest objecting to the claim. The claim is
presumed to be valid up to the full amount of
workers' compensation benefits claimed by the employee or his dependents. This subsection applies
whether the claim is filed in court or in an adjudicative proceeding under the authority of the commission.
(17) A partner in a partnership or an owner of a
sole proprietorship may not recover compensation or
other benefits from the Uninsured Emplovers' Fund
if:
(a) the person is not included as an employee
under Subsection 35-l-43(3)(a); or
(b) the person is included as an employee under Subsection 35-l-43(3)(a), but his employer
fails to insure or otherwise provide adequate payment of direct compensation, which failure is attributable to an act or omission over which the
person had or shared control or responsibility.
(18) For purposes of Subsection (17Mb):
(a) a partner of a partnership and an owner of
a sole proprietorship are presumed to have had or
shared control or responsibility for any failure to
insure or otherwise provide adequate payment of
direct compensation, the burden of proof being on
any person seeking to establish the contrary; and
(b) evidence affirmatively establishing that a
partner of a partnership or an owner of a sole
proprietorship had or shared control or responsibility for any failure to insure or otherwise provide adequate payment of direct compensation
may only be overcome by clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary.
(19) A director or officer of a corporation may not
recover compensation or other benefits from the Uninsured Employers' Fund if the director or officer is
excluded
from coverage
under
Subsection
35-l-43(3)(b).

1994

35-1*108. Managed health care — Health care
cost containment.
(1) Self-insured employers and workers' compensation carriers may adopt a managed health care program to provide employees the benefits of this title,
beginning January 1,1993. The plan may include one
or more of the following:
(a) (i) A preferred provider program may be
developed so long as the program allows a
selection by the employee of more than one
physician in the health care specialty required for treating the specific problem of an
industrial patient. If a preferred provider
program is developed by an employer, insurance carrier, or self-insured entity, employees are required to utilize preferred provider physicians and medical care facilities.
If a preferred provider program is not developed, an industrial claimant may have free
choice of health care providers. Failure of an
industrial claimant to utilize a preferred
health care facility as defined in Section
26-21-2 as part of a preferred provider program, or failure to initially receive treatment from a preferred physician, may, if the
claimant has been notified of the program,
result in the claimant being obligated for
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any charges in excess of the preferred provider allowances.
(ii) Notwithstanding the requirements of
Subsection (a)(i), a self-insured entity or
other employer may have its own health care
facility on or near its worksite or premises
and may continue to contract with other
health care providers, or the employer may
operate a health care facility and require
employees to first seek treatment at the provided health care or contracted facility.
(iii) An employee of an employer utilizing
a preferred provider program or having its
own health care facility may procure the services of any qualified practitioner
(A) for emergency treatment if a physician employed in the program or at the
facility is not available for any reason;
(B) for conditions the employee in
good faith believesare nonindustrial; or
(C) when an employee living in a rural area would be unduly burdened by
traveling to a preferred provider.
(b) (i) Other contracts with medical care providers or medical review organizations may
be made for the following purposes:
(A) Insurance carriers or self-insured
employers may form groups in contracting for managed health care services
with medical providers;
(B) Peer review;
(C) Methods of utilization review;
(D) Use of case management; and
(E) Bill audit.
(ii) Insurance carriers may make any or
all of the factors in Subsection (i) a condition
of insuring entities in their insurance contract.
(2) As used in Subsection (1), "physician" means
any health care provider licensed under Title 58,
Chapter 5, Podiatrists; Title 58, Chapter 7, Dentists
and Dental Hygienists Act; Title 58, Chapter 12,
Practice of Medicine and Surgery and the Treatment
of Human Ailments; and Title 58, Chapter 24a, Physical Therapists Practice Act.
(3) Each workers' compensation insurance carrier
writing insurance in this state shall maintain a designated agent in this state registered with the commission.
(4) In addition to managed health care plans, insurance carriers may require employers who have an
experience modification factor of 1.00 or higher, as
determined by the National Council on Compensation Insurance, or who may be determined by the carrier to have a three year loss ratio of 100% or higher,
to establish a workplace safety program which may
include:
(a) a written workplace accident and injury reduction program that promotes safe and healthful working conditions, which is based on clearly
stated goals and objectives for meeting those
goals. The program should describe:
(i) how managers, supervisors, and employees are responsible for implementing the
program and how continued participation of
management will be established, measured,
and maintained;
(ii) the methods used to identify, analyze,
and control new or existing hazards, conditions, and operations;
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(iii) how the program will be communicated to all employees so that they are informed of work-related hazards and controls;
(iv) how workplace accidents will be investigated and corrective action implemented; and
(v) how safe work practices and rules will
be enforced; and
(b) a documented review of the workplace accident and injury reduction program each calendar
year delineating how procedures set forth in the
program are met.
(5) The premiums charged to any employer who
fails or refuses to establish a workplace safety program pursuant to Subsection (4)(a) or (b) may be increased by 5% over any existing current rates and
premium modifications charged that employer. 1992
35-1-109. Workers' compensation insurance
fraud — Elements — Penalties — Notice.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Corporation" has the same meaning as in
Subsection 76-2-201(3).
(b) "Intentionally" has the same meaning as in
Subsection 76-2-103(2).
(c) "Knowingly" has the same meaning as in
Subsection 76-2-103(2).
(d) "Person" has the same meaning as in Subsection 76-1-601(8).
(e) "Recklessly" has the same meaning as in
Subsection 76-2-103(3).
(2) Any person who has intentionally, knowingly,
or recklessly, devised any icheme or artifice to obtain
workers' compensation insurance coverage, disability
compensation, medical benefits, goods, professional
services, fees for professional services, or anythingof
value under this chapter or Chapter 2, Utah Occupational Disease Act, by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, promises, or material
omissions, and who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly communicates or causes a communication with
another in furtherance of the scheme or artifice, is
guilty of workers' compensation insurance fraud,
which is punishable in the manner prescribed by Section 76-10-1801 for communication fraud.
(3) A corporation or association is guilty of the offense of workers' compensation insurance fraud under the same conditions as those set forth in Section
76-2-204.
(4) The determination of the degree of any offense
under Subsection (1) shall be measured by the total
value of all property, money, or other things obtained
or sought to be obtained by the scheme or artifice
described in Subsection (1), except as provided in
Subsection 76-10-1801(l)(e).
(5) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the offense described in Subsection
(1).
(6) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any
offense described in Subsection (1) to permanently
deprive any person of property, money, or anything of
value is not a necessary element of this offense.
(7) A scheme or artifice to obtain workers' compensation insurance coverage includes any scheme or artifice to make or cause to be made any false written or
oral statement or business reorganization, incorporation, or change in ownership intended to obtain insurance coverage as mandated by this chapter or Chapter 2, Utah Occupational Disease Act, at rates that do
not reflect the risk, industry, employer, or class codes
actually covered by the policy.
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35-3-3. Legal nature of Workers' Compensation Fund.
The Workers' Compensation Fund is a nonprofit, self-supporting, quasi-public corporation. It is an independent state agency and a body politic and corporate. It is a legal entity and may sue and be sued in its own name. All of its
business and affairs shall be conducted in the name of the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah.
^ 8 t o r y ! c - 1 9 5 3 » 35-3-3, enacted by L.
19S8, ch. 56, S 6.
Repeals and Reenactmento. — Laws 1988,
cn. 56, § 6 repeals former $ 35-3-3, as enacted
by Laws 1986, ch. 204, § 279, relating to the
name and nature of the fund, effective July 1,
1988, and enact* the present section.

Laws 1986, ch. 204, § 279 repealed a former
§ 35-3-3, as enacted by Laws 1985, ch. 242,
§ 58, relating to the State Insurance Fund, effective July 1, 1986, and enacted another former i 35-3-3.

35-3-5. Board of directors.
(1) There is created a board of directors of the Workers' Compensation
Fund. The board shall be composed of five directors, to be appointed by the
governor with approval of the Senate and one of which shall be the executive
director of the Department of Administrative Services or his designee, who
shall represent the state as a policyholder. The governor shall appoint two
directors who are owners, officers, or employees of policyholders other than
the state that have been insured by the Workers' Compensation Fund for at
least one year prior to appointment. The governor shall appoint two directors
from the public in general. At least three directors appointed by the governor
shall have had previous experience in investments, risk management, occupational safety, casualty insurance, or law. Any director who represents a policyholder that fails to maintain workers' compensation insurance through the
Workers' Compensation Fund shall immediately resign from the board. No
person may be a director who has any interest as a stockholder, employee,
attorney, or contractor of a competing insurance carrier providing workers'
compensation insurance in Utah.
(2) Any director appointed by the governor may, after notice and a hearing,
be removed by the governor for neglect of duty, inefficiency, or malfeasance.
(3) Directors shall post a bond in an amount specified by the director of the
Division of Finance. The bond is considered an expense of the Workers' Compensation Fund to be paid out of the Iryury Fund.
(4) The term of office of the directors appointed by the governor shall be
four years, beginning July 1 of the year of appointment. The directors shall
hold office until the appointment and qualification of their successors. The
terms of office for directors appointed by the governor shall be staggered so
that one term shall expire each year on June 30. Vacancies on the board shall
be filled by appointment of the governor for the remainder of any unexpired
term.
(5) Of the directors appointed to the board with terms beginning July 1,
1988, one shall be appointed to a term ending June 30,1989, one appointed to
a term ending June 30, 1990, one appointed to a term ending June 30, 1991,
and one appointed to a term ending June 30, 1992.
(6) The board shall annually elect a chairman and such other officers as
needed from its membership. No additional compensation beyond travel expenses and per diem allowance may be paid for these responsibilities.
(7) The board shall meet at least quarterly at a time and place designated
by the chairman. Three directors shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of
transacting all business of the board. Each decision of the board requires the
affirmative vote of at least three directors for approval.
(8) Directors appointed to the board shall receive actual and reasonable
travel expenses for meetings of the board. The directors appointed by the
governor shall receive a per diem allowance and reimbursement for actual
and necessary expenses incurred in carrying out official duties as provided
under Section 63-1-14.5. Per diem and expenses may be paid for no more than
20 days each year. Per diem allowance and expenses shall be paid out of the
Injury Fund upon vouchers drawn by the chief executive officer in the same
manner as the normal operating expenses of the Workers' Compensation
Fund are paid. The executive director of the Department of Administrative
Services, or his designee, shall serve on the board without a per diem allowance.
History: C. 1953, 35-3-5, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 56, 5 8.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1988,
ch. 56, § 8 repeals former § 35-3-5, as enacted
by Laws 1986, ch. 204, 5 279, relating to liability of officers and employees, effective July 1,
1988, and enacts the present section.
•
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§ 35-3-5, as enacted by Laws 1985, cb. 242,
§ 58, relating to the State Insurance Fund, and
enacted another former § 35-3-5.
Cross-References, — Appointment of director of Division of Finance, $ 63-1-12.
Appointment of executive director of Departm e n t o f Administrative Services, 5 63-1-4.
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35-3-1. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Board" means the board of directors of the
Workers' Compensation Fund.
(2) "Chief executive officer" means the chief
executive officer appointed by the board.
(3) "Director" means a member of the board.
(4) "Fund" and "Workers' Compensation
Fund" mean the nonprofit, quasi-public corporation established by this chapter.
(5) "Injury Fund" means the premiums, reserves, investment income, and any other funds
administered by the Workers' Compensation
Fund as provided in this chapter.
iwo
35-3-2.

Establishment of the Workers' Compensation Fund and the Injury Fund.
(1) (a) There is created a nonprofit, quasi-public
corporation to be known as the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah,
(b) The purpose of the fund is to:
(i) insure Utah employers against liability
for compensation based on job-related accidental injuries and occupational diseases;
and
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(ii) assure payment of this compensation
to Utah employees who are entitled to it unueT Tttte S5, CnapteTB \ and %
(2) (a) There is created an Injury Fund, which
shall be maintained by the Workers' Compensation Fund.
(b) The Injury Fund shall consist of all assets
acquired from premiums and penalties paid into
the Injury Fund and interest and dividends
earned on those assets.
(c) The Injury Fund is the sole source of monies to:
(i) pay losses sustained on account of the
insurance provided; and
(ii) pay salaries and other expenses of the
Workers' Compensation Fund in accordance
with this chapter.
1990
$5-3-3.

Legal nature of Workers* Compensation
Fund.
(1) The Workers' Compensation Fund is:
(a) a nonprofit, self-supporting, quasi-public
corporation; and
(b) a legal entity, which may sue and be sued
in its own name.
(2) All of the business and affairs of the corporation shall be conducted in the name of the Workers*
Compensation Fund of Utah.
i9eo
35-3-4. Price ol insurance — Liability of state.
(1) The Workers' Compensation Fund shall provide
porkers' compensation insurance at an actuarially
sound price, which the board shall determine.
(2) The state is not liable for the expenses, liabilities, or debts of the Workers' Compensation Fund,
and may not use any assets of the Injury Fund for any
purpose.
1990
35-3-5. Board of directors.
(1) There is created a board of directors of the
Workers' Compensation Fund.
(2) The board shall consist of seven directors.
(3) One of the directors shall be the executive director of the Department of Administrative Services
or his designee.
(4) One of the directors shall be the chief executive
officer of the fund.
(5) The governor, with the advice and consent of
the Senate, shall appoint:
(a) three directors who are owners, officers, or
employees of policyholders other than the state
that have been insured by the Workers' Compensation Fund for at least one year before their appointment; and
(b) two directors from the public in general.
(6) No two directors may represent the same policyholder.
(7) At least four directors appointed by the governor shall have had previous experience in investments, risk management, occupational safety, casualty insurance, or law.
(8) Any director who represents a policyholder that
fails to maintain workers' compensation insurance
through the Workers' Compensation Fund shall immediately resign from the board.
(9) A person may not be a director if he:
(a) has any interest as a stockholder, employee, attorney, or contractor of a competing insurance carrier providing workers' compensation
insurance in Utah;
(b) fails to meet or comply with the conflict of
interest policies established by the board; or
(c) is not bondable.
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(10) After notice and a hearing, the governor may
remove any director for neglect of duty, inefficiency,
or malfeasance.
(11) The term of office of the directors appointed by
the governor shall be four years, beginning July 1 of
the year of appointment. The appointments shall be
staggered so that no more than two terms expire each
year on June 30.
(12) Each director shall hold office until his successor is appointed and qualified.
(13) Any vacancy on the board shall be filled by
appointment of the governor for the remainder of any
unexpired term.
(14) The board shall annually elect a chairman and
other officers as needed from its membership.
(15) The board may not provide or pay any compensation except for these responsibilities as set forth
in Subsection (20).
(16) The board shall meet at least quarterly at a
time and place designated by the chairman.
(17) The chairman may call board meetings more
frequently than quarterly and shall call additional
board meetings if requested to do so by a majority of
the board.
(18) Four directors are a quorum for the purpose of
transacting all business of the board.
(19) Each decision of the board requires the affirmative vote of at least four directors for approval.
(20) Directors appointed to the board shall:
(a) receive actual and reasonable travel expenses for meetings of the board; and
(b) receive a per diem allowance and reimbursement for actual and necessary expenses incurred in carrying out official duties established
by the director of the Division of Finance under
the authority of Section 63A-3-106.
(21) The fund shall pay the per diem allowance and
expenses from the Injury Fund upon vouchers drawn
in the same manner as the Workers' Compensation
Fund pays its normal operating expenses.
(22) The executive director of the Department of
Administrative Services, or his designee, and the
chief executive officer of the Workers' Compensation
Fund shall serve on the board without a per diem
allowance.
1983
35-3-6. Duties of board.
(1) The board shall:
(a) appoint a chief executive officer to administer the Workers' Compensation Fund;
(b) receive and act upon financial, management, and actuarial reports covering the operations of the Workers' Compensation Fund;
(c) ensure that the Workers' Compensation
Fund is administered according to law;
(d) examine and approve an annual operating
budget for the Workers' Compensation Fund;
(e) serve as investment trustees and fiduciaries of the Injury Fund;
(f) receive and act upon recommendations of
the chief executive officer;
(g) develop broad policy for the long-term operation of the Workers' Compensation Fund, consistent with its mission and fiduciary responsibility;
(h) subject to Sections 31A-19-401 through
31 A-19-420, approve any rating plans that would
modify a policyholder's premium;
(i) subject to Sections 31 A-19-401 through
31 A-19-420, approve the amount of deviation, if
any, from standard insurance rates;
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0") approve the amount of the dividends, if any,
to be returned to policyholders;
(k) adopt a procurement policy consistent with
the provisions of Title 63, Chapter 56, Utah Procurement Code;
(1) develop and publish an annual report to
policyholders, the governor, the Legislature, and
interested parties that describes the financial
condition of the Injury Fund, including a statement of expenses and income and what measures
were taken or will be necessary to keep the Injury Fund actuarially sound;
(m) establish a fiscal year;
(n) determine and establish an actuarially
sound price for insurance offered by the fund;
(0) establish conflict of interest requirements
that govern the board, officers, and employees;
and
(p) perform all other acts necessary for the policymaking and oversight of the Workers' Compensation Fund.
(2) Subject to board review and its responsibilities
under Subsection (IKe), the board may delegate authority to make daily investment decisions.
1992

35-3-7. Powers and duties of chief executive officer.
(1) The chief executive officer shall:
(a) administer all operations of the Workers'
Compensation Fund under the direction of the
board;
(b) recommend to the board any necessary or
desirable changes in the workers' compensation
law;
(c) recommend to the board an annual administrative budget covering the operations of the
Workers' Compensation Fund and, upon approval, submit the administrative budget, financial status, and actuarial condition of the fund to
the governor and the Legislature for their examination;
(d) direct and control all expenditures of the
approved budget;
(e) from time to time, upon the recommendation of a consulting actuary, recommend to the
board rating plans, the amount of deviation, if
any, from standard rates, and the amount of dividends, if any, to be returned to policyholders;
(0 invest the Injury Fund's assets under the
guidance of the board and in accordance with the
provisions of Title 31 A, Chapter 18;
(g) recommend general policies and procedures
to the board to guide the operations of the fund;
(h) formulate and administer a system of personnel administration and employee compensation that uses merit principles of personnel management, includes employee benefits and grievance procedures consistent with those applicable
to state agencies, and includes in-service training programs;
(i) prepare and administer fiscal, payroll, accounting, data processing, and procurement procedures for the operation of the Workers' Compensation Fund;
(j) conduct studies of the workers' compensation insurance business, including the preparation of recommendations and reports;
(k) develop uniform procedures for the management of the Workers' Compensation Fund;
(1) maintain contacts with governmental and
other public or private groups having an interest
in workers' compensation insurance;
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(m) within the limitations of the budget, employ necessary staff personnel and consultants,
including actuaries, attorneys, medical examiners, adjusters, investment counselors, accountants, and clerical and other assistants to accomplish the purpose of the Workers' Compensation
Fund;
(n) maintain appropriate levels of property, casualty, and liability insurance as approved by the
board to protect the fund, its directors, officers,
employees, and assets; and
(o) develop self-insurance programs as approved by the board to protect the fund, its directors, officers, employees, and assets to supersede
or supplement insurance maintained under Subsection (n).
(2) The chief executive officer may:
(a) enter into contracts of workers' compensation and occupational disease insurance, which
may include employer's liability insurance to
cover the exposure of a policyholder to his Utah
employees and their dependents for liability
claims, including the cost of defense in the event
of suit, for claims based upon bodily injury to the
policyholder's Utah employees;
(b) reinsure any risk or part of any risk;
(c) cause to be inspected and audited the payrolls of policyholders or employers applying to
t t a Workers' CQm^ei&a&wv Furvd fat \x\svitaxvcfc\
(d) establish procedures for adjusting claims
against the Workers' Compensation Fund that
comply with Title 35, Chapters 1 and 2, and determine the persons to whom and through whom
the payments of compensation are to be made;
(e) contract with physicians, surgeons, hospitals, and other health care providers for medical
and surgical treatment and the care and nursing
of injured persons entitled to benefits from the
Workers' Compensation Fund;
(f) require policyholders to maintain an adequate deposit to provide security for periods of
coverage for which premiums have not been paid;
(g) contract with self-insured entities for the
administration of workers' compensation claims
and safety consultation services; and
(h) with the approval of the board, adopt the
calendar year or any other reporting period to
report claims and payments made or reserves established on claims that are necessary to accommodate the reporting requirements of the Insurance Commission, Industrial Commission, State
Tax Commission, or National Council on Compensation Insurance.
1990
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35-3-10. Audits and examinations required.
(1) The state auditor shall audit the Workers' Compensation Yund annually.
(2) (a) The insurance commissioner shall examine
the Injury Fund according to the purposes and
procedures provided in Sections 31A-2-203
through 31A-2-205 at least once every five years.
(b) The chief executive officer shall pay the
necessary expense of this examination from the
Injury Fund.
1990
35.3-II. Adoption of rates.
The Workers' Compensation Fund shall adopt the
rates approved by the insurance commissioner under
Titl£ 31A, Chapter 19, Part IV. The chief executive
officer, with t n e approval of the board, may file with
the insurance commissioner a resolution to deviate
from the rates approved by the insurance commissioner in order to provide workers' compensation insurance at the lowest possible cost to policyholders
consistent with maintaining the actuarial soundness
of the Injury Fund.
1988
35.3-12. Withdrawal of p o l i c y h o l d e r s .
Any policyholder may, upon complying with Section 31A-22-1002, withdraw from the Workers' Compensation Fund by providing an advance written notice of his intent to cancel. The policyholder shall remain liable for any unpaid premium for periods of
coverage prior to cancellation.
1988
35-3-13. Cancellation of policies.
The Workers' Compensation Fund may cancel a
policy prior to the conclusion of the policy period only:
(1) by agreeing to the cancellation with the
policyholder and sending notice of the cancellation to the industrial commission;
(2) for nonpayment of premium, after 30 days'
notice to the Industrial Commission and to the
policyholder; or
(3) for failure on the part of the policyholder to
comply with the contractual provisions of the policy, after 30 days' notice to the industrial commission and the policyholder.
1988
35-3-14. P r e m i u m a s s e s s m e n t .
The Workers' Compensation Fund is liable for the
premium assessment provided by Subsection
59-9-101(2) to the same extent as private workers'
compensation insurance companies.
1994

35-3-15. Interest and costs of collecting delinquent premium.
If the Workers' Compensation Fund commences a
legal action for collection of delinquent premium, it is
entitled, in addition to the unpaid premium, to inter35-3-8. Liability limited.
W> H o officeT OT employee oSt^e^oTVers' Compen- est on. the. uxupaid ^TCTCIULTCI at tbA &&m& tate. as, U thaa
sation Fund is liable in a private capacity for any act being charged by the United States Internal Revenue
performed or obligation entered into when done in Service for delinquent taxes from the due date of the
good faith, without intent to defraud, and in an offi- unpaid premium, and for all costs of collection includcial capacity in connection with the administration, ing reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs. The
management, or conduct of the Workers' Compensa- remedies of the Workers' Compensation Fund under
this section do not affect or diminish, and may be
tion Fund or affairs relating to it.
(2) Subject to the director's fiduciary responsibility exercised in addition to, its right to cancel policies
1988
as established by Section 35-3-5, no director of the under Sections 35-3-12 and 35-3-13.
Workers' Compensation Fund is liable in a private 35-3-16. D i v i d e n d s .
capacity for any act performed or obligation entered
The board may declare a dividend to policyholders
into when done in good faith, without intent to de- if it determines that a surplus exists in the Injury
fraud, and in an official capacity in connection with Fund at the end of a fiscal period after the payment of
the administration, management, or conduct of the all claims, administrative costs, and the establishWorkers' Compensation Fund or affairs relating to it.
ment of appropriate reserves for future liabilities. In
1990
making this determination, the board shall require a
35-3-9. Repealed.
i9*o certified audit and actuarial report of the financial

LABOR — INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

condition of the Injury Fund. The board shall establish uniform eligibility requirements for such dividends. In determining the amount of dividend to be
paid to policyholders, the board may establish a procedure which takes into consideration t h e claims loss
experience of policyholders as an incentive to encourage safe working conditions for employees. The
Workers' Compensation Fund may use dividends to
offset amounts due or owing by policyholders or former policyholders.
1988
35-3-17. Availability of employers' reports.
The Department of Employment Security shall
make the employers' annual reports provided for in
Section 35-1-41 available to the Workers' Compensation Fund, to the same extent they would be available
to private insurers.
1988
35-3-18.

Workers* Compensation Fund exempted.
(1) The Workers' Compensation Fund is exempt
from the provisions of:
(a) Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records
Access and Management Act; and
(b) Title 63, Chapter 1, Parts 1 through 9,
Utah Administrative Services Act.
(2) The board may specifically exempt the
Workers' Compensation Fund from any provisions of
Title 67, Chapter 19, Utah State Personnel Management Act, and Title 63, Chapter 56, Utah Procurement Code.
(3) The provisions of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, do not govern the initial
determination of any person's eligibility for benefits
under Title 35, Chapter 1, Workers' Compensation,
and Title 35, Chapter 2, Occupational Disease Disability Compensation.
1991
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Terras Ponce v. Jimenez
AUREA E. TORRES PONCE, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v. ENRIOUE JIMENEZ £T AL. , Defendants and
Appellants.
No, R-81-161.

Decided June 2, 1982.

1.

INJUNCTION - ACTIONS FOR INJUNCTIONS PROCESS IN GENERAL,
A petition for injunction shall be
processed under Rule 57.1 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure,

2.

ID* - SATORE AND GROUNDS IN GENERAL NATURE AND FORM OF REMEDY - WHEN PROPER.
IN GEUZKhL - ABSENCE OF FACTUAL CONTROVERSY - MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
An injunction may be issued without
hearing when, absent a factual controversy,
the case is adjudicated through summary
judgment.

3.

CORPORATIONS - INCORPORATION AND ORGANIZATION NATURE OF INCORPORATION - IN GENERAL,
The Puerto Rico Telephone Company is
a public-private corporation that
cannot deny its condition as such
just because it was incorporated as
— a private corporation in the State
Of Delaware,

4.

ID. - ID. - KINDS AND CLASSES OF CORPORATIONS PUBLIC-PRIVATE CORPORATION'S.
The provision of art. 9 of Act No, 25
of May $, 1974, to the effect that
nothing in that act shall bo construed
as to grant to the Puerto Rtco
Telephone Company the status of a
public corporation, does not prevent
that it be considered as a publicprivate corporation. The preservation
of private company status would simply
ensure the taxability of the interests
paid in excess of the soney in debentures.

5,

PUBLIC OfFICEKS AND EMPLOYEES - IN GENERAL APPOINTMENT, QUALIFICATION AND TENURE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYMENTS, AND POWER TO
APPOINT AND REMOVE - IN GENERAL PERSONNEL ACT.
The merit principle that governs the
rules of the public service personnel
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78
system applies to the Telephone
Authority and its subsidiary
Puerto Rico Telephone Company,
even though they are organised
as private corporations*
- ID. - ID, - ID. - ID. - ID,
ID.The
intent of the 1975 Public Servj.ce
Personnel Act wa9 to extend the
benefits of a personnel administratis:
based on the merit principle, to the
greatest number of public employees.
,

STATUTES, CUSTOMS AND EQUITY - ENACTMENT,
REQUISITES, AND VM-IDITY - APPROVAL
OP BILLS BY THE EXECUTIVE - APPROVAL
Or REGULATIONS FOR APPLICATION OF
ACTS - DISCIPLINE REGULATIONS OF THE
PUERTO RXCO TELEPHONE COMPANY*
Rule «1 of the Discipline Regulations
of the Puerto Rico Telephone Company
is not valid because it allows for
removal of employees without hearing•

UOGMENT of Carmen Scnla 2 *yas, Judge (San Juan),
which found for plaintiff in a complaint
for injunction. Affirmed.
Daniel R. Porcf nguez "for appellants'.
Hu&fcerto Marcftand far appellee.

Rafael

(Translation)

70

IN THE SUPREME C0U31T OF PUERTO RICO

Aurea E. Torres Ponce,
Plaintiff-appellee
v.

No. R-81-161

Review

Enrique Jim4nez et al.,
Defendants^appe H a n t s

MR. JUSTICE DAVILA delivered the opinion of the Court.

San Juan, Puerto Hico, June 2,

1982

Appeal is taken from the judgment ordering that
plaintiff be reinstated in her position and that she
receive back pay from the date she was disffissed, plus
any other benefits to which she is entitled.

The

following finding* of fact made by the trial court are
not in controversy-

Plaintiff started working for the

Puerto Rico Telephone Co, in April 1972.

She wcricsd

there for seven consecutive years and was continually
promoted for her work.

Plaintiff is not a member of

Exhibits 2" and 3 - A copy of the personnel
record reveals the dates of the promotions and
the corresponding periodical salary raises.
Exhibit 4 - Letter dated June 7, 1975,
from the Corporation's President thanking
plaintiff for the extraordinary zeal displayed in her work*
Exhibit 3 - Letter datsd May 27, 1977,
from the Corporation's President thanking
plaintiff for her continuous commitment, to
her worK, raising her salary to .$7,809.00.
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(Translation)

the Union that represents the Telephone Co^s

PAGE

$Q

employes

because her position does not fall within the appropriate
unit.

She is part of the management.

dismissed, she was a regular employee.
the probationary period*

When she was
She had passed

She held a position as accountant,

on October 9, 1918, she; was summarily dismissed without
hearing.

She went to court*

On October 30, 1978, after receiving a petition for
injunction, the court set a hearing for November 29, 1973.
Notice was served as provided by law, On November 2:8,
defendant filed a motion to dismiss.

The parties met in

chambers.

Both parties offered several documents in

evidence.

The minutes reveal that they were granted a

thirty-day tern to file their briefs, and defendant was
given ten dAys, after notice of plaintiff1* brief was
served, to answer the complaint.
(1) Section 678 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended,
32

L.P.R.A.

5 3524(3) ,2 provides that a petition for

injunction Shall be processed under Rule 57.1 o£ Civil
*To restrain the application or
enforcement of any statute of the
Legislature of Puerto Rico, or the
performance by a public officer, a
public corporation, or a public agency,
or by any employee or officer of such
corporation or agency of any act
authorized by law of the Legislature
of Puerto rlico, unless it has been
determined by finalr firm, unappealable,
and unreviewable judgment that such
statute or act authorized by law is
unconstitutional or invalid.

"Provided, however, that the court
may issue said temporary restraining
order, preliminary or permanent
injunction subject to the terms o£
Bul« 57 of Civil Procedure: . , . .*

(Translation)

R-81-161

Procedure.

Rule 57,1 provide* that no preliminary injunction

shall be issued without notice to the adverse party and
that the hearings for a preliminary and a permanent
injunction may be consolidated.

Rule 57.1 is equivalent

to Rule 65 {al of the Federal Rulea of Civil Procedure.
This rule has often been construed in the federal juris*
diction.

It is clear that the purpose of the hearing

is to receive evidence to elucidate tha facts in controversy.

7 Moore's federal Practice, sec. 65.04(3], at 65-59/

and cases therein cited.
In Securities and Exch. Coro'n v. Murphy, 625 ?.2d
633

(1980),

defendant

alleged

that

the

trial

court erred when it issued a preliminary injunction,
without holding an evidentiary hearing, upon granting
a Tnotion for summary judgment.
affirmed this decision.

The appellate court

After considering all the cir-

cumstances, it concluded that the Securities and Exchange
Commission had clearly established the absence of a genuine

"**' Notice. No preliminary injunction
shall be issued without notice to the
adverse party.
* <b) Consolidation of hearing with
trial on_ merits. Before or after the
commencement of the hearing of an
application for a preliminary injunction,
the court may order the trial of the
action on the merits to be consolidated
with the hearing of the application.
Even when this consolidation is not
ordered, any evidence, received in the
hearing of an application tor preliminary
injunction which would be admissible
upon the trial on the merits becomes
part of the record of the case and need
not be repeated upon the trial.*

uuiM-e^-aw

its* iw M *
IDs

PAGE
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(Translation)

factual controversy.

Since the purpose of a hearing la

to listen tc all parties and recaive evidence on the facts
in controversy, absent such controversy, the injunction
could be issued without hearing-

See:

161

Durbin

v.

F.2d

87

National

.'19715;

(1947);
Farners

Socialist

Marshall
Org,

Workers

Election;, SS6 P.2d 586

Inc.,
v.

111.

Sims v. Greene,

446

Farms,
F.2d

State

Inc.

353,
Bd.

356

of

(1977).

In the case Corujo Collaso v* Viera Martinez, 111
O.P.ff,

552 (1981), we held that petitions for injunction

must be decided under Rule 57 of the Rui.es of Civil
Procedure, and that ail other rules are supplementary
thereto as long as they do not altar the summary character
of the action.
In the case at bar, defendant filed a motion to dismiss.

He alleged aa a question o£ law that an injunction

did net lie because the Puerto Rico Telephone Co, was
net a public instrumentality,

He deemed that the com-

plaint should be dismissed because it did not allege a
sufficient cause on which to grant relief.

It is evident

that the trial court acted pursuant to Rule 10,2 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure and considered the motion to
dismiss as a motion for Summary Judgment.

The parties

4
" • . . the following defenses
fr.ay at the option of the pleader
be made by motion: . • . (5) failure
to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted; (6) . . . .
if,
on a motion asserting the defense
numbered (5), matters outside the
pleading being attacked ^r^ presented
to and net excluded by the court/
the motion shall
be treated as
one for summary Judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 36 until
its final disposition, and all parties

8

ft-$l~L61

(Translation)

83

raised no objection thereto.

The minute* cf that day

show that, while in their in-cha^ibers meeting, they agreed
to file their briefa.

The note handwritten by the judge

on the record states that the case was taken under advisement.

The defendant never questioned the facts alleged in

the cojnplaint.

He could have questioned them while

in-chambers but did not do so. Neither iid

he deny them

during the ten-day term granted by the court to answer the
complaint after being served with notice ef plaintiff's
brief.

He filed several briefs on whether or net the

Puerto Rico Telephone Company wee a public corporation.

5

He had the opportunity to request a hearing and did not
do so.

All his acts reveal that he knew that the controversy

was one of law and not of facts.

He stay not allege now

that due process of law was not followed.
[2} The case at bar ia similar to Securities and Excfr.
Com'n v. Murphy, supra*

An injunction may be issued without

hearing when, absent a factual controversy, the case is
adjudicated through summary judgment.
We will now examine tne core of the appeal.

shall be given reasonable opportunity
to present all material pertinent to
such motion under said rule."
Motions of February 12, 1979, February 16,
1979, October 15, 1979, and April 11, I960,
In Jacobson & Co., inc. v. Armstrong CorftCo. ,
548 F.2d *"JB(1977)/ tne edurE—decided
that defendant could not complain that a hearing
was not conducted when it had had the opportunity
to request it in order to offer evidence
before
the injunction was issued, and did not do so.
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(Translation)

Q\

After World War I there was a need to develop p u b l i c
corporations to meet the new and numerous tasks faced
toy Western n a t i o n s .

Whereas, previously, governments only

regulated the operation of some i n d u s t r i e s ,

now they

vera forced to carry out by themselves c e r t a i n economic
activities.7

Per i n s t a n c e , during the war, the United

Scates too* over r a i l r o a d s , telephones, and t e l e g r a p h s .
In an age of c a p i t a i s c a r c i t y and high taxation of p r o f i t s ,
where investment r i s k s were g r e a t , public corporations were
e s t a b l i s h e d in those econonic s e c t o r * that private e n t e r p r i s e would not t o u c h . 8

In d i f f e r e n t countries t h i s

development was seldom the product of systematic and
deliberate l e g i s l a t i o n .

In most c a s e s , the determining

motive behind t h e i r creation was a blend of p o l i t i c a l and
practical factors.

From th* i n f i n i t e v a r i e t y of public

corporations, three p a r t i c u l a r types can be d i s t i n g u i s h e d .
1} Government departments or a g e n c i e s .
I) The public

corporations proper e s t a b l i s h e d by

statute*
3) The j o i n t stock

conpauriies controlled

t o t a l l y or

partially by the Government, e s t a b l i s h e d under the laws that
govern p r i v a t e corporations.
7
L i l i e n t h a l , The Conduct of Business
Enterprises by the Tederai Government, 54
H* g v,'L. R » v / 1 4 5 . 547 (lft4U . the
frolic
Corporation, A Comparative Synpoaium S4;
CW.Friedmann e d . , Carsweli Company, Canada 1954).

^The Public Corporation, k Comparative
Symposium, s_upca a t 542.
9

I £ . a t 545.

10

I d . at 547.

Thurston, Government Proprietary Corporations,
21 Va. L. Rev. 351(19353 .
~~

R-91-161

translation)

85
lr. the United States, many corporations of the third
type have been incorporated under the general incorporation
12
law* of Delaware.
Therein, as well as in other
countries, many of those created under private corporation
laws underwent great modifications.
Adoption of corporate form has been seen to have
several advantages, among them, avoidance of traditional
and rigid regulation* in furtherance of managerial efficiency
and originality. 13
The public-private corporate form allows for independent
operation.

It need not wait for annual appropriations

of funds for its operation.
own capital.

It produces and raises its

It may reinvest the surplus, save or drop

consumer prices, as convenient.

The financial statements

shall be under the responsibility of the agencies provided by law,
through periodical reports prepared by public and private auditors.
The fact that such a corporation does not operate for profit
but for public benefit does not justify managerial disregard
for Its successful operation.

On the contrary, by reason'

of its special status it has a greater obligation to
14
appraise costs and report its operations.
Regarding
its

personnel

policy,

it

is

axiomatic

that

business efficiency requires selection, promotion, and
IS
retention of employees on a purely merit basis.
Generally,
l2

Id. at 3€4.

13

Lilienthal, supra at 563.

l4
Lilienthal, supra at 565; The Public
Corporation, supra at 5904

The Public Corporation, supra at 590.
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(Translation)

in government agencies and departments, recruitment and
tenure s£ employees will be based on their political
qualifications.

But the type of corporation under our

consideration has enough, freedom to ignore political
factors and to work out it* own solution to problems of
employee compensation, work, schedule, incentives, tenure,
and labor relations.

The quality of the relations between

^anagenent and employees can become the chief asset of
a corporation.

The personnel in these corporations

must be imbued with the ideal of the public service,
notwithstanding that they are not part of the personnel
central system.

Up to what point these employees should fczzn

part of this system is strongly determined by traditions,
by the desire for security and other considerations which
vary frcn country tc ccuntry*

16

The most important prohlero faced by each country
ts

that of striking an adequate balance between the

corporation's managerial autonomy and the political
responsibility of offering an adequate public direction.
Notwithstanding that

its

status is similar to that of

a legal private person, this characteristic may not
prevail over the public responsibilities entailed by lr.a
organization.

The combination of public law controls,

en the one hand, and private law on the other, is still
a difficult matter to accept for the legal pursuit but
it is absolutely essential in

the existing soeio-historical

circumstances.

The Public Corporation, supra at 563-5G5*
17

Id, at

591-593.

PAGE
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{Translation}

Appellant alleges that the Puerto Fico Telephone Co. is a

private corporation, since i t was incorporated and ho Ids a private
corporation status under the Delaware Corporation Lav.

It meets the

requirements of a private corporation. But, as we have seen, this
Is not a reason for denying the fact that i t is a public-pri-vate
corporation. Althou^l i t is Incorporated as a private corporation
under the Delaware Corporation la*, the Telephone Authority, a public
corporation of the Ganmonwaalth of Puerto Rico, owns 100% of its shares.
It has a dual public-private personality inter-ced to offer better
public services and to achieve certain purposes.

Act No. 25 of flay 6,

1974 (27 L.P.R.A. S 4 0 5 ) i S allowed the Telephone Authority,
AQ
"The Authority i s hereby empowered
to acquire the System or a l l of the issued
and outstanding shares of the common stock
of the Puerto Rico Telephone Company (the
"Company"5 for such price and upon such
terms and conditions*as the Authority s h a l l
determine are in the best i n t e r e s t s of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, i t being provided that the Authority as w e l l as the
Company and i t s parent companies rcay
n e g o t i a t e the transaction f r e e l y and
without the intervention cf t h i r d p a r t i e s ,
including the Public Service Commission.
In connection with the a c q u i s i t i o n of
the System the Authority may in i t s d i s c r e t i o n assume the payment of p r i n c i p a l
and i n t e r e s t of any or a l l of the bonds
of the company• and assume any at a l l
of the debts and o b l i g a t i o n s of the
Company/ and provide for the assignment
to the Authority, or i t s designee, of
any or a l l of the outstanding contracts
and i n t a n g i b l e r i g h t s and i n t e r e s t s of
the Company. In the event that the
Authority acquires a l l cf the common
stock of s&ii Company a l l the mairJbers
of the Governing Board s h a l l c o n s t i t u t e
the Board of Directors of the Company,
i t being further provided that the
Executive Director of the Authority
s h a l l hold the p o s i t i o n of President of

t h e P u e r t o R i c o T e l e p h o n e Company,

The

Authority nay, in i t s d i s c r e t i o n , continue to operate the System through the
Company, or disaul^e the Company, or
cause a l l or any part of the *s*phs,

JUN-04-38
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PAGE 14

(Translation)

gg

public corporation created under t h i s same a c t , 27 L.P,R.A.

$ 402, to acquire the system or all the common shares issued by the
Puerto Rico Telephone Co.
of the Board of Government

I t provided that a l l the members
of the Telephone Authority

would c o n s t i t u t e the Board of Directors of the Puerto Rico
Telephone Co., and that the Executive Director of the
Authority would fee the President of the Company.

I t granted

the Authority the discretionary power to dissolve or continue operating
the telephone system through the Company. A r t i c l e 3 (27 L.P,R.A.
$ 4 0 3 ( a ) ( b ) ) 19 s t a t e d that i t s purpose was to improve and
r i g h t s and i n t e r e s t s ' of the Company
to be assigned or otherwise transferred
to the Authority or to any subsidiary
corporation of the Authority, or otherwise e x e r c i s e a l l of the r i g h t s and
powers conferred by law upon shareholders
of the Company. Nothing herein s e t forth
s h a l l be deemed to l i m i t or preclude the
r i g h t of the Authority to acquire the
System or any part thereof through the
e x e r c i s e of the power of eminent domain.**
19
that! "It ia herebv resolved and declared
"(a* an efficient communications
system ia essential to the operations
of the government of the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico and to the continuation
of the development of the economy
of Puerto Rico far the benefit ar.d
general welfare of the inhabitants
of Puerto Rico;
"(b) in order to improve and
expand the Communication facilities
in Puerto Ri^o to provide additional
and more efficient service to the
public . . . ."

R-81-16I

(Translation)

expand communication

facilities in order to give the

public additional and more efficient services.

Article 11

of the law exempts it from paying taxes or excise taxes,
an exemption usually granted to public instrumentalities.
(4] Finally,

appellant

alleges that the Puerto Rico

Telephone Co. is not a public corporation, since art. 9
(27 L.P.R.A. S 409} 2 0 provides that "nothing in this
chapter shall

be construed as to grant to the Puerto Rico

Telephone Company or any company whose stock is acquired
by the Authority, the status
of

the

report

Coanmonvealth
of ..the

of

Committees

of

a

public

corporation

Puerto

Rico."

The

on

Government,

joint
Finance,

"The Authority is hereby empowered
to create by resolution such subsidiary
corporations as It shall deen convenient
to carry out the purposes of this chapter
and to lend or give funds and transfer
any of its properties to such subsidiary
corporations* Such subsidiary corporations
shall be wholly-owned public corporations
of the Authority, and shall have sucii
powers and duties vested to the Authority
by the provisions of this chapter ds
shall be assigned to them by the Governing
Board; Provided, however, That nothing in
this chapter shall be construed as to
grant to the Puerto Pico Telephone
Company or any company whose stock is
acquired by the Authority, the status
of a public corporation of the Ccinmonwealth of Puerto Rico. The Governing
Board shall appoint the members of the
Board of Directors of any and all such
subsidiary corporations, provided that
at least a simple majority of the members
of each such Board of Directors shall
be members of the Governing Board. All
rights, privileges, imnmnities and
exemptions conferred on the Authority
by this chapter are hereby conferred
on such subsidiaries in carrying out
the powers and duties assigned to
them by the Governing Board."

JUN-04-S8
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Socioeconomic
and

commerce,

PAGE IB

(Translation)

Developing
Consumer

and

Planning,

Affairs

and

,,,,

Industry

Civil

Law

—afser considering S,B. 737 of March 15, 1974, l a t e r
enacted as Act No. 25 of May 6, 1 9 7 4 — s t a t e s , on p« 39,
that the a c q u i s i t i o n of a l l common stock of the
Rico Telephone Co* ia

contemplated

Puerto

"as" a p r i v a t e

corporation subsidiary to the Authority,

The company's

private s t a t u s would ensure the t a x a b i l i t y cf the
i n t e r e s t s paid i n excess of 9120 millions in debentures.
Once the Company's debt was due or c a n c e l l e d , the Authority
could d i s s o l v e i t .

I t would a l s o allow for a f l e x i b l e

p;anning and organization of the Telephone Company,

It

l e thus expressed in the report cf February 6, 1974,
s e c t i o n e i g h t , p, 1, presented tc the Governor of
Puerto Rico by the Coirar.ittae on the Acquisition of the
Puerto Rico Telephone Co.
the b i l l which l a t e r became Act tfo* 25, supra, was
discussed on April 26, 1974.

The minutes of the House

cf Representatives for that day r e v e a l that Representative
Del Valle Escobar, who drafted the b i l l , sairt that the Puerto fUco
•telephone Canpany would continue as the Authority's subsidiary private
The Secretary of J u s t i c e ' s opinion No, 4
of 1975 said that the 'Telephone Company" did not
have to be r e g i s t e r e d at the State Department,
as would be required of a p r i v a t e corporation,
since the company was created and operated
"AS a public corporation" bestowed with the
powers granted by Act No. 25 of May 6, 1974.
The Region 24 National Labor Relation Board's
Decision and Order of February 20, 1975,
case No. 24-RG-5524, Puerto Rico Telephone
Company and Jnldn de Troncuistas de Puerto Rico,
Local 9 c l , e t c . , dismissed the request to
transmit the record to the Federal sphere
because i t deemed that upon acquiring the
Puerto Rico Telephone Company, the l a t t e r
became a p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n of nhe Gcvecnnenc
and s o i t had no j u r i s d i c t i o n over the same.

*-81-161

(Translation)

corporation s i n c e

H

t h i i ' s t a t u s 1 would ensure the t a x a b i l i t y

of the i n t e r e s t s paid in excess of one hundred and twenty
i r l l i i c n d o l l a r s in debentures." Also, Representative Jarabo camanted
on a r t . ^ of the Act and pointed out that subdivision (a)
e s t a b l i s h e d as f i r s t p r i o r i t y the e f f i c i e n c y of the
communications system and that s-ubdivi9ion (bj s e t forth
that the system

would be owned by the government.

It was believed that in five years the totality of Puerto Pico's
telephone system could be uufled, \j>,dex tiie supervision of the Board of
Government of the Telephone Authority, which would in turn be zhc
Board

of Directors of the P'jerto Rico Telephone Corrpany. The lawmakerrs

intent i s clear.

The Puerto Rico Telephone Company was

acquired to be part of the public corporations system
which would give telephone service. I t would operate as the
type of public corporation organized under the laws of
private corporations, to operate as a private corporation
for the reasons already mentioned.

Hence, the company

w i l l be considered a public or a private corporation,
for certain l e g a l purposes, depending on the p a r t i c u l a r
case.
[5-6] Act No• 5 of October 14, 1975 (3 L.P.R.A. 5 1301 et seg_,) ,
che Public Service Personnel Ace in ics *rt. 2.1 (3 L.P.ft.A.

$ 1311(2)},

22

provides that a l l public ertp:oye*s, whether

22
"To the end of afcsurihg the
extension and strengthening of the
merit principle to ail sectors of
the Puerto JUcan public service, all
public employees, whether they are
commonwealth or municipal employees
with the exception of those excluded
in section 1338 of this title, snail
be covered by a single personnel system,
established to enforce the merit; principle, which shall be known as the
Public Service Personnel System.11

^

,

PAGE IB

ID>

*VW.1»

R-fll-161

(Translation/

32

government, municipal or other, w i l l be under a s i n g l e
personnel system, established co enforoe the marit principle, whidi
s h a l l be known as the Public Service Personnel System,
Section 10.S (3 L.P.R.A. $ 1338 ( 3 ) < 4 ) ) 2 3 s e t s forth that
the previsions of this chapter shall not apply to those er^loyees of
agencies or instnmentalities operating as private business or enterprises or to those employees of enterprises or instrumentalities entitled
to collective bargaining through special laws. These groups shall adopt,
with, t i e advice of the Personnel Offioe arid within the next 120 days
after the act is approved, a personnel regulation system incorporating
th.e merit principle that shall govern those employees not covered
by c o l l e c t i v e bargaining agreements.

In Normative Letter

No. 1-80 Qt July $, 1930, addressed to the d i f f e r e n t heads
of departments and a g e n c i e s , the Director of tha Central
Office of Personnel Administration informed that thti
Puerto Rico Telephone Authority was excluded from the
Personnel Act and should adopt, as provided by law, a
personnel r e g u l a t i o n system incorporating the merit
"(3) Employees of government agencies
or i n s t r u m e n t a l i t i e s operating as private
e n t e r p r i s e s or b u s i n e s s e s
"(4) Employees of government agencies
Or i n s t r u m e n t a l i t i e s e n t i t l e d to bargain
c o l l e c t i v e l y through s p e c i a l laws and

''Agencies or i n s t r u m e n t a l i t i e s excluded
hereby under subsections- (3) and (4) s h a l l
adopt/ with the advice of the o f f i c e of
Personnel, a personnel regulation embodying
the merit p r i n c i p l e which s n a i l govern
the personnel standards of those employees
not covered by c o l l e c t i v e bargaining agreements within 120 days following the
approval of t h i s a c t . Copies of the
regulations thus adopted s h a l l be sens
to the L e g i s l a t u r e of Puerto Rico."

R-51-1S1

(Translation)

principle, to cover those employees not protected by
collective bargaining agreements.

The Ports Authority

was also classified in this category.
v. Director Ejecutivo,

In ft*ye3 Coreano

110 D.P.R* 40 {1930), we held

that the merit principle was applicable to the Ports
Authority,

It is evident that, grounded on the same

reasons, the merit principle also applies to the Telephone
Authority

and its subsidiary, the Puerto Rico Telephone

Company, despite its

private corporate form,

in ehe

light of the existing public policy, the analysis in
Reyes Coreano, supra, still holds.

The clear intent of

the law is to extend the merit principle to the greatest
possible number of public employees.

It imposed the
zo

obligation of managing nonunion personnel according

the merit principle, although, attending to its particular
circumstances, such personnel was
from other statutory provisions.

effectively excluded
When we discussed the

advantages of public-private corporations, we saw that one

cf

the assets of this type cf corporation if. its public
policy.

This has also been established ir. other countries.

it propitiates a better and more efficient service.
In Delgado Rivera v.

Alcalde de Carolina, 309 D.P.?~

5

(1979), and in Delbrey v. Municipio de Carolina, 111 D.P.R.
492

(1981);

we held that whenever eh* municipalities'

regulations do not comply with the fundamental purpose of
guaranteeing

strict application cf the merit principle in

cases of employee's removal, the provisions of the Act
and the Personnel Regulations shall be applied.
[7]

Let us ttien examine whether the Regulations cf the Puerto Ri^n

Telephone Co. guarantee the rights granted by the merit principle as
established in the Personnel Act.

The letter of dismissal

ID.

JUN-O^-ge 16:14 FROM*

R-81-161
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(Translation]
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that appears of record, dated October 9, 1978, and addressed
to plaintiff, justifies the dismissal based on Rule No. 41
cf the Disciplinary Regulations (Threatening Acts) which
entails Immediate dismissal without hearing.

Therefore, on

this same date she was dismissed without hearing,
24

of Act Mo. 5 of October 14, 1375 (3 L.P.R.A. J 1336(4)) ,

Soction 4.6
provides that

the appointing authorities may remove any career employee
for just cause and upon prior preferment of charges

in

writing, after holding an administrative hearing, if the
employee so requests.
Puerto Rico Telephone

25

Upon dismissing plaintiff, the

did

not

principle of the merit system:

comply

with

the

basic

a hearing prior to dismissal,

a-^ie 41 of the Regulations of the Puerto Rico Telephone
26
Cc. is not valid.

In

view cf the foregoing, the appellee's dismissal is set aside

and a hearing s h a l l be held as required by law.

24
"The appointing authorities may
remove any career employee for good
cause and upon previous preferment of
charges, in writing, and upon prior
holding of an administrative hearing,
if the employee so requests."
25
Act NO. 1 Of July 17, 1979 (3 L.P.P.A. (Supp.)
I 1336(4) ) , amended this Section and eliminated
"and upon prior holding of an administrative
hearing, if the employee so requests.* Since the
dismissal in the Instant case was effected in
19 73, the law then in force is the one applicable.
26
In Bisjicg v. wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976), a
career employee was oTsroissed without hearing.
He was charged with conduct uns*uited for the
police corps. A city ordinance permitted the
dismissal of career employees at the will and
pleasure of the city.
It was held that the
statute did not warrant him a property interest
and that knowledge of the sa:ne prevented hiju
from having sufficient expectation of continued
employment. Therefore, due process was not
violated and the svmwary dismissal was valid.

*" 8 1 ~ i 6 i

(Translation)

Mr. Chief Justice Trias Monge and Mr, Justice Dl&z
Cruz took no part in this decision.

IE/mee
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Page 49
1
I I company from trying to see if this is a valid claim
2
J 2 or not That's what we did
3
13
When they realized that there had been
4
1 4 possible fraud, they referred this information to
5
1 5 Dr. Chung, who said, "My gosh, this woman wasn't
6
J ^ entirely truthful with me. I didn't know all these
7
I 7 things. It looks like this is not entirely
8
1 % attributable to October the 12th pulling on the
9
i 9 cord. There may be other problems."
10
JlO
But the argument that Workers'
11
III Compensation Fund exceeded the scope of its granted
12
112 authority falls apart in light of the language of
13
|13 that first page, which is a blanket authorization to
14
|l4 release all medical records. That should be
|15 dispositive. And the fact that later, when a lie had
15
|l6 been discovered, this was referred to the Attorney
16
17
117 General's Office for a possible criminal prosecution,
18
118 should not invalidate that, because under the
1
|19 Workers - Workers' Compensation Fund — pardon me, 19
20
bo Insurance Fraud Code, Section 31A-31-104, that kind
21
bl of information can be released to an investigative
22
m agency to see if there should be prosecution. If an
23
03 insurance company finds fraud, they can't just -24
B4 they don't have to sit quietly. They should be able
[25 to speak out, which is what they did.
25

Page 511
MR. GARDNER: This is one where there
wasn't an arrest There wasn't a custodial
interview. I'm not quite sure if I have the burden
of proof on this one or — or if Counsel should go
forward on that one.
MS. AH CHING: It doesn't matter; I can.
Your Honor, we'd call Miss Paola
Valente.
THE COURT: Before we start with the
testimony, it appears to me, Counsel, that we're not
going to start seating our jury certainly not before
maybe a quarter to 12:00, and it would be silly to
start and break at noon. Any objection to my sending
word downstairs to release them and ask them to come
back at 1:30?
MR. GARDNER: That would be best, Judge.
MS. AH CHING: I don't have an objection,
Judge.
THE COURT: I just have to let you both
know, that's one reason I've been pushing
Ms. Ah Ching so hard, I just feel terrible the way we
treat jurors a lot of times. These motions should
have been noticed up. They should have been in the
file. They should have been noticed up earlier. We
should have taken care of them when we're not making

Page 50
11
So, on those points, I disagree with
2 Counsel's argument and ask that this motion be
3 denied.
14
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Gardner.
[5
The motion's denied. I'm finding that
16 the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah is not a state
[ 7 agency and that Miss Ellingsworth knowingly and
18 voluntarily signed a complete release with the
19 understanding that a full investigation would be done
BO in order to validate or invalidate her claim.
11
You'll do findings and an order,
12 Mr. Gardner, although they certainly don't need to be
13 done until trial is over.

Page 52
these folks sit downstairs.
Would you let Jane know that we - yeah,
tell them we're working hard on the case. We don't
mean to waste their time, but the morning's been used
up on these other matters and that they should come
back at 1:30.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
M
MR. GARDNER: I see. I'll do that.
15
15
THE COURT: Next motion?
16
N
MR. GARDNER: Your Honor, why don't we
17
17 address the third motion, which is the motion to
M suppress statements made to state representatives.
18
M And I think the allegation is that after July 11th,
19
p) '95, which was the first IME performed by Dr. Chung, 20
11 whatever statements made by Miss Ellingsworth to
21
P Workers' Compensation Fund should be suppressed.
22
P
THE COURT: Is that okay with you,
|23
1* Ms. Ah Ching? It's your motion.
! 24
£
MS. AH CHING: That's fine, Judge.
25

fARLTON WAY, CSR 801-535-5464

MS. AH CHING: You'd stipulate to

everything foundational-wise, that Miss Valente
works MR. GARDNER: I will, Your Honor.
PAOLO VALENTE, recalled as
a witness on behalf of the Defendant, after having
been duly sworn, testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MS. AH CHING:
Q. Miss Valente, you had some contacts
conversation-wise with Miss Ellingsworth at separate
times during the pendency of this case; is that
right?
A. Yes.
Q. And some of these were recorded; is that
right?
A. That's correct.
Q. What was the first conversation that was
recorded?
Page 49 - Page 52
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Page 71
I decision, her being the immediate manager of the
1 this type of information provided by
I claims; but, yes, that definitely was...
2 Miss Ellingsworth is information that is obtained
j Q. All right. I think you've already ~
3 under coercion. It's a violation of
i pardon me. Paola said - let me ask you. Are you a
4 Miss Ellingsworth's Fifth Amendment rights and
I member of the law enforcement community?
5 Article 1, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution.
> A. No, I am not.
6
THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Gardner?
MR. GARDNER: Thank you,
7
MR. GARDNER: I simply can't understand
f
I
No other questions.
8 how this information is obtained improperly. These
9 are not law enforcement people. This is not a
i
THE COURT: Anything further,
10 custodial interrogation. The purpose of suppressing
I Ms. Ah Ching?
11 evidence is to punish improper police conduct —
MS. AH CHING: I have no further
12 misconduct. That's not what happened here. We have
i questions, Judge.
13 a private insurance company trying to find out, "Is
i
THE COURT: Thank you Mr. Mann.
14 this claim legit or have we been hoodwinked?"
i
Argument?
15 There's no difference whether these people were an
i
MS. AH CHING: Your Honor, the issue of
16 investigator and adjuster with the State Farm
, whether or not these people are law enforcement
17 Insurance Company or Farmers' Bureau or Allstate or
people keeps coming up, and I think, number one —
18 Workers' Compensation Fund. They call in Brenda,
and I'm trying to find the case in the Annotations.
19 they invite her in, she's free to leave. They say,
I didn't pull it out because I didn't think it would
20 "Brenda, have you had any prior injuries? Anything
be an issue, but that's what I'll do over the lunch
21 else that we don't know about?" And when she insists
hour -- that Workers' Compensation Fund is a state
22 again and again, "No, I've never had any other
agency and, therefore, falls under that umbrella.
23 injuries," they say, "Well, at this point, Brenda,
This is akin to cases where a snitch is sent in to
24 we've got to tell you, our information says that you
get information from an individual. The snitch works
25 had quite a bit." That's not coercion. That's an
for the police department, is paid by the police
Page 70
\l department; and I believe that there is case law, and
2 I'll try to find it, that if a person works for a
3 police agency or for an arm of the state and obtains
U information illegally, that it's subject to the
jS constitutional requirements of the Utah and United
ft States Constitution.
This is a case where several interviews,
jt specifically the February 1995 interview and the
March 1995 interview, took place with an investigator
with criminal prosecution in mind. Miss Ellingsworth
was misled to believe that she was giving a statement
to determine whether or not she qualified for
benefits. Miss Valente has testified that benefits
I were already suspended at the time, that the purpose
I for the interview is to obtain information as to
f whether or not Miss Ellingsworth should be
prosecuted.
They already had information to the
J contrary - the hospital records, the police report
They did not disclose this information to
Miss Ellingsworth. They basically asked her
questions so that she would answer them in a certain
way without disclosing to Miss Ellingsworth that they
had information to the contrary.
I would indicate or would contend that
SHU/TfYMWAV PCD
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Page 72
1 investigator trying to find out what's going on.
2
And like Mr. Mann testified, this woman's
3 benefits have been reinstated once before by the IME
4 doctor. And had these conflicting information
5 matters been explained adequately, they could have
6 reinstated the benefits again. They've got to have a
7 chance to talk to the claimant and find out what's
8 happening. That is not a custodial interview. It is
9 not coercion. It's an investigator trying to find
10 out, "Are we paying properly our contractual
11 obligations or are we being duped?"
12
So, in that sense, I disagree with
13 Counsel, and I submit that this motion to suppress
14 for the face-to-face interview should be denied. The
15 other telephone interviews hardly can be construed as
16 custodial interrogation. There's no basis for
17 suppressing those. That's all, Judge.
18
THE COURT: Ms. Ah Ching, anything else?
19
MS. AH CHING: No, Your Honor.
20
THE COURT: Okay. I will be pleased to
21 read any case that you find that's pertinent to the
22 issue, but - and subject to reversing myself; but
23 I'm going to go ahead and deny the motion; same basis
24 as the last one, I don't think this is a state
25 agency. I think this is essentially a private
n~

n*\
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j jasurance company and what happened is no different
l than if it had happened with Blue Cross/Blue Shield
I of Utah. And, in fact, Miss Ellingsworth*s actions
\ were in her legitimate attempt to qualify for
I insurance benefits. She provided information that
j wasrequested.I don't see how this could possibly
• be in the nature of a law enforcement interview.
; That's the reason for the ruling.
>
Let's move to the last motion. That's
i the motion in limine regarding felonies.
MS. AH CHING: Your Honor, if I'm not
: mistaken, Mr. Gardner, if Miss Ellingsworth
testifies, intends to bring in - there's a 1988,1
think, conviction for Attempted Uttering of a Forged
Script
Is that correct? Or are t h e r e - o r do
you want to bring in all of the other misdemeanors?
MR. GARDNER: I'm not so worried about
this in itself. I am concerned about the 1988
forging of the prescription.
That is correct, Your Honor; I did intend
to utilize that if the Defendant elected to testify.
MS. AH CHING: With the State's
stipulation, then, that they won't try to use any
other convictions, I'll just talk about the one Class
Page 74
1 A, the Forged Script.
2
In our motion we've indicated that —
3 well, first of all, even though the conviction - and
4 the conviction happened in 1988, is not quite ten
5 years old, we'd argue to the Court that it is close
6 enough - this is 1997 - that the Court ought to not
7 allow the State to use i t
8
Secondly, I think the case law - and
9 there's numerous cases on 609 motions - would
10 indicate that where a prior conviction is for the
ell l same type or similar type of crime involved in the
*12 matter under present consideration, then the
13 probative value of the evidence as affecting the
14 party's credibility will rarely outweigh the results
15 of prejudice to the jury - or prejudice on
16 Miss Ellingsworth's part,
|17
This is - the State has provided me with
|l8 a copy of a court docket that, number one, the
|19 statute provides that the State needs to get a
B20 certified copy of the conviction. So, I would think
U2i that the court docket is not appropriate in this
H22 case.
a23
Now, I would agree that if
M24 Miss Ellingsworth gets on the stand, Mr. Gardner may
& be able to ask her, "Have you been convicted of a

1
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Class A Misdemeanor?" If Miss Ellingsworth answers,
"No," he cannot use the court docket. He needs a
certified copy of the conviction.
Secondly, the Court needs to make a
determination as to whether bringing in that
conviction would be more prejudicial than probative.
And that's where our argument is, is that bringing in
an Uttering or Attempted Uttering of a Forged Script
in a case where the State is alleging that she is
using the Workers' Comp funds to obtain medication in
a drug-seeking type behavior, I think, makes that
type of a conviction even more prejudicial, because
then what we're left with is the Jury looking at that
conviction and using it for more than what the - the
law allows the State to use it for.
I'll just quickly go through the factors
that are listed in Saunders that the Court needs to
look at to weigh whether or not the conviction is a
more prejudicial than probative.
Number one, the Court needs to look at
the nature of the crime. The nature of this crime
involves something that's very close to what the
State is alleging that Miss Ellingsworth did. And
the purpose for the State bringing in the Attempted
Uttering of a Forged Script is to try and convince

Page 76
1 the Jury that because she has this conviction, she is
2 eight or nine years later still trying to obtain
3 medications under false pretenses.
4
"B. The recentness or remoteness of the
5 crime." As I indicated to the Court, the conviction,
6 I believe, according to the court docket, happened in
7 1988.
8
"C, the similarity of the prior crime to
9 the charged crime insofar as the close resemblance to
10 the - between the two crimes," that may lead the
11 Jury to punish Miss Ellingsworth based on that crime
12 as opposed to this crime. And I think I've already
13 indicated to the Court that - that given the State's
14 theory of the case and what they intend to present to
15 the Jury, that allowing that conviction to come in
16 would be — the similarity is great.
17
"D. The importance of credibility
18 issues in determining the truth in the prosecution."
19 This is the instance where it's more important for
20 the Court to maybe keep out a prior conviction if
21 this - this case comes down to who believes who.
22 And I think that's - in this case, it is one of
23 those cases. Miss Ellingsworth is probably the only
24 witness that the Defense has to present to contradict
25 the information that the State would have witnesses.
Page 73 - Page 76
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has art controlled by statute, passed by the
1 would recall, indicates specifically not that the
legislature. And given that and the case that I've
2 stuff could be used to bring a prosecution for
indicated to the Court, we would ask the Court to
3 providing false information, but that it would be
reconsider suppressing this information.
4 only used to see if she qualifies. So, it's actually
The second piece of information that I
5 misleading. The statute is pretty clear that this
would like to point out to the Court is that under
6 warning needs to be put on there. And rather than
the statute that Miss Ellingsworth has been charged
7 putting the warning on there, they actually put on a
with, and I've provided a copy to the Court -- the
8 statement that is actually - that is misleading to
reason there's two copies, Judge, is one was the
9 the person signing the statement.
statute that became effective July 1st, 1997. I
10
So with this additional information, Your
don't think there are any major differences, but I
11 Honor, we would ask the Court to reconsider and to
included that quote anyway for the Court's
12 suppress all the medical records that were obtained
information. But, anyway, 35-1-109(9) indicates
13 pursuant to - obtained pursuant to the release that
specifically in the statute that - that Workers'
14 Miss Ellingsworth signed.
Comp or anybody — employer or anybody of that sort, 15
THE COURT: The ruling will stand. I
a person providing insurance, must - or it says:
16 think you can argue this to the Jury, if you want,
"It shall provide notice on any
17 Miss Ah Ching. But it's just beyond any concept of
documentation that it prints,
18 reasonability that somebody without hearing this
reproduces or furnishes to any person
19 warning would think it was okay to present fraudulent
that applies for insurance coverage or
20 information to the Insurance Fund in order to get
that reports or makes a claim on an
21 benefits. I don't think it precludes the State
accident, injury or death, or
22 Insurance Fund, and I think the Walhberg case holds
otherwise reports or gives notice of
23 just the opposite you've just cited. I think it
anything in regards to such matters,
24 draws a clear distinction between the Industrial
that the agency or the insurer, (such
25 Commission and either the State Insurance Fund or any
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1 other insurance carrier, which it tends to lump
as Workers' Comp,) shall cause to be
2 together, which is the way I see it.
printed or displayed in comparative
3
So let's go ahead with our jury trial.
prominence with other contents of the
4
MR. GARDNER: Excuse me, Judge. I need
k
statement, the admonition that any
5 to make one point, that Section 35-1-109(9) went into
5
person who knowingly presents false or
6 effect May 1st of 95, months after this case
k
fraudulent information" and so on,
7 occurred. So I don't think that Counsel should be
I
that "The statement must be proceeded
8 allowed to argue that to the Jury. I think the
I
by the words, 'For your protection,
9 effective date is several months after this all went
I
Utah law requires the following to
10 down.
appear on this form.'"
11
THE COURT: I was just noticing, as
And as the witness testified on the
12 Ms. Ah Ching was arguing, that it says that the 1994
medical records, there was not that admonition as
13 amendments were effective July 1,1994. That is not
required by statute. It wasn't placed on that form.
14 correct with respect to this particular crime?
It appears to be the only form, if not one of the
15
MR. GARDNER: I thought it was May 1 st
only forms, if not the only form, that
16 of '95.
Miss Ellingsworth signed in regards to providing
17
THE COURT: It's just what the statute
information to Workers' Comp.
18 says. I'm not verifying for the accuracy of what's
It would be our contention that Workers'
Comp violated the conditions of the statute, and
19 in the - what months did it cover.
specifically the statute that Miss Ellingsworth is
20
MS. AH CHING: And that's why we copied
charged under; and therefore, they could not use that
21 the two statutes, Judge, is that this was the '94 one
information that they obtained, i.e., the medical
22 that was in effect when Miss Ellingsworth was
records that were obtained pursuant to the release of
23 charged
information that was given.
24
THE COURT: Let's go ahead.
25
Dick, would you bring the Jury in?
In fact that release. Judse. if vou
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Q. Okay. And that was two days after your
Blynco accident; right?
'A. Yes.
Q. When you say you had other insurance that
could have paid for the Blynco injury?
A. I didnft do it that way because I wasn't
advised to.
Q. But two days after that, you said that
you were self-insured; is that right?
PC A. Yes.
Q. Let's go back to the first part of your
m testimony. You said that when you pulled on the this
|Q pulley A. Uh-huh.
Q. - that you talked this over with Sharon
It Rowley, and she knew it had happened because she
|? mentioned it to you before?
A. That's correct.
Q. Did you hear her testimony on Tuesday two
pD days ago?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Do you remember her words where she
fe testified under oath sitting right where you are
m sitting that these blinds had never been caught
B5 pulling up? Did you hear her testify to that?
Page 563
- A. No, I didn't hear those specific words.
Q. If we have the court reporter play back
S those words for you, would that refresh your
4 recollection as to Sharon Rowley's testimony on that
|5 point?
A. Yes.
MR. GARDNER: okay. Your Honor, I am not
sure if that's possible, if we can pull that up?
MS. AH CHING: Your Honor, I think what
fe we could do is have the Jury — I mean, the Jury was
p here. They can remember if that was said or not.
MR. GARDNER: That's fine. That might be
|S simpler. Let's go by that means.
Ma'am, do you remember — you said you
B did not remember Sharon Rowley testifying to that; is
f that correct?
A. No, that isn't what I said. I said I
don't remember her testifying to those specific
| words.
Q. Do you remember her saying that there had
never been an accident like that before?
A. She said by pulling on a blind cord.
Q. Okay.
A That isn't how I was injured.
Q. Well, did you hear her testify that she
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

VOL m , TRIAL, 5-8-97

Page 564
couldn't understand how this could have happened?
A. Pulling on a blind cord once again, is
what she testified to, is what I heard.
Q. And you were pulling on the cord of this
blind; is that right?
A. No, I was — the pulley, to raise the
blind, to put the slat through.
Q. And the pulley to raise the blind-A. Uh-huh.
Q. - what is that, not a cord, but a piece
of metal?
A. No, it is like a (Indicating) -- it is
about this wide, and it is like a rope thing. You
pull it like this (Indicating).
Q. Uh-huh?
A. And it raises it up so that you can...
Q. Okay. Well, she testified - this is my
recollection, and the Jury will give this the weight
that they deem it deserves. She said that this had
never happened before. Is it your testimony that she
lied or misled the court?
A. I don't believe she used those specific
words. She said, "By pulling on a blind cord," to
the best of my knowledge. That's all I believe she
said.
Page 565

1
Q. All right. And your testimony also was
2 that Debbie Cleverly, your - the overall supervisor,
3 told you to maybe go home and rest and then go to the
4 hospital later if you didn't feel good; is that
5 right?
6
A. That's correct.
7
Q. My recollection is that she testified
8 that she was concerned that if you might possibly
9 have been hurt, to go to St. Mark's. It's a little
10 bit different...
11
MS. AH CHING: Your Honor, objection.
12 Mr. Gardner is now testifying about what was said or
13 was not said. And he can ask questions of the
14 witness but not testify unless he wants to take the
15 witness stand.
16
THE COURT: It is cross-examination. He
17 can go ahead.
18
MR. GARDNER: Ma'am, do you remember
19 Debbie Cleverly testifying to that, that she was
20 concerned about you, she thought you might be hurt,
21 she wanted you to go to St. Mark's?
22
A. Yes, I recall her testifying to that.
23 But I also sat for a long period of time in the break
24 room before she even bothered to come in there to see
25 how I was doing. So I don't see...
Page 562 - Page 565
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1:
Q. But your testimony is that she simply
N * wanted you to go home and rest and then maybe if you
H 3 still hurt afterwards go to the hospital. That's a
Hi little bit different.
| < A. Yes, that's what she told me.
H. Q. So is it your testimony that what really
B - happened is different from what she testified to?
| | j A. Maybe she doesn't recall exactly or I
H 9 don't recall exactly the specific words that we
Hi; used. I mean, it has been since '94. It is quite a
U\. long time to remember.
iji: Q. All right. Do you have a clear
||i: recollection of everything that happened on October
U\i 12th both at Blynco and at the hospital?
Hi 5 A. Yes, I do.
LL Q. Okay. You testified a few minutes ago
| r that at St. Mark's you were told that if you are not
| b feeling better you could go to a doctor of your
ita choice. Do you remember testifying to that a few
lb: minutes ago?
lei
A. Yes.
1422 Q. And yet you specifically mentioned that
l b you called Dr. Borne1 s office?
|p
A. Yes.
Ip
Q. So you were told, weren't you, that you
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testified that Dr. Borne's office couldn't get you in
on October 17 and that's why you went to Dr. Seeman;
is that right?
A. As I recall.
Q. But they had an appointment for you that
same day; isn't that correct?
A I don't remember.
Q. Okay. And Dr. Borne's appointment for
you was on the same day as Dr. Seeman's; is that
correct?
A I don't remember.
Q. Okay. You also testified that you told
Dr. Seeman, when you saw him on October the 17th,
about this assault that happened three days earlier?
A Yes.
Q. Did you hear him testify repeatedly that
he knew nothing about that until this case was
convened?
A Yes.
Q. He isn't lying?
A I don't believe —
MS. AH CHING: Your Honor, objection.
She can't comment on the credibility of another
witness.
MR. GARDNER: But she can comment about

tj
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H ! were being referred me Dr. Michael Borne?
1 what's going here. Her testimony is one way and
H 2 A. If I chose to see Dr. Borne. They didn't
2 someone else is - pardon me. She is saying she lied
t] 3 tell me that I had to go see Dr. Borne.
3 under oath, is what she is saying.
[14
Q. But you were given the name of
4
THE WITNESS: No.
5
THE COURT: Don't answer that,
B 5 Dr. Michael Borne; weren't you?
6 Miss Ellingsworth.
H 6 A. They referred me to Dr. Borne.
7
MS. AH CHING: Your Honor, I think she
rj 7 Q. Okay. And were you given a paper that
1
8 can say that she's saying something different, but
I 8 also had Dr. Borne s name on it?
9 she can't say, "Yes, he's lying." I mean, it may be
tj 9 A. Yes, that's how I got the number to call
10 inadvertent on Dr. Seeman's part. I think it is
iJ:o him.
11 inappropriate for one witness to comment on the
Ip
Q. Okay. So his name and his address and
12 credibility of another.
i J12 his phone number was on that?
13
THE COURT: I think that's what the whole
ip
A. Yes.
4
14 trial is about.
I
Q. Okay. Now, do you remember Paola
15
She can answer.
i p Valente's testimony that Dr. Borne's office expected
16
MR. GARDNER: Do you need me to repeat
i p you on October the 17th?
17 that question?
IP
A. Yes.
18
A No, I understood.
Ip
Q. So they had an appointment for you on
19
No, I don't believe that Dr. Seeman was
I :9 that day; didn't they?
20 lying. But towards the end, Dr. Seeman was having
||20
A. Yes.
I 2l
Q. Okay. And instead of going to
21 health problems and he had had strokes and stuff and
1 p Dr. Borne's office, you went to Dr. Seeman's office?
22 he wasn't keeping track of things in the office like
1 23 A. Yes.
23 he should have been. So he could have forgotten, or,
4
1p
Q. Okay. And you went to Dr. Seeman's
24 you know, I am not saying he was lying.
1 [25 office - or, pardon me, a few minutes ago you
25
Q. Did you see him look at his notes that he
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^ be in effect throughout the trial.
1 Venetian blinds that go into residential homes. A n d
We are in recess.
2 so what the workers would do, is that they would put
(Recess)
3 one slat on the support, pull the strings through it
THE COURT: Now that you are formally
4 and get it organized, lift it up and do another slat
5 sworn in, we are about to start the trial. Every
5 until it was long enough that it was completed.
6 time we take a break, whether it is overnight or
6
Well, on October 12th of 1994, the
7 lunch or a short break, I ' m going to try to remember
7 Defendant w a s working at Blynco. She had about 11
g to ask you to please not talk about the case until
8 co-workers around her. She pulled on the string of
! 9 the trial is over and it lands in your lap for final
9 the blind. A n d then she turned and said to someone,
•0 decision. But we don't want any preliminary
10 "I think I hurt myself." There were 11 people
;i deliberations going on or any other investigation
11 around her. No one saw any problems. In fact, you
|i2 into the case or even any discussion of the evidence
12 are going to hear the supervisor, Debbie Cleverly,
13 that you will have heard b y that p o i n t
13 and a co-worker, Sharon Rowley, come in and tell you
14
We are going to start now. Mr. Gardner
14 what happened. They are even going to bring in one
15 is going to give an opening statement, I suspect, and
15 of the blinds that they put together. They couldn't
16 Miss Ah Ching will also give one, and then w e will
16 believe that this woman had been injured.
17 move into the evidence.
17
They have the Defendant go to St. Mark's
18
Each attorney - if it's Mr. Gardner's
18 Emergency Room, and she was seen by a Physician's
19 witness, he'll do direct exam, and then Miss A h Ching 19 Assistant named Rebecca Dickinson, and Rebecca is
20 will do cross-examination. A n d he m a y do redirect,
20 going to testify. She examined the Defendant, heard
21 and she m a y do recross. Essentially, they will ask
21 the Defendant's story. She couldn't see anything
22 questions until they believe that they've extracted
22 wrong. So she diagnosed her as being a muscle
23 all the information that the witness has that will be
23 strain, told her to go on light duty for maybe one
24 valuable to you in deciding what the facts are.
24 day, told her to take some aspirin, put some ice
25
W e m a y have a couple of bench
25 packs on the injured part of her shoulder but light
Page 122
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1 duty the next day.
1 conferences. That is when I ask the lawyers to come
2
The Defendant never returned to work.
2 up here. The bottom line on that is that we are
3 And on that one so-called, work-related injury, she
3 talking about things that we don't want you to hear.
4 has received almost $5,000 in money and in medical
4 The reason we are doing that is usually that the
5 benefits.
5 subject matter is something that might have an
6
The state of Utah alleges that that claim
6 improper effect on your role in court and what you
7 and the benefits that the Defendant received were
7 are to decide on. So don't worry about what we are
8 received as a result of fraud. This is why...
8 talking about. It's usually just a little legal
9
When the supervisor, Debbie Cleverly,
9 argument about some point or other.
10 submitted the claim to Workers Compensation fund for
10
I think that's all you need to do.
11 the Defendant there was a box on the form that says:
11
Let's go ahead, Mr. Gardner.
12 "Do you have any doubts whether this is a valid
12
MR. GARDNER: Thank you, Your Honor.
13 injury? H And she checked "yes." And she sent a
13
M a y it please the Court and Counsel.
14 letter to Workers Comp Fund with the claim. And the
14 Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, this is a case
15
letter said this woman had only been working here for
15 about Workers Compensation fraud. There is a
16 two weeks. She had only worked maybe 59 hours during
16 one-felony count information against Brenda
17 that two weeks. And she called in and complained
17 Ellingsworth, the Defendant in this case. A n d the
18 repeatedly of illnesses and other problems. In
18 evidence is going to show that on October 12th of
19 addition there were 11 co-workers around her, no one
19 1994 Brenda - I ' m going to call her the Defendant
20 from now on — was working at a blind manufacturing
20 saw an injury, no one saw any problem.
21 shop. It was called Blynco Manufacturing. It is
21
Nevertheless, the Workers Compensation
22 down here about 60th South State Street. She had
22 Fund accepted the claim. And on October 17th, five
23 been working there for about two weeks. A n d what
23 days after this happened, the adjuster, Paola
24 this company did was, they would actually put
24 Valente, contacted the Defendant and took a statement
25 together the slats and the strings to manufacture the
25 from her. "What happened? How were you injured? Do
CARLTON WAY, CSR 801-535-5464
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1 you have any other back problems?" A n d the Defendant
2 said, , f No, no, no, I have no other back problems. M y
3 back hurts." A n d based on the written claim from
4 Blynco Manufacturing and this follow-up phone
5 conference between Paola Valente and the Defendant,
6 Workers Compensation Fund of Utah accepted the claim
7 and began paying monetary and medical benefits to the
8 Defendant.
9
What no one knew was this: T w o days
10 after the Defendant pulled on the blind there at
hi Blynco and said she injured herself, Defendant w a s a
12 victim of a rather savage domestic violence assault
13 She was beaten badly. Beat around the face, the
14 neck, thrown against a wall. A n d she w a s taken b y
15 ambulance on a stretcher with a neck brace back to
16 St. Mark's emergency hospital (sic). And she was
17 treated by a medical doctor there. A n d she claimed
18 of back pain to both the police officer - and you
19 are going to hear Steve Anjewierden from the
20 Sheriffs Office testify. He was the officer on the
hi case. He made a report. He'll testify that she told
22 him she had been beaten repeatedly and injured in the
23 face and j a w and the upper back. She told the
24 ambulance driver, Cal Kunz - he was with Gold Cross
25 Ambulance Service, the same thing. A n d you are going
I
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Paola Valente, met with the Defendant again, because
Brenda, one, w a s not getting better. There were
ongoing complaints of pain to the back. And the
adjuster thought, "She pulled on a blind. She should
be doing fine by now. What's wrong?" And on January
11th, Paola Valente talked to Defendant and asked her
to sign a release, an authorization to give medical
records, all of her medical treatment, to Workers
Compensation Fund. The Defendant signed the release,
dated it January 11th. A n d on the next page she w a s
asked to write down all of the doctors that had
treated her. A n d as best she can remember, she wrote
down five. And she said, "I think that's all of
them." Paola Valente thought, "This can't be
right." A n d so she sent the request for records out
to all the hospitals in the Salt Lake Area.
In two weeks, she began to get lots of
medical records back; lots and lots and lots. She
got medical records back from Cottonwood Emergency,
St. Mark's, Holy Cross, pharmacies, Dr. Seeman,
Dr. Hebertson, many, many more people. And the
records she got showed that the Defendant had been to
these hospitals about 200 times. And w e are only
going to focus, really, on what happened in 1994,
onwards. But w e are going to have some of the
Page 128
doctors w h o treated her in January and February and
March and May of 1994. They will come in here and
are going to testify because you'll see charts of all
of the various times that the Defendant went to these
doctors and all the various medications she was
receiving from them. But in January of '94,
Dr. Bruce Argyle treated her for back pain and back
injuries. February of '94 he treated her again for
back injuries. March of '94, Doctor - let me make
sure that I've got the exact name - Dr. Robert
Gannon at Holy Cross Emergency treated the Defendant
for upper right back pain. May of 1994, Dr. Ronda
Smith at H o l y Cross Emergency treated the Defendant
for upper back pain - pardon m e , back pain.
Five different times — pardon me, four
different times in 1994 alone, the Defendant was
being treated b y various doctors for back pain and
back injuries.
O n January 11th, the same day that Paola
Valente met with the Defendant and her signed this
release, this authorization to get medical records,
on that same day, the Workers' Compensation Fund had
a different doctor, a specialist, examine the
Defendant And his name is Dr. Jeff Chung. He did

1 to hear him testify because he made a report, as
2 well. She said, "I got hit repeatedly in the face,
3 the jaw and hurt m y back; lots of pain in m y back."
4 And she arrived at St. Mark's emergency hospital on a
5 stretcher with a neck brace. They treated her for
6 back injury, neck pain, face pain. I believe that
7 the report says some bruising. They released the
8 Defendant after she w a s treated.
9
Three days later, on October 17th, the
10 same day the Defendant talked to Paola Valente by
II phone and said, "I have no other problems except what
12 happened at Blynco," on October 17th, the Defendant
13 went and saw a doctor, Dr. Eugene Seeman. And she
14 said, "I'm vomiting. I've got migraine headaches. I
15 have got upper back pain. I have got shoulder pain,
16 all caused by pulling the cord on the blind at Blynco
17 Manufacturing." And Dr. Siemons will testify, he
18 made notes, the Defendant said nothing at all about
19 the intervening domestic violence assault. She told
20 no one, no one knew. And for the next several
21 months, the Defendant continued to receive treatment
22 by a number of doctors, medications, including
23 hydrocortisone, Loritabs, and s o m e other pain killers
24 and she received monetary benefits.
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was to see if all these injuries that Brenda had
complained about were caused by the October 12th,
1994 work injury when she pulled on the blind. And
Dr. Chung will tell you that on January 11th the
Defendant told him, "I have had no previous back
injuries. I have no other problems. And she also
neglected to mention the October 17th domestic
violence attack where she was badly beaten. And
based on information she gave him Dr. Chung said,
"Well, it doesn't seem right, but let's put her on a
work-hardening program for a couple of weeks, let's
give her the benefits, you know, from December into
January and let's see if we can get her better."
After - after Paola Valente had sent out
the request for records and she got all these records
back, she sent those to the doctor, Dr. Chung. And
in February of 1995, he did a different records
check. And he'll testify that he did not know about
all the other times that the Defendant had been in
the hospital, all of the other times she had been
there for back treatment, back injury treatment, or
all of the other things that she had received. And
based upon that, he then will testify that he changed
his diagnosis.
Now, Paola Valente is also going to tell
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1
Then Brett told her, "Wait, we have
2 records now that show you were the victim of a
3 domestic violence assault, you have had all these
4 previousreportsfrom the hospital for various
5 treatments. What about those, Brenda?" And the
6 Defendant began to change her story, equivocate. But
7 she still hung onto her story that, "All of the
8 problems that I have had were caused by what happened
9 on October 12th when I pulled on the blind."
10
Ladies and Gentlemen, with the witnesses
11 from Blynco, with the documents that we are going to
12 show you, where the doctors and the adjusters and the
13 Workers' Compensation Fund were misled into believing
14 all these problems stemmed from what happened at
15 Glenco, even though that was a little bit bizarre,
16 and with the later information that was uncovered
17 about the October 15th - pardon me, October 14th,
18 the domestic violence attack and all of the other
19 medicalrecordsabout the problems that the Defendant
20 had before this ever happened, the evidence is going
21 to show beyond areasonabledoubt that this woman,
22 the Defendant, committed a Workers' Compensation
23 Insurance fraud by which she obtained medical
24 benefits and treatment, medical prescriptions and
25 drugs and money, by means of material

Page 130
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you, with a chart, she is going to list all the money
1 misrepresentations and omissions. And the insurance
2 that Workers' Compensation Fund paid between October 2 company was paying for her injuries when, in fact,
3 of f94 and late January of f 95; about four months.
3 they did not originate on October 12th, a
4 And they paid with $2,100 for monetary benefits and
4 work-related accident when she pulled on the cord;
5 they paid about $2,800 for various medications and
5 but, instead, they stem from October 14th when she
6 medical treatments. The total amount was just barely
6 was beaten badly and they extend from other problems
7 under $5,000. I think Paola has a chart which says
7 that she had before this ever began; but the
8 $5,100. That is little bit off the mark, and so we
8 Defendant wasn't truthful and the insurance company
9 are going to correct that. But the total amount
9 Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah was victimized
10 received by the Defendant was about $4,950.
10 into paying several thousand dollars' worth of
II
When, all of these records had come to
11 benefits and money that this woman did not deserve.
12 light, Paola Valente, the adjuster, and Brett Mann,
12 And based upon that evidence, I am going to ask you
13 who was the investigator with Workers Compensation
13 at the end of this trial to bring back a conviction
14 Fund, sat down and met with the Defendant. And Brett 14 of guilt; one count of Workers' Compensation Fraud, a
15 Mann will tell you, he asked the Defendant six
15 third degree felony.
16 different times: "Have you had any other back
16
Ladies and Gentlemen, thank you very
17 injuries besides what happened on October 12th when
17 much.
18 you pulled on this cord on the blind at Glenco?" And
18
THE COURT: Miss Ah Ching.
19 six different times the Defendant insisted, "I've had
19
MS. AH CHING: Thank you, Your Honor.
20 no other back injuries. I have had no other injuries
20
May it please the Court, Mr. Gardner and
21 at all." And then - pardon me, I stand corrected.
21 Mr. Webster, Miss Ellingsworth, Ladies and Gentlemen
22 The Defendant mentioned she had a minor knee injury 22 of the Jury, I suppose after hearing Mr. Gardner's
23 sometime years and years ago. She didn't mention the
23 opening, I might as well sit down and say - and call
24 domestic attack on October 17th, and she denied
24 it quits, because according to his opening, Brenda
stating that she had any back problems.
25 has done all these bad changes that are prohibited by
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j i she had been struck.
2 Q. H o w could y o u tell?
: A . There w a s s o m e discoloration a n d
4 swelling, b u t it w a s n ' t severe as it h a d been
5 relatively recently.
$ Q. Deputy, I k n o w this happened in October
? of '94. B u t as y o u describe this, I'll j u s t inform
l you that y o u were gesturing with y o u r left h a n d b y
9 the left side of y o u r j a w . D i d that relate t o w h a t
o you were told b y B r e n d a of w h a t happened o n October
! the 14th?
:2 A. Y e a h Again, in reading m y report t o
3 refresh m y m e m o r y for this case, she said she w a s
4 struck in the j a w a n d also in the ear o n both sides
J ;5 of her head (Indicating).
|;6
Q. Just n o w y o u were gesturing with y o u r
| :7 right h a n d b y the right side of y o u r j a w ; is that
! ;i what she also showed y o u h a d happened?
M9
A. A s I recall, y e s .
20
Q. W h a t happened as a result of those
ll complaints b y Brenda Ellingsworth?
'22
A. I forwarded the case to the Detective
23 Division. I d o n ' t k n o w what the outcome w a s o r if
'?4 charges, if any, were filed.
25
Q. Let m e ask this: W a s medical care

TU.
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1 center, I suppose you'd call i t But I recognize my
2 n a m e a n d m y department assigned an identification
3 n u m b e r . A n d I remember that incident as I read the

4 text
5

Q. A l l right. Does it also have the

6 victim's name "Brenda Ellingsworth" and the location
7 w h e r e y o u were sent?
8
A. It does.
9
Q. Does those things track with the

10 information that is in S-l — or, pardon me, S-3?
11
A. Y e s , they d o .
12
Q. Does that also track with your
13 recollection of what happened?
14
A. It does.
15
Q. Deputy, is that a fair and accurate
16 record of what happened on October 14th as told t o
17 y o u b y the Defendant?
18
A. It does, y e s .
19
MR. GARDNER: Your Honor, at this time, I

20 would offer into evidence as State's Exhibit 3 the
21 Sheriffs Office report identified by Deputy Sheriff
22 Anjewierden.
23
THE COURT: Miss A h Ching?
24
MS. AH CHING: Your Honor, I w o u l d
25 object. I think the Rules are pretty clear a police
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1 furnished for Brenda, the victim?
2
A. O h , yes. W h e n I arrived at the scene,
3 the fire department and ambulance c r e w w e r e already
4 there. A n d as I read m y report, I recall that she
5 had been transported to the hospital b y the ambulance
6 crew.
7
Q. A l l right. W h y w a s she transported t o
8 the hospital b y ambulance?
9
A. Because she w a s complaining of injuries
10 and pain, and I suppose that the fire personnel
11 believed that that w a s in her best i n t e r e s t
12
Q. A l l right. Officer, several times y o u
13 have said that y o u h a d to refresh y o u r recollection
14 b y looking at y o u r report.
15
M a y I approach the witness, Y o u r H o n o r ?
16
THE COURT: Yes.
17
MR. GARDNER: r d like to s h o w y o u w h a t ' s

18 marked for identification as State's Exhibit 3.
19
D o y o u recognize that two-paged
20 document?

21
A. Yeah, it appears to be my initial report
22 prepared for that incident
[23
Q. How can you identify that as your initial
24 report?
125
A. We phone the reports in to a transcribing
CARLTON WAY, CSR 801-535-5464
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officer c a n testify about his report b u t they are not
evidence to b e admitted into evidence.
THE COURT: Mr. Gardner?
MR. GARDNER: On this thing where the
Officer has to refresh his recollection, w e can have
h i m read the report. I thought this might be

7 simpler.
8
THE COURT: I will sustain the objection.
9
MR. GARDNER: Okay.
10
Deputy, let m e ask this: Looking down,
11 c a n y o u read exactly what the Defendant told you as
12 reported in y o u r report?
13
A. Yeah.
14
Q. Pardon m e . Let m e clarify that. What

15 Td like to ask is what injuries the Defendant
16 reported that she h a d suffered. W e d o n ' t need the
17 other matter about the rest of the domestic
18 violence.
19
A. Okay. In the second paragraph here, it

20 reads 21
Q. Brenda stated that?
22
A. Correct. Brenda states that Ronnie began
23 t o pull her hair, a n d then hit her in the right eye
24 with his right hand. She states that he 25 correction, she states that he began to push her
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iround the apartment, and then he hit her on the left
• side of the jaw and in the left ear. Brenda states
; that she was hit at least ten times during the
. assault
Q. You can stop there.
;
Were the injuries that you saw on the
• victim's eye, face and body consistent with what she
"! told you had happened?
; A. They were.
Q. And after the Defendant was taken by
: ambulance, did you have any more contact with her?
: A. Not in regards to this report.
j Q. Let me ask this: Do you know which
.4 hospital the victim was taken to?
j A. I don't know that.
i Q. Do you know which ambulance company
;? transported her?
j A. Yeah, Gold Cross Ambulance, the only one
3 in the Valley.
3 Q. By any chance, do you know the names of
U the personnel who transported her in the the Gold
2 Cross Ambulance Service?
3
A. No, I don't
24 Q. Does that information that you read
25 accurately track the Defendant's — the Defendant's,
Page 198
l in this case, statements to you on October 14th?
2 A. As I recall them, yes.
13 Q. All right. At any time did the
4 Defendant, victim of that domestic violence case,
15 tell you that she had been injured two days earlier
6 at work?
7
A. No, I don't recall that
8
Q. All right. Did you have any record in
9 your report about such a complaint by the Defendant,
10 Brenda Ellingsworth?
11
A. No, there is no record of that
12
Q. Everything which you have described to us
13 happened in the West Valley City Area of Salt Lake
14 County, State of Utah?
15
A. It is the unincorporated area of Salt
16 Lake County.
17
Q. All right But it is Salt Lake County,
18 Utah; isn't it?
19
A. It is, absolutely.
20
MR. GARDNER: Deputy, thank you*
21
I have no other questions.
22
THE COURT: Cross?

23
24
25
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CROSS-EXAMINATION
1
2 BYMS.AHCHING:
3
Q. Officer Anjewierden, this report that
4 Mr. Gardner has talked about is the only report that
5 you filled out in this?
6
A. I believe that is the case, yes.
7
Q. There are no other reports or notes
8 anywhere else?
A. I made notes at the time. I have no idea
9
10 where they would be.
Q. And thisreportthat you filled out, this
11
12 is as accurate a documentation of what occurred and
13 was told you as you could put in the report; is that
14 right?
A. I believe so. That was certainly my
15
16 intent.
Q. And everything that you felt was
17
18 important about what Brenda told you, you put in the
19 record; isn't that
right?
A. Yeah. As it pertained to the case, I
20
21 believe so.
Q. And when Brenda was telling you what her
22
23 injuries were, you looked at her face to determine
24 whether it matched with what she said; is that right?
A, Yes.
25

|
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Q. And when Brenda told you that she was hit
1
2 in therighteye area with ~ by her - by Ronnie,
3 you looked at her face; is that right?
A. That's correct
4
Q. You indicated that you saw that she had
5
6 some swelling about her face but it wasn't severe; is
7 that right?
A. That's correct
8
Q. You also indicated that she said that he
9
had
pushed her around the apartment, and then hit her
10
11 on the left side - left-hand side of her jaw; is
12 that right?
A. I believe that's the case.
13
Q. And you looked at her face and you saw
14
15 it?
A. That's correct
16
Q. You looked at her face and saw some
17
slight
brusing in the mouth area?
18
A. I don't think I saw bruising, but just
19
red
marks that I felt coincided with her statement of
20
21 the assault
Q. And then she also indicated that she was
22
23 hit on her left ear?
A. Yeah, that's stated in the report.
24
Q. Okay. Brenda indicated to you that she
25

|
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j1
A. Yeah. For the most part, yes.
1 was hit at least ten times during the assault; is
2
Q. So it wouldn't be unusual for Brenda not
2 that right?
t 3 to bring up the subject that she was injured two days
!3
A. That's correct.
4 prior at work; is that right?
j4
Q. N o w , when you spoke to Brenda, was she
5
A. Think it would be unusual.
5 sitting down, standing up, what was she doing; do y o u
6
MS.AHCHING: No further questions.
6 recall?
7
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
7
A. I don't think I do recall that.
8 BY MR. GARDNER:
8
Q. Okay. When you came to the apartment,
9
Q. Deputy, did this w o m a n seem injured in
9 was the fire department and ambulance already there?
10 any other w a y other than this domestic violence
10
A. They were on the scene, but they waited
j 11 attack that she had just suffered?
11 outside to ensure that it's safe to go inside. So
12
A. N o t to m e .
12 they were at the scene of the apartment.
13
MS. AH CHING: Your Honor, this man is
13
Q. So your conversation with Brenda then
14 not a physician. He didn't - I mean, all he can
14 took place inside the apartment; is that right?
115
testify to is what she told him and what he saw on
15
A. That's correct.
16 her face. He did not examine her.
16
Q. She was not in the ambulance already; is
117
THE COURT: That is a correct statement,
17 that right?
18 Miss A h Ching, but I think the answer does limit
|l8
A. Yeah. I meant inside the apartment.
19
itself to that scope.
19
Q. N o w , in your report that you have
20
MR. GARDNER: That w a s the only question
20 reviewed for today's hearing there is no indication
21
I
had.
Thank
you.
21 in the report that Brenda told you that she was
72
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Deputy.
22 thrown against a wall; is that right? You can look
23
Does the Jury have any questions for the
23 at your report?
24 Deputy?
24
A. N o , that is not documented.
I
[25
Q. A n d there's n o indication in your report
25
W e are done.
Page 204
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1
THE COURT: Thank you, Deputy. No
1 that Brenda told you that she had an injury on her
2 back; is that right?
2 further questions.
3
A. I don't recall that, no.
\
3
MR. GARDNER: I'll call Mr. Cal Kunz.
4
Q. Is there indication in your report?
4
CAL KUNZ, called as a
5 witness on behalf of the State, after having been
5
A. No.
I 6 duly sworn, testified as follows:
6
Q. The injuries or the areas that were hit,
7
DIRECT EXAMINATION
7 Brenda told you about was in the face area; is that
8 BY MR. GARDNER:
8 right?
9
Q. Mr. Kunz, would you please tell us your
9
A. A s I specifically documented them, yes.
10
Q. Okay. N o w , Mr. Gardner asked you if
10 full name and spell your last name?
11 Brenda told you that she was injured on the job two
11
A. Cal Byron Kunz, K-u-n-z.
12 days before. D i d you ask her if she was just injured
12
Q. Mr. Kunz, I understand that you worked
13 on the j o b two days before?
13 with Gold Cross Ambulance Service back in 1994?
14
A. N o , I would have had n o w a y of knowing if
14
A. I did, yes, sir.
15 that was the case.
15
Q. Were you working with that Gold Cross
16
Q. Would you routinely ask people, in
16 Ambulance Service on October 14th of 1994?
17 domestic violence cases, whether they've been injured
17
A. I actually was. I don't have a copy of
18 at work?
,
18 the report, though, if I could see that?
19
A. No, I don't know that.
19
Q. Okay, let me first of all ask this: How
20
Q. Did you routinely, in domestic violence
20 long have you been working with Gold Cross Ambulance
21 cases, ask people whether they've had any surgery?
21 as of October?
22
A. I don't, no.
I
22
A. In what year was that?
23
Q. So unless there is a reason to, y o u 23
Q. 1994.
24 you want find out what happened on just that
24
A. Okay, I worked there total for about four
[25 occasion; is that right?
25 years. I - that would have been about two or three
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L fa^ being as I was a finisher and worked on a
pulley, there was nothing light duty that I could do
p there.
Q. Okay. And what did she tell you about
4
what you needed do if you came back to work?
A. She told me that I could not come back to
work
until I was basically all the way better because
7
1% of the type of work it is.
Q. Okay. Now, at some point you went and
|i0 saw Dr. Seeman; is that right?
A. Yes.
U2 Q. Do you recall the date that you went to
hj see Dr. Seeman?
L
A. Not exactly. No, I don't.
B5
Q. Why is it that you went and saw
B6 Dr. Seeman?
b7
A. Because I was having problems with my
B8 shoulders still and up in here (Indicating).
D9
Q. Okay. And when you went to see
DO Dr. Seeman, what did you tell them or what did you
pi tell Dr. Seeman specifically about what had happened,
m what injury you had?
B3
A. I told him that I injured myself at work,
B4 pulled on the pulley and what had happened and it had
p hurt my shoulder, and stuff, up in here
Page 547
11 (Indicating).
12
Q. Okay. Now, was there anybody else at
3 Dr. Seeman*s office that you talked to or that you
4 dealt with?
5
A. Yes, there was.
6
Q. And who was that?
7
A. His assistant, Steve.
8
Q. Okay. And what involvement did Steve
9 have in your treatment?
Bo
MR. GARDNER: Your Honor pi
THE WITNESS: Sometimes he did my
B2 therapy B3
MR. GARDNER: Excuse me. Your Honor V*
THE COURT: You have got to stop when you
•5 hear an objection.
&6

MR. GARDNER: This i s g o i n g t o g e t i n t o

7 hearsay. I don't think we ought to get into this

8 Steven. I am not sure who this is. If this is going
B9 into hearsay testimony, I am going to anticipate —
BO make an anticipatory objection.
I1
THE COURT: Hearsay objection will be
B2 sustained.
p
Go ahead, Miss Ah Ching.
I4
MS. AH CHING: what involvement did
|tt Steven have with your treatment?
fARLTON WAY, CSR 801-535-5464
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A. He did my therapies sometimes.
Q. Okay. Did you have conversations with
Steven?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. And did you have conversations
with Steven about the assault of October 14th? And
we want to know just what you told Steven.
A. Yes. As I recall, I also mentioned that
to Dr. Seeman, too.
Q. And what did you tell Dr. Seeman about
the assault of October 14th?
A Well, I was at my son's house because I
didn't return back to where I was living after not
going to work that day. So - and I was standing in
the kitchen with my back to the front door. And I
thought the door was locked. Well, it wasn't. And
my husband came in and assaulted me.
Q. Do you recall when it was that you told
Dr. Seeman this?
A. I believe it was the first time I seen
him.
Q. Okay. And was anybody else there besides
you and Dr. Seeman?
A. Steve.
Q. Okay. Now, you saw Dr. Seeman for about

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
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a year; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Are you familiar - are you aware
of what the status is of Dr. Seeman r s office right
now? In other words, if it is open still or closed?
A. It is closed.
Q. Do you recall how often you saw
Dr. Seeman through that year?
A. Sometimes once a week, sometimes twice a
week.
Q. And during that time, was it all to see
Dr. Seeman or was it for therapy or what was - what
— give me a flavor of what the appointments were
about?
A. They were doing therapy on my upper right
shoulder here with — like that ultrasound thing
(Indicating) and heat, radiation-type therapy.
Q. Okay. Now, you provided certain
information to Miss Valente; is that right?
A Yes.
Q. Okay. What kinds of information did you
bring Miss Valente; do you recall?
A. To the best of my knowledge, what she
asked for.

25

Q. Okay. Was there any information that
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WATE

V. ELLINGSWORTH 96-460

Condenselt™

f~~
"~~~
Page 550
I ^ Valente asked y o u for that y o u didn't provide
J 2 her to your recollection?
J j K No, there i s n ' t
II
Q. Okay. Let's talk about the release of
15 information that you filled out. Do you remember
h doing that?
it
A. Yes.
|l
Q. Okay. Do you remember when you filled
15 that information out?
1)0 A. I don't recall.
III
Q. Prior to filling out that release o f
Ji2 information, had y o u had any other discussions with
|I3 Ms. Valente about the filling out o f the release o f
§14 information?
|15
A. I don't recall it has been s o long, long
lie ago.
•17
Q. Had you received any paperwork similar to
lis that to get you to release information?
319
A. I don't believe s o .
DC
Q. Okay. On the day that y o u went into sign
Cl this release o f information, d o y o u remember that
122 day?
123
A. Vaguely.
|24
Q. Okay. D o y o u remember what happened that
p5day?
J
Page 5 5 1
11
A. Yeah, I went in and she asked m e to sign
12 the release o f information to release m y medical
13 records.
|4
Q. Okay. D i d y o u talk to her about what the
15 release was about?
16
A. I don't believe so. I believe she just
17 told me that it w a s to release m y medical records.
18
Q. Okay. D i d she discuss with y o u what —
19 you know, where the release was going to go or what
IK type of people were going to look at the
111 information?
p
A. No.
B3
Q. Did you read the release of information?
|M
A. Yeah, I looked at it and I thought I
115 understood it.
p
Q. Okay. And did you sign the release of
p" information?
p
A. Yes.
p
Q. Now, do you remember the back side of the
po release or the second page of the release of
pi information?
P
A. I - 1 only remembered signing one
fc release paper.
P4
Q. Okay. There's - you've heard discussion
g5 about Page No. 2 where you list the doctor and the
CARTTfYKT w A v"r»co" « A I - < I * - * A * L A
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hospital —
J
A. Oh, I see what y o u mean now.
Q. D o y o u remember that sheet?
A. Y e s .
Q. W a s there any discussion about that sheet
o f the release?
A. I don't believe s o .
Q. Okay. When y o u filled in that release,
what w a s your understanding o f what y o u needed to d o
to complete that portion o f the release?
A. T o just fill out and specify that I
didn't have any injuries to this area (Indicating)
that I had injured at work.
Q. Okay.
A. I felt that other injuries were
irrelevant.
Q. Okay. W h y did y o u think that other
injuries were irrelevant?
A. They didn't specify any difference until
afterwards. Then they explained it to me.
Q. Okay. When y o u talked with M i s s Valente
about the different places that you'd been —
A. Y e s .
Q. — did y o u remember every place that y o u
had been?
|
Page 5 5 3
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A. No.
Q. Okay. The release o f information that
y o u signed, d o y o u recall doing anything else that
day for M i s s Valente?
A. N o , I don't.
Q. D o you recall going to Dr. Chung's
office?
A. Y e s , I do.
Q. W a s — w a s it the same day or w a s it a
different day; d o y o u recall?
A. It w a s a different date, I believe.
Q. H o w m a n y times did y o u see Dr. Chung?
A. Once.
Q. H o w long w a s the one time that y o u s a w
Dr. Chung?
A. I believe it w a s - it w a s briefly, about
20, 30 minutes.
Q. Okay. A n d when y o u s a w Dr. Chung, what
kind o f treatment or what kind o f things did he d o
with your body or with your back when y o u saw him?
A. H e had m e put on a hospital g o w n , and he
had m e raise and lower. A n d he pushed on m y shoulder
area and m y neck and the upper part right here
(Indicating).
1
Q. Okay. D i d he ask y o u questions?
T>«~~ CCA _ T*«~~ C O
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A. Yes.
H:
Q. Okay. Did he ask you about any prior
n . 5 ^ problems that you'd had?
Ij 4 A. I don't — not when he said, "Back
II < problems," in my mind this injury is (Indicating)
[J ? here, you know, not (Indicating) the other part of my
U ? back.

H $ Q Okay. When doctor - when Dr. Chung and
N * you talked about any prior back injuries —
lljo
A. Uh-huh.
til'
Q- - you had, did you know at the time that
h i: you had had prior back injuries?
r}{3 A. Well, to the lower back of my back, and
| M stuff, yes. But I didn't think that, you know, that
r 1:5 it mattered. I thought he meant just because of the
r Ii6 work-related injury.
rip
Q. Did you tell Dr. Chung that you had
1 is injuries on your lower back?
I 19 A. I don't recall.
r to
Q. Okay. Who was it that recommended to you
| : i the work-hardening program?
| ::
A. Dr. Chung.
[ 23 Q. Was it at that interview or at that
I p session that you had with him?
1p
A. No. I believe he mentioned something
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Page 556 1

l
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

18
19
20
21

22
23
24
25

THE COURT: It is sustained.
MS. AH CHING: YOU did not go to a

work-hardening program; is that right?
A. No, I did not
Q. And you did not — was the reason you
didn't go because of your own choice?
A. NO, it was because of the advice of my
physician.
Q. Did you relay that information to Paola?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, Mr. Mann, Brett Mann, talked about
these interviews that they had with you; is that
right?
A. Yes.
Q. And you heard him and what he said
happened on those interviews; is that right?
A. Yes, I heard what he said happened on
them.
Q. Now, when he asked you whether you had
any former injuries, what did you believe that to be?
A. I thought that he meant to the same part
of my body that was injured at work.
Q. Okay. When he asked you if you had any
injuries subsequent to your October 12th injury, what
did you take that to mean?

II

]

|
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A. To that same area.
1
1 i about it. But it was a couple of weeks after that,
Q. Okay. Did you ever see any of the
2
f 2 or something, that he wanted me to get right into a
[ 3 work-hardening program. It was, I believe, like
3 records, the hospital records, that Mr. Mann had?
4
A. No, I did not. I don't even recall the
[ 4 eight-hour days of work hardening.
[5
Q. How were you notified that you had to go
5 interview because I had just been released from the
[ 6 to this work-hardening program? Did they call you on 6 hospital. And, you know, I was in the hospital for
M 7 the phone, did they write a letter?
7 about a month before that.
Q. Okay. Which interview are you referring
8 A. I think she called.
8
9 to now, the February one or the March one?
[ 9 Q. Who's "she"?
[10
A. Paola.
A. The February one.
J
10
Q. Okay. And the February one that happened
J
[11
Q. And when — who made the appointment at
11
[ 12 the site, was it you that made the appointment at the
12 on the 27th of 1994?
13 site?
A. I believe that's the date.
1
13
14
Q. How long had you been out of the hospital
14 A. I don't believe so.
I 15 Q. Okay. But you were notified of the day
15 when you went in for that interview?
J
16 to go to the site; is that right?
16
A. Only one or two days.
1
17 A. I don't recall.
Q. Okay. And was the inter - did you go to
17
H Q. Okay. Now, did you go to the
18 the interview because you were asked to go, or why
|
19 work-hardening site?
j
19 did you go to the interview?
20 A. No, I did not
20
A. I went to the interview because I was
J
21 Q. Why didn't you go?
21 asked to go.
22 A. At that time, Dr. Seeman had told me that
22
Q. Were you contacted - did you have any
23 he 23 contacts with Workers' Compensation Fraud while you
24 were at the hospital?
1
24
MR. GARDNER: Well, w h y don't w e get
I [25 Dr. Seeman back. This is hearsay again.
25
A. I believe Paola had requested a meeting
I

1
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11 with me, and I called her to let her know that I had
1 or Mr. Mann that you had been assaulted on October
• ^ had to have stomach surgery, and stuff, and that I'd
2 14th prior to your interview?.
3 , k there for awhile. And then I called them to let
3
A. I didn't feel that, you know, the fact
y 4 tfctn know that I was home, I believe, before I...
4 that my husband hit me in my private life was
|<
Q. Okay. Just to clarify: You said you
5 information that would benefit them in any way
i * were at the hospital for almost a month; is that
6 because it wasn't to the same area that I was injured
7 at work.
I - right?
8
Q. Okay. When you told Mr. Mann and
It
A. Yes.
He Q. And it was for stomach surgery?
9 Miss Valente that you didn't have prior back
10 injuries, what was your intent? What were you
jfe
A. Yes.
§i:
Q. Now, do you recall when it was that your
11 thinking?
Hi: benefits from Workers' Comp were terminated?
12
A. That I didn't have any injuries to that
13 area where I was injured at work (Indicating).
[jl? A. They never really were steady payments.
14
Q. Okay. Did you at any time plan to
Hi; They were always giving me a hard time about
15
deceive
Miss Valente or Mr. Mann?
tji: something, so I don't really recall.
16
A. No, I did not.
Hjr Q. Okay. Let me put it this way: When you
17
Q.
At the time that you were injured at
|jr went in for the February interview, 1994, were you
18 Workers' Comp — or at Blynco and at the time that
H]> still getting checks from Workers' Comp?
19
you went to the hospital —
|I|9 A. No, I was not.
20
A. Uh-huh.
Ip
Q. Okay. When you went in for the interview
21
Q. — did you have any other way of paying
it: in March of 1994, were you still getting checks from
|b: Workers' Comp?
22 for your medical bills?
lb
A. No, I was not.
23
A. Yes, my - as I recall, I think my
1124 Q. Then what was your intention of going in
24 ex-husband had insurance, still.
25
MS.AHCHING: Okay. I have no further
|
I p to do these interviews if you weren't getting checks?
I!
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1
Hi
A. To clear up any discrepancies that they
2
It 2 may have thought that there was, because I didn't
3
II3 want there to be any misunderstandings.
4
[14
Q. Okay. Now, let's talk about the assault
I 5 that happened on December 14th. What happened at the 5
6
H 6 assault? Tell us where you were hit?
7
117
A. In — mostly in the face and in the jaw,
8
[18 and stuff. He pulled my hair. As I recall, he
9
| | 9 kicked me in the lower part of the back a couple of
10
llio times.
11
IJii
Q. Okay.
12
1 J»2 A. I did file a police report.
13
1p
Q. Okay. Who called the ambulance? Do you
14
I 4 know?
15
|i5
A. I don't recall.
16
116
Q. Did you call the ambulance?
17
|p
A. I know that I called the police, I
18
118 believe. I believe that the police may have called
19
119 the ambulance. I don't recall.
120
Q. Okay. Did you want to go to the hospital
20
I pi that day?
21
22
Ip A. No.
23
123
Q. Why did you go to the hospital?
4
24
|p
A Because I was assaulted.
25
1 fe Q. Why didn't you disclose to Miss Valente

Page 561
questions of Miss Ellingsworth.
THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Gardner.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. GARDNER:
Q. Ma'am, I think you testified a few
minutes ago at the beginning of your testimony that
your husband was out of work when —
A. Yes.
Q. — you had this happen at Blynco?
A. Yes.
Q. So your last statement, that you could
pay these medical bills with your ex-husband's
medical insurance, what insurance was that?
A. He was in the Roofers' Union.
Q. Okay. So what insurance was that?
A. I believe it was through American
Administrators at that time. And at that time I was
also applying for medical and food stamps and things
from the State to help.
Q. Did you make a claim to that insurance
company?
A. From the assault?
Q. From the assault?
A. No, I didn't. When it was marked on
there, I put "self pay."
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1 know.
\ \! took the very day that he saw you on October the
2
Q. But on October the 17th, you did not tell
L : nth?
3 Paola; is that your testimony?
t\x
A. I did not look at his notes, no.
4
A. On October the 17th?
1 j 4 Q. Did you hear him testify that he made
5
Q. That's right.
115 notes almost immediately after he met with you on
6
A.
I don't think that I even spoke to Paola
\\] October the 17th?
7 Valente on October 17th.
1 :
A. Yes.
8
Q. When is your recollection that you spoke
fh
Q. Okay. And he later wrote a letter to
9 to her?
f Q Workers' Comp Fund based on those notes. Did you
10
A. Toward the end of October when my
1 ; hear that testimony?
11 benefits began.
I ; A. Yes.
12
Q. Okay. Let me ask this: When those
[ :: Q. Did you hear him testify from the letter
13 benefits began coming, didn't you receive a series of
1.3 that he knew nothing at all about this domestic
14 checks from Workers1 Compensation Fund?
II A violence assault?
15
A. No, I received one check at that time.
H;< A. Yes.
16
Each
time I had to take in a doctor's thing.
Ib
Q. After Dr. Seeman had seen you on October
17
MR. GARDNER: Your Honor, may I please
( :" the 17th, you kept seeing him for the next 13 months;
18 see Exhibit 8?
I :s is that right?
19
May I approach the witness, Your Honor?
1b
A. That's correct.
20
THE COURT: Yes.
Ip
Q. Until about November of 1995?
21
MR. GARDNER: Miss Ellingsworth, I would
I :i
A. That's correct.
22 like to show you this exhibit which is now in
1b
Q. And you knew he was having these problems
23 evidence. I am going to stand over here so you can
[ p but you kept going to him; is that right?
24 see it. I would like you to take your time.
1:4
A. Yes.
25
Do you recognize what these are?
1p
Q. Okay. You also testified that you told
I
Page 571
I ! Paola Valente, when you talked to her by phone on
i 2 October 17th, about the domestic violence assault
1 h that happened three days earlier; is that your
I 4 testimony?
1 5 A. I don't recall. I don't remember saying
[ 6 those specific words.
17
Q. Do you remember telling the Jury that you
IJ 8 told Paola Valente all the information she asked you
I 9 for?
jo
A. Yes. But Paola Valente didn't come out
1 :i and say, "Has your - does your husband beat you?"
1 :2 That's not something - you know, "Had you been
I p assaulted?", you know, she didn't ask me anything
I p like that, no.
Ip
Q. Okay. But when you talked to her on the
I p phone on October the 17th, you didn't tell her about
I p the fact that three days earlier you had been
I p assaulted; did you?
Ip
A. I felt that it was irrelevant because it
1-3 wasn't to the same area that I was hurt at work.
[i:i
Q. Okay. A few minutes ago I thought I
1-2 heard you testify that you told Paola Valente about
1-3 this assault. Did I misunderstand you or did your
1 -< testimony change?
1^
A. I may have misunderstood you. I don't
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1
A. Yeah.
2
Q. Xeroxed copies of the checks Workers'
3 Compensation Fund sent to you?
4
A. Yes.
5
Q. I'd like you to look at this first check
6 for $286 dated October 31 st of 1984?
7
A. That is the first check I received.
I
8
Q. Is that your signature on the back of
9 that?
10
A. Yes, it is.
11
Q. There are other checks here. I'd like
12 you to look at them. The next one is another check
13 for the same amount dated November the 18th. Do you
14 see that?
15
A. Yes.
16
Q. And Td like you to see the signature on
17 back of that. Is that your signature?
18
A. Yes, it is.
19
Q. There are more checks, same amount?
I
20
A. Yes.
21
Q. Okay. So the November the 28th and then
22 another one for December the 2nd. Are these the
J
23 other checks that you received?
24
A. Yes.
25
Q. And are these your signatures on those
Page 570 - Page 573
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A. It would have been — it would have been
1 want And because you have them, if you don't
close to the time that her benefits were terminated,
2 understand, if I — as I read through them, you'll be
towards the end of January.
3 able at the look at them and fill in the gaps
Q. Okay. Her benefits were terminated the
4 yourselves.
5
(Judge reads instructions.)
end of January?
6
THECOURT: That's the end of the
A. Correct. Right. January 24th.
7 instructions. You will have two verdict forms in the
Q. Okay. And you sent the letter at about
8 jury room, a verdict of guilty and one that says not
the same time?
9 guilty. And we'll bring the evidence in when the —
A. Yes.
10 when you retire.
Q. And then after that was when the February
11
Now, we will have the closing argument.
and March interview that was tape-recorded took
12 Because the State has the burden, Mr. Gardner will go
place; right?
13 first, and he will also have the final argument.
A. Correct.
14 Ms. Ah Ching will argue for the Defendant in between.
MS. AH CHING: I have no further
15
Mr. Gardner?
questions.
16
MR.
GARDNER: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Gardner.
17
May it please the Court and Counsel,
MR. GARDNER: I have no other questions,
18
Ladies
and Gentlemen, as attorneys we are only
Your Honor, and no other rebuttal witness.
19 allowed to talk to you face to face during the jury
THE COURT: okay. Thank you,
20
voir dire, the opening statement and the closing
Miss Valente.
21 statement. The reason for that is because the Court
Any rebuttal for the Defendant?
22
hopes, meaning they expect you to pay attention to
MS. AH CHING: No, Your Honor.
23 the witness and listen to exactly what they say and
THE COURT: okay. So we are through with
24 see the demeanor on the stand. We, the attorneys,
the evidence.
25 can only participate in eliciting the testimony from
We will take a brief recess now while we
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1 prepare the jury instructions. We are almost to the
1 them so that you can hear what actually happened.
2 point
2
Now, I tried to convince all eight of you
3
(Outside the presence of the Jury.)
3 unanimously that a Workers' Compensation fraud was
4
THECOURT: Before we leave the record, I
4 committed by the Defendant in this case between
5 believe we have a stipulation between Counsel that
5 October 12th, when she says she was injured at
6 exceptions to the instructions can be made timely
6 Blynco, and the end of January when the medical
7 after instruction and argument and the Jury is out?
7 records began to come back and the Workers'
8
MR. GARDNER: That's correct, Your Honor.
8 Compensation Fund realized that they had been badly,
9
MS. AH CHING: That's all correct, Your
9 badly mislead and that they had made a mistake in
10 Honor.
10 giving the benefits when in reality the injury,
11
THECOURT: Okay. Thank you. And as
11 apparently, and I suggest to you, did come from other
12 soon as the instructions are ready, we'll instruct
12 things besides what happened on October 12th of
13 1994.
13 the Jury and have closing arguments.
14
Now, for two and a half days we brought
H
(Recess).
15 out a lot of evidence. It has been IS witnesses,
15
THE COURT: Ladies and Gentlemen of the
16 almost. And it might be confusing to follow
16 Jury, at this point you have heard all the evidence.
17 everything that everyone has said So I would like
17 You will be able to take the exhibits that have been
18 to simplify this case as best I can. This case boils
18 received into evidence with you into the jury room.
19 And I am about to read you the instructions which are 19 down to credibility. The Defendant says she was
20 the law that applies to the case.
20 injured on the job on October 12th by pulling on a
21
Each of you has a set of these
21 pulley or a cord (Indicating). And she alleges, she
22 instructions sitting in front of you on the counter.
22 says that all of her injuries, all of her problems
23 You don't have to read along if you don't want to.
23 after that with her back and shoulder and neck,
|24 You don't have to look at them in the jury room if
24 stemmed from what happened at Blynco Manufacturing on
25 you don't want to. But you can study them all you
25 October 12th. And she stated that story. And I
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1 suggest to all of you that that is a falsehood. She
1 has fabricated to try to justify getting the money
I xnd the medical benefits and the prescription drugs
I , from that incident.
I.
You are going to have to decide if you
I . believe the Defendant, who has been contradicted by
I • every other witness who has come. And I suggest to
1 , you that the Defendant's credibility at this point is
I . so thin as to be invisable. She has simply lied and
1 lied and lied, trying to get the money, trying to get
1 the medical benefits and then cover up everything
1 ; else that happened which showed that her problems
I : stem from November the 14th — October the 14th,
I : being badly beaten in domestic violence and the
1 f previous problems.
1.
Let me begin sequentially, if I can.
1 • Well, pardon me, "chronologically" is the word that
1 i I'm looking for. October 12th, the Defendant has
1 i been at work for about two weeks. She claims that
1;; while pulling on a cord or a pulley, she injured
I:: herself and it jarred her shoulder badly. Please
12 remember that when she talked to the very first
1 j person who's next to her, Sharon Rowley, Sharon says,
1:; "I can't believe that happened. I can't believe
1:5 that you injured yourself like that." And Sharon
1
Page 603
1 I says to the Defendant, "Show me." And the Defendant,
1 2 as best Sharon remembers with her right hand, lowers
1 3 the blind and raises it again without any pain or
1 4 discomfort. Sharon still can't believe it, but talks
1 5 to Debbie, or Debbie Cleverly is informed, and they
1 6 have the Defendant rest. And then Debbie says, "I
1 7 was concerned about my employees. I wanted her to go
J 8 to the emergency room of St. Mark's."
19
The Defendant testified Sharon Rowley
1 '10 knew this happened because it had happened before.
J,il Well, Sharon Rowley testified that this had never
I ji2 happened before. So that's a witness that
113 contradicts the Defendant. And the Defendant says,
114 "Well, there were a couple of different words
J |15 used." "No. Pulling on a pulley or a cord and
116 injuring yourself is unusual, extremely unusual."
117 Sharon Rowley said it never happened before. So the
18 Defendant is saying Sharon Rowley is deceptive. It
19 did happen before. She knew it happened before.
20 She's covering up. Debbie Cleverly said, "I was
[ pi concerned about my employee. I wanted her to go to
122 the hospital and be checked." Well, the Defendant
23 said, "No, no, no. She wanted me to go home and
24 rest And maybe if it hurt, then afterwards go to
[25 the hospital." Well, again, there's a redefinition.
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The Defendant is changing what her supervisor is
saying, trying to make her look a little bit like she
is not so good. No. Debbie Cleverly is very, very
clear, saying, "I wanted her to go to the hospital."
When the Defendant goes to the hospital,
she is seen by Rebecca Dickinson, who says, "Minor
strain, long" — pardon me, I am not quite sure of
the name — "rhomboid muscle or trapezius muscle."
She said it was a strain. And she said, "Released to
work the next day, light duty. Do some ice. Do some
Tylenol and a couple of Lortabs tonight." You can
see the medical record yourself. No neck pain is
what's in Rebecca's Dickinson's report. It seemed to
be a minor injury, very minor, if it happened at
all. But the Workers' Compensation Fund, when they
found out about it, they begin to take responsible
actions. They began to make sure that medical
benefits were provided to the Defendant and also
monetary benefits.
When the claim form is telephoned into
Workers' Comp, one of the questions that is asked
Debbie Cleverly is: "Did you have a question about
this?" And Debbie writes a letter. And you are
going see that in Exhibit 1. She said in two weeks
that the Defendant had been on the job, repeatedly
Page 605
she called in sick, she complained, she acted like
she wanted to get out of this job. Those were the
words under oath of Debbie Cleverly. In two weeks
she only worked 59 hours. Debbie was very, very
skeptical about what happened. She said there were
11 people working in the vicinity, 11 people. None
of them saw what happened.
Based upon that I suggest there is real,
real reservations whether anything at all happened on
October the 12th.
But two days later when the - pardon
me. When the Defendant goes to St. Mark's Hospital,
she is released, walks out. She is referred to
Dr. Michael Borne. She's given a written letter with
an appointment time, his address and he's right next
door to St. Mark's Hospital. Right next door to
St. Mark's, 39th South at 13th East. The Defendant
stated she lived at 39th South and Seventh West.
It's 20 blocks away.
Two days later the Defedant is badly
beaten in a domestic violence assault, hit in the
face and jaw. And she told Dr. Steven Minnaugh she
was thrown against the wall and her upper back was
injured. That's what she told the doctor, and he
made careful notes.
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Three days after that, she does not go to
1 arrangements for her to go to the doctors. A n d I
2 think they authorized five different treatments by
: sec Dr. Michael Borne, who is just 20 blocks away
; from her house. Instead she goes all the way
3 this doctor, and they begin to pay monetary
; downtown to Dr. Seeman, who is at Eighth South and
4 benefits.
5
Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, between
•: about 650, 700 East. She goes miles out of her way
6 October the 17th and the next seven months, this
* to see a different doctor that she is not referred
7 woman gets check after check after check. It is not
• to, one who's much farther away from her house, one
8 a lot; about $286 every couple of weeks, but it is
, whom the Defense has shown has now had his license
9 enough to Tielp her get along. But the insurance
; investigated and is about to be taken for improper —
10 company believes in good faith she was hurt on the
and let me make sure I have got the exact language of
11 j o b and they were trying to help her. And on each of
: the stipulation. I think it was improper use of
12 these checks right above the signature of the
; controlled substances and medications. Why would
13 Defendant you'll see a warning cautioning her, plus
;. this Defendant go all the way to a different doctor
14 Paola testified that Workers' Comp Fund sent a
j she wasn't referred to when the first doctor is much,
15 warning to the Defendant saying, "This compensation
.5 much closer to her house? I'd like you to think
16
is only for people who are really injured on the
.5 about that question as you go through the rest of the
; evidence, Ladies and Gentlemen. Because she goes to 17 job. If you are not injured on the job, you can be
18 prosecuted for Workers' Compensation Insurance
.5 Dr. Seeman, and his records are that he — she tells
19 fraud. The Defendant told you on cross-examination
j him, T v e got headaches. I am vomiting. I've got
20
that she understood that, and she acknowledged it.
:o back pain. I have got shoulder pain caused by
21 She didn't say she got the warning, but she said she
:i October 12th pulling on the blind at Blynco," his
22 saw that warning on every check and she understood
sworn testimony, and he told it repeatedly based on
23 what it meant.
:3 notes that he kept right then. He did not know and
24
Well, Ladies and Gentlemen, going on to
:4 he was not told that she had been severely beaten in
25 the period in January: By January of '95, we are now
.5 a domestic violence incident three days earlier. She
CTATE V- ELLINGSWORTH 96-460
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1 did not tell him.
2
The very, very same day, October 17th,
3 Paola Valente contacted the Defendant, asks what has
4 happened. She doesn't tell her about the domestic
5 violence. In fact, the Defendant's account was, "I
6 didn't even talk to Paola Valente that day. I talked
7 to her at the end of October." Well, that simply is
8 not true because Paola Valente made careful notes,
9 tape-recorded the conversation, had it transcribed,
10 had it dated, October the 17th. The Defendant's
n memory is either not quite clear, or she's not
12 telling the truth. And I suggest to you that it's
13 the latter.
|i4
But on October 17th, Dr. Seeman is
15 visited the very next day — pardon me, I think it is
16 October 19th, Paola calls Dr. Borne and says, "What
17 happened, did the Defendant go to your hospital?"
18 They tell her she never showed up. October 20th,
19 Dr. Seeman calls and says, "Can you authorize this
20 treatment?" Well, Paola Valente authorized it. This
21 is an insurance company, Workers' Comp Fund, which
22 has tried to help this woman recover. The incident
23 is a little unusual. She doesn't go to the doctor
24 she is referred to, but nevertheless they accept the
25 claim, they start benefitting her by making
CARLTON WAY, CSR 801-535-5464
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three months, November, December, January, three
months after this injury, and the woman is still
being treated by Dr. Seeman. And you heard his
testimony. He would prescribe two different pain
medications at once. Why? Because he was afraid one
medication alone would not stop the pain. And the
woman, according to the reports from Dr. Seeman to
Paola Valente, complained again and again of
inability to return to work, severe pain and migraine
headaches. Those are serious things, Ladies and
Gentlemen.
By January, Paola Valente is wondering,
"What's going on? This does not seem to be that
serious an injury. Why is she getting so much
treatment? Why is she in so much pain? Why is she
unable to return to work from pulling on the cord at
work?" And she asked for the independent medical
examination.
During this time, there's also testimony
that repeated prescription drugs are being prescribed
to the Defendant And some of those bills are coming
to Workers' Compensation Fund; even two different
prescriptions by different doctors for the same drug
at the same time. And again Paola Valente is very,
very cautious.
Page 606 - Page 609
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In January, when Paola Valente - pardon
1 j 2 me, January 11th, when the independent medical
1' 3 examination is done by Dr. Chung, he too is wondering
1 j 4 what is happening. And he asked the Defendant
1! 5 carefully: "Have you had any prior medical problems
1; 6 with your back or any subsequent problems?" His
117 testimony was that the Defendant denied everything.
I 8 She said, "I never had any problems except for a knee
119 injury, except for something minor like that" —
I iio pardon me, "Something different like that." No
JH prior, no subsequent back problems. They were
1 12 shoulder problems, her neck problems.
1 13
Dr. Chung, his testimony also contradicts
1 14 the Defendant. She said, "I told everyone." Well,
1 is she didn't. You have seen and you have been able to
1 16 witness the demeanor of these people, Paola Valente,
1 17 Dr. Chung, Brett Mann. You even were able to see
1 18 Dr. Seeman. And I suspect that one of you had your
I 19 heart skip a beat at one point in his testimony when
I 20 he identified you as the Defendant. Well, it's
] 21 true. These witnesses were not able to remember the
1 22 Defendant and point her out because their treatment
1 23 happened years ago. But the doctors each kept
1 24 careful notes about what happened. Each of them have
1 25 consistently said that they heard the same thing from
I
Page 611
J I the Defendant, "I have had no other problems. No
1 2 previous, no subsequent."
13
In independent medical examinations done
J 4 by the doctors, January 11th, he reluctantly
1 5 concludes, "Well, with no other explanation, we have
1 6 to attribute Brenda's medical problems to what
1 7 happened on October 12th. Let's get her into a
1 8 work-harding program because if there is malingering
I 9 going on, she is going to be in a program eight hours
I 10 a day, five days a week. People can see that. But
J n the Defendant doesn't go.
1 12
And she testified, "Well, Dr. Seeman told
1 13 me — advised against it. And I told Paola
I 14 Valente." Well, Paola said, "No, she did not. She
1 15 just didn't show up"; again a contradiction there,
1 16
But then when the medical records are
J 17 obtained, that's when all - the avalanche of data
J 18 comes forward. And it becomes clear, very, very
J 19 clear, this Defendant has had major problems before
J 20 and after this October 12th incident.
J 21
Now, when Brett Mann interviews the
1 22 Defendant on February 27th, he asked her - and you
J 23 heard me go down through the transcript ten different
J 24 times - "Have you had any prior injuries before
J [25 October 12th? Any injury at all?" Ten different
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times the Defendant says, "No, not that I know of.
No, I have not had any prior injuries; no, no, no."
Ten times. And on cross-examination suddenly it is
"Well, I just can't remember. I can't remember
anything that happened to me because I had just
gotten out of the hospital. And I asked, "Well,
didn't he ask you if you had been in the hospital
recently?" And you heard Brett Mann testify that he
asked that specific question, "Have you been in the
hospital recently?" And the Defendant said, "No,"
twice. She said, no, she had not been hospitalized
recently. Well, today she said, "I got out of the
hospital just one or two days before, and I had been
in there for a month."
Ladies and Gentlemen, if you are in the
hospital for a month to have some major work done on
your stomach and you just get out of the hospital one
or two days earlier and you are meeting with someone
that says, "Have you been in the hospital?", I
suggest that each one of you would say, "Well, yes, I
have. I just got out. I have been in for a month."
But not the Defendant. She denied repeatedly that
she had ever been in the hospital. And I suggest
that that's part of the pattern that the Defendant
was trying to use to keep Workers' Compensation in
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the dark and keep the money coming and keep the
medical benefits coming and keep the drugs coming.
Ladies and Gentlemen, when a suspect in a
criminal case — and that's what the Defendant is
here. When she repeatedly lies, omits to tell the
insurance company and the adjusters about medical
problems when she is specifically asked about them,
when she denies previous and subsequent medical
problems which are very, very directly applicable to
what her medical claim is and when it happens so many
times that there's no mistake, that this is not an
accident, then you have an ongoing plan, you have an
ongoing pattern, you have a scheme, you have an
artifice to defraud. And the Judge has read you
definitions of a scheme or artifice.
The only way I can prove to all of you
that the Defendant formed - intentionally and
knowingly formed a scheme or artifice is to show you
her actions. And again and again and again, it is
clear that this Defendant was going to the hospital,
getting treatment for her back. And then on October
the 12th, when she pulls on a blind, she goes there
and then - pardon me. She said she injured
herself. And when she goes to the hospital, she
I
exaggerates that injury so that she receives almost
|
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S5,000 worth of benefits over the next several months
1 some ice on it and go back to work the next day,
and stays off work for four months. She actually
2 released to work, light duty and then two days later
•received$2,200 in money and in medication and about 3 you are so badly beaten that you have to be taken by
; $2,700 more she attempted to get by the treatment
4 ambulance on a stretcher with a C-collar and neck
5 rendered to her by Dr. Seeman and the other doctors
5 brace into the same emergency room and then you are
. and the bills that were being sent to Workers'
6 wheeled out on a wheelchair and you complain on
• Compensation Fund.
7 October 14th, "I've been punched ten times, I have
5
But that time they said, "Wait Now we
8 been thrown against the wall, I have got pain in my
• know what is really going on. We arc not going to
9 face, my jaw and my upper back," I suggest to you
10 that the pain after the domestic violence is going to
: pay it"
11 be worse than what happened two days ago earlier by
The law says that the amount of money,
12 pulling on the cord. But that's not what the
; the value of the goods, property, things obtained or
13 Defendant says. "The pain was less after I got
} sought to be obtained are the basis for the degree of
14 beaten up." That is simply incredible and you should
i a crime. And here we have shown beyond any doubt
15 not believe that
f that the value of the money and benefits that the
16
The Defendant then kept trying to tell
.? Defendant obtained or sought to obtain by means of
17 Brett Mann, "Well, all the previous problems I had
; these false representations, material omissions or
18 were my lower back." She said that about four times
.$ other miscommuncations was far greater than $1,000
19 during the February 27th interview. "They were all
.9 and just barely less than $5,000. It places this
20 to my lower back." And on March 3rd, a week after
:: offense squarely in the field of a Third Degree
21 that, again, shefs trying to make him think these
:i Felony.
22 previous problems were lower back because she told
2
Ladies and Gentlemen, I am also very
23 him that again and again. That's why we brought in
3 concerned and I'd point out to you that when the
24 Dr. Argyle, who treated her on January 30th and then
:4 Defendant is questioned by Brett Mann, when she
25 again on February 11th. That's why we have in
:5 finally begins saying, "Well" - she sees the
vTATE
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sheriffs report on the table. She says, "I know
what you are talking about." She then begins to
admit, and the evidence is irrefutable, "Yes, on
October 14th I got beaten up by my husband." But she
tries to minimize that. Again, this is part of the
pattern showing a scheme or artifice to defraud. The
Defendant exaggerates her injuries on October 12th,
minimizes her injuries on October 14th, and also
totally denies the injuries before then. You
remember when Brett Mann testified, "I asked this
Defendant, 'Can you quantify on a scale of one to ten
what the pain was like in your back after October
12th?'" And the answer was, she said, "On a scale of
one to ten, it was about an eight and a half."
Okay. "Did you ask her how bad the pain was on
October 14th after the domestic violence assault?"
"I did." What did she say?" "She said, 'On October
14th, the pain was about an eight/" Ladies and
Gentlemen, I suggest to you that that is simply
incredible and you should not believe that for a
moment
If you pull on a pulley or a cord at work
and you have a minor strain, if you have that at all,
you walk into the hospital, you are treated, they see
a minor strain, they release you and tell you put
CARLTON WAY, CSR 801-535-5464
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1 evidence his reports, Exhibit 15, which show upper
2 back problems, headaches, neck pain. That's why we
3 brought in Dr. Robert Gannon, who treated this woman
4 on March 16th, '94. She came into Holy Cross for
5 treatment for back pain, upper back pain. That's
6 highlighted on his report, Exhibit 16. And that's
7 why we brought in Dr. Rhonda Smith. And I think she
8 testified regarding Exhibit 17.
9
May 18th of '94, again, Defendant comes
10 into Holy Cross to be treated for upper back pain.
11 In fact, Dr. Argyle even remembered the Defendant
12 reaching over her shoulder and touching her right
13 trapezius muscle, I think he testified. Well, that
14 evidence is simply overwhelming. Three doctors
15 testified that on four times the same year that the
16 woman has been in to see them in the hospital for
17 upper back injuries. And yet when she's questioned
18 by the Workers' Comp adjuster, investigator, she says
19 again and again, "No, no. It is a different pain,
20 different part of my body. Lower back." Ladies and
21 Gentlemen, that is part of the scheme or artifice.
22 The woman is simply — call a spade a spade. She is
23 lying.
24
The Defendant says, "I was so badly under
25 the influence of medications, I can't remember what
Page 6 1 4 - P a g e 617
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happened." That simply should be held in great
1 had had previous and had subsequent injuries, his
caution and disregarded by you for this reason:
2 opinion as to the causation of her injuries changed,
Again and again when the witness testified in her own
3 and his opinion was that her injuries and her medical
behalf she can remember clearly what she said. And
4 problems stemmed from something other than October
then when the Defense Attorney tried to bring out
5 12,1994, when she pulled on this cord or pulley at
parts of this transcript that were exculpatory, "Oh,
6 Blynco. I suggest that you should weigh that
I didn't mean this and didn't intent to defraud you,"
7 opinion, that expert opinion, very, very carefully.
the Defense wants you to believe that the Defendant
8
But what happens is that when the
was very lucid. But when I tried to cross-examine
9 Defendant in this case by means of omission —
her and she says, "Well, I can't remember anything,"
10 material omissions, misrepresentations and lies gets
the Defense will have you believe that she can't
11 money and gets valuable medical benefits that she is
remember anything. Well, it doesn't work that way.
12 not entitled to, she is committing a fraud.
The woman was either lucid or she wasn't. The
13
Fraud is a crime. And I ask you, Ladies
testimony from Brett Mann was that they went over
14 and Gentleman, to put aside the request of sympathy
»this again and again ten times trying to explain to
15 that has come from the Defendant simply because the
• her what happening to see what is going on -- pardon
16 Judge has instructed that you must not let sympathy
* me, to get the truth from her about what happened,
17 play a role in your deliberations and go over the
j
Trying to wrap up, Ladies and Gentlemen:
18 elements. And I have written down here one more time
; At the end of the March 3rd, 1994, conversation by
19 for my use: If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable
; Paola, there was some things that happened that were
20 doubt that each and every element has been proven by
:: pretty revealing. I'd like you to think very
21 me on behalf of the State of Utah, then your duty is
2 carefully about these things: After all the records
22 to come back and bring a verdict of guilt to a third
:;• had been received, after the evidence is
23 degree felony, Workers' Compensation Insurance Fraud,
:* unmistakeable that two days after October 12th the
24 against the Defendant.
:: Defendant was badly beaten in a domestic violence
25
Ladies and Gentlemen, that's exactly what
,rATE V. ELLINGSWORTH 96-460
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; assault, when the evidence is beyond question that
: four times earlier that year she had been in the
3 hospital and treated for upper back pain, when the
4 Defendant has been caught in a lie after lie after
5 lie after lie after lie, then she says, "Well, can
6 you give me some more money? What about the mileage
1 money? What about the other check?" The Defendant
8 is still trying to get the money from the Workers1
9 Compensation Fund. And Brett wisely deflects that to
;0 the adjuster. Ladies and Gentlemen, I suggest that
11 that last series of comments from the Defendant
12 should reveal her motive. Motive is different from
J intent, but it can help you understand what's going
14 on in her mind. The Defendant wanted money. And I
|I5 suggest to you that she also wanted drugs. But at
;16 all points, she wanted the Workers1 Compensation
,17 Insurance Fund to pay for all this even though her
|I8 problems dealt - stemmed from much more serious and
jl9 definite things from October 12th, the
pO non-work-related injury.
|21
Finally you have the testimony of
22 Dr. Chung, Jeff Chung. He was qualified as an expert
23 in the field of physical medicine and
124 rehabilitation. His testimony was that when he got
2' 5 the follow-up records that showed that the Defendant
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I am asking you to do, bring back a verdict of quilt
in this case because we've met our burden and it is
clear for all of you to know that the Defendant
committed a crime. Ladies and Gentlemen, thank you
very much.
THE COURT: Miss Ah Ching.
MS. AH CHING: Thank you, Judge.
May it please the Court, Mr. Gardner,
Miss Ellingsworth, Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury,
it has been a long three days, so I will try and keep
it short.
To start off with, I'd like to talk about
in our criminal justice system there's certain
concepts that we regard very closely and we feel are
very important. And those concepts are so important
that throughout this trial you have been told over
and over and over again, "You have got to remember
this, you have got to remember this." One of those
concepts you were told during jury voir dire, you
were told when you were seated as a jury and you were
told again in the Jury Instructions is the concept of
presumption of innocence. In other words,
Miss Ellingsworth, Brenda, is presumed innocent until
and in fact she is proven guilty by the evidence that
the State has presented. And even today and right
*ie
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not
have
any
prior
back
problems.
And
the
records
1
asked,
"And
you
haven't
been
since
the
industrial
1
2 injury to now? The only time you have been in the
1-2 that we were in possession of at that point did show
quite
an
extensive
history
of
back
problems.
3 hospital is your recent stay?"; how did the Defendant
3
4 answer that question?
Q. All right. But why ten times did you ask
4
5
A She stated, "Yeah, and this has nothing
her?
6
to
do
with that."
A. Basically it was to give her the
7
Q. All right Did you ask the Defendant if
opportunity to explain or to tell us, you know, that
8
she'd
ever been in the hospital? And I am looking at
she did have problems, that she did have back
9 Page 3 of your transcript, "What about in the last
problems.
10
couple of years?" How did she respond to that?
Q. All right. Why did you ask her twice if
11
A. "No."
she had subsequent problems?
12
Q. All right. The middle of Page 3, did you
h A. The reason I asked her twice if she had
13 say, "Okay, have you had an injury since October the
>3 subsequent problems is because we were aware of an
14 12th of f94?" How did she respond to that second
M incident where she was assaulted after the alleged
15 question about that?
15 industrial injury, and we were trying to confirm the
16
A. "No, I haven't."
16 assault and when it occurred and just was going to
17
Q. Okay. The bottom of Page 3, you said,
!7 get the view of the Defendant.
8 Q. All right. Do you have a copy of your
18 "Okay, but you haven't had an injury?" How did she
19 respond?
I 9 transcript there with you as part of your notes that
20
A. "No."
toyou brought with you?
21
Q. Okay. Your next question: "You haven't
u A. Yes, I do.
22
been
injured in any way, shape or form since the
P
Q. Let me just ask you some questions, first
23 industrial accident?" How did the Defendant respond?
B of all: On the first page of your conversation, when
24
A. "Not to my knowledge."
4 you asked the Defendant, "Do you have any prior
25
Q. Can you turn to Page 7 of your
5 history with your shoulder or your back," what was
1STATE V. ELLINGSWORTH 96-460

6

I

f

I

Page 495
1 her response?
2
A. "No, I don't."
3
Q. All right. The very next thing you asked
4 was: "Okay, so you had no prior history before
5 October the 12th of '94?"; is that correct?
6
A. That is correct.
7
Q. What did the Defendant say?
8
A. "No, I haven't."
9
Q. All right. Your next question was: "Of
0 your shoulder or your back"; is that right?
1
A. That's correct.
2
Q. What did Brenda answer to that?
3
A. "No, I don't."
4
Q. The very next thing you asked was: "Do
5 you have any injuries since the industrial accident
* on October the 12th, 1994"; am I right?
!7
A. That is correct.
»
Q. What did the Defendant respond to that?
J9
A. "No, I don't."
to
Q. All right. The next thing you asked
|l was: "Have you been seen by a hospital other than
P your recent visit recently?" How did she answer that
P question?
M
A. "No, I haven't."
P
Q. Okay. The bottom of Page 2, when you
uARLTON WAY, CSR 801-535-5464
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1 transcript?
2
Did you ask the Defendant, between Page 3
3 and Page 7 of this transcribed interview, about the
4 domestic violence assault on October the 14th?
5
A. Yes, I did.
6
Q. How did she respond to that revelation?
7
A. On Page 7?
8
Q. No. During this interview?
9
A. During the interview, I started basically
10 asking her about her address and asked her if she had
11 lived at a particular address. And I had a copy of
12 the Sheriff's police report set in front of me at
13 that time. And then she actually kind of stopped me
14 and says, "I know what you are getting at." And then
15 we went into the industrial - or the domestic
16 violence because her report was sitting in front of
17 me at that time.
18
Q. Did the Defendant admit that she had been
19 a victim of a domestic violence assault on October
20 14th at that stage of the interview?
21
A. Yes, she did.
22
Q. All right. On Page 5 of your transcript,
23 did you ask the Defendant to reanswer your question
24 as to how many times she had been in the hospital in
25 the last year?
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